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THE 1958 TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS:
A DOCUMENTED HISTORY (U)

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PREFATORY NOTE

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PREFACE

This Memorandum is one of the products of continuing research undertaken by RAND for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) on crisis management and the control of limited war situations. It is a companion piece to the author's RM-4803-ISA, The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: An Analysis (U), Secret, published in January of 1966.

The earlier Memorandum presented the author's analysis of the 1958 situation and suggested lessons to be drawn from it for those concerned with decision-making in crises. For ease of access and use, it was published at a lower level of classification, eschewing the citation of highly sensitive source materials, and was consequently analytical rather than historical in approach.

For the close student of crisis management, however, it seemed desirable to make available the present more comprehensive and detailed account of the Taiwan Straits crisis, despite -- or perhaps even because of -- the sensitivity of the sources available to the author. This detailed history stems from the author's extensive access to government papers relating to the events of the summer and fall of 1958 in the Far East, including most particularly classified files in the Department of State and the Department of Defense. He also consulted materials at Headquarters, CINCPAC and the Taiwan Defense Command in Taipei. Additional background was obtained by interviews with most of the leading decision makers who participated in national policy formation at that time.

The Summary that follows was written expressly for publication with the present Memorandum. It has been previously published, however, as Chapter I in the author's earlier analytical study, where it was inserted to provide background to the analysis.

SUMMARY

The first sign of a possible crisis in the Taiwan Straits came on June 30, 1958, when the Chinese Communists demanded a resumption of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks. The first military action came in late July in the form of air clashes over the Taiwan Straits and the Chinese mainland. During July the Chinese Nationalists began to anticipate a Communist move against the Offshore Islands. Urging the United States to commit itself publicly to the defense of the Offshore Islands, they also sought modern equipment for their armed forces, including the delivery of American Sidewinder missiles.

While the United States refused to issue a public statement indicating that it would defend Quemoy, it did increase its military assistance to the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) and began intensive contingency planning for a crisis in the Taiwan Straits. The basic policy of the American government was that it would help defend the Offshore Islands only if necessary for the defense of Taiwan. American officials in the field, however, were authorized to assist the GRC in planning for the defense of the Islands, and assumed that nuclear weapons would be used to counter anything but very light probing by the Chinese Communists.

In early August, officials in Washington became concerned with the possibility of a crisis, although they did not expect the Chinese Communists to launch a major military attack. During that same month, a consensus developed that a high-level decision should be made as to

what the American reaction would be to an air-sea interdiction campaign against the Offshore Islands. There was also strong pressure for a diplomatic warning to the Chinese Communists that the United States would not tolerate the fall of Quemoy.

On August 22 it was decided, just below the presidential level, that the United States would participate in the defense of the Offshore Islands if they came under attack. It was agreed that, as an attempt to deter a Chinese Communist move, a public statement clarifying the American position would be issued in the form of an exchange of letters between Secretary of State Dulles and Representative Thomas Morgan.

THE CRISIS ERUPTS: THE U.S. DECISION TO INTERVENE

On August 23, 1958, at 6:30 p.m. Taiwan time, the Chinese Communists launched a heavy artillery attack against the Quemoy Islands. Although anticipated by a number of planners, the attack provoked a re-evaluation of American policy toward the Offshore Islands.

During the weekend of August 23 and 24, officials in the Pentagon and the State Department worked on position papers for a meeting to be held at the White House on the 25th. The basic position paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, like most of the subsequent papers, was prepared in the political-military section of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Urging the United States to involve itself in the defense of the Offshore Islands, this paper stated bluntly that, although initial operations might have to be conventional for political reasons,

atomic strikes against the Chinese mainland would eventually be necessary if the Chinese Communist move was to be stopped effectively and quickly. At this meeting, approval was given to the Navy paper authorizing CINCPAC to reinforce American capability and to prepare to escort supply ships to the Offshore Islands. CINCPAC was also authorized to prepare to assist in the event of a major assault against Quemoy. Aware of the problems that would arise if the Chinese Nationalists were to know the full extent of the American commitment to the Offshore Islands, Washington ordered the Taiwan Defense Commander not to inform the GRC of planned American moves.

American officials on Hawaii and Taiwan approved of Washington's decisions

At the same time, in the last week of August, American military actions in the Taiwan Straits and in the Far East in general were substantially stepped up as a means of communicating American determination to the Chinese Communists. The Chinese Nationalists, who were reacting favorably to the steps taken by the United States, continued to press for a public statement that America would regard an attack on Quemoy as an attack on Taiwan. They also asked for an American convoy to Quemoy and stand-by authority for the Taiwan Defense

Commander to participate in the defense of Quemoy in the event of an all-out Chinese Communist assault. By August 28, American officials in the field were reporting that the critical issue was the supplying of Quemoy, and attention then came to be focused on this problem.

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PROBE (August 23-31)

The Chinese Communist attack began with the firing of some 40,000 shells against the Quemoy Islands on August 23, 1958. The initial fire was directed at a ceremony welcoming the Chinese Nationalist Defense Minister to Quemoy. Following this, the Chinese Communists, by a combination of artillery fire and PT boat action, succeeded in preventing any landing of supplies until American escorted convoys began to sail on September 7. Artillery fire remained heavy during the first two weeks of the crisis and was directed mainly at incoming convoys. At the same time, a number of air engagements took place in which the Chinese Nationalists very quickly demonstrated their superiority over the Chinese Communists.

During the first two weeks of the crisis, Chinese Communist propaganda tended to play down the events in the Taiwan Straits. The People's Daily simply reported what was in fact taking place. Soviet propaganda followed the same line by denying that a major crisis was occurring. The Chinese Communists, however, did begin to beam a series of radio broadcasts at Quemoy, calling upon the garrison to surrender and warning that it was cut off and isolated.

THE U.S. DECISION TO ESCORT

Following the decision to prepare for escort and the tacit decision that the United States would defend the Offshore Islands, planning in Washington focused on moves for deterring a Chinese Communist invasion of Quemoy. The Government also began to issue a series of public statements strongly suggesting that the United States would be involved in the defense of Quemoy. Concern even came to be expressed at high-level meetings that the Chinese Nationalists might not be doing all they could to deal with the situation and might indeed be trying to pull the United States into a major war with the Chinese Communists.

A second meeting at the White House on August 29 authorized American escorts for GRC convoys to within three miles of Quemoy. This decision was immediately disclosed to the GRC, and plans were made for such conveying.

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS REASSESS THEIR STRATEGY

Intense Chinese Communist military action against the Offshore Islands began to taper off early in September. The Nationalists, increasingly confident that the United States would undertake escort operations, began to reduce substantially their efforts to resupply the Islands. At the same time, the Chinese Communists brought their artillery action to a virtual ceasefire after September 2. Chinese Communist propaganda continued to play down the crisis but did begin to report some criticism of the

American position in the West. On September 4, the Chinese Communists announced their claim to a twelve-mile limit, which would put all of the Offshore Islands within their territorial waters. On September 5, Pravda stated in an "Observer" article that the Soviet Union could not "stand idly by" if things happened "on the frontier territory of its great ally," and that an attack on the mainland would cause the Soviet Union to help the Chinese Communists. On September 6, Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai issued a public statement offering to reopen the Sino-American ambassadorial talks. The Chinese Communist People's Daily devoted most of its front page to Chou's statement and thereafter began to publicize the developing crisis. Meanwhile, the Mainland Chinese inaugurated a series of public meetings calling for the liberation of Taiwan.

THE U.S. DECISION TO DEFEND QUEMOY

American officials hoped that increased American military action in the Taiwan Straits, including the escort of GRC supply vessels to within three miles of Quemoy as well as American public statements, would alleviate the crisis by both deterring a Chinese Communist invasion and breaking the blockade. The series of American statements publicly expressing U.S. interest in keeping Quemoy out of Chinese Communist hands reached a climax after Secretary Dulles met with President Eisenhower at Newport, Rhode Island. In a formal statement, the American Government announced that the security of Taiwan had become increasingly related to the defense of Quemoy. Following this statement, Dulles held a press briefing

in which he went very far toward making clear the American determination to defend Quemoy.

While marking time in their efforts to resupply the Islands, the GRC began pressing the United States for permission to bomb the mainland and for greater American involvement in the crisis. American officials on Taiwan, urging restraint on the GRC, went forward with plans for an escorted convoy, scheduled to set sail on September 7.

On September 2, Dulles met with members of the Joint Chiefs and other top officials to formulate the basic American position in the crisis and to define American policy in the event of a Chinese Communist invasion of the Offshore Islands. At this meeting there was considerable debate on the question of to what extent Quemoy could be defended without nuclear weapons and on the more general question of the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons for deterrence. The consensus reached was that the use of nuclear weapons would ultimately be necessary for the defense of Quemoy, but that the United States should limit itself initially to using conventional forces.

The next meeting on September 3 authorized a formal paper urging the President to agree to an American defense of the Offshore Islands. At the same time, it was recognized that it was important to make unmistakably clear to the Chinese Communists that the United States was prepared to intervene in order to deter a possible Chinese Communist move. Following this, Eisenhower met with Dulles at Newport, and then the President returned to Washington for another White House consultation on the crisis. This meeting considered a paper prepared by the

Joint Chiefs on proposed American policy in the event of a Communist invasion of Quemoy.

At the White House meeting on September 6, the President authorized the Joint Chiefs to employ American conventional forces in the event of a major assault on the Offshore Islands. Nuclear weapons were to be used only with the President's permission.

THE PROLONGED BLOCKADE: COMMUNIST MOVES (September 7-October 6)

On the morning of September 7, the first U.S. escorted Chinese Nationalist convoy set out for Quemoy. The convoy beached in Lialo Bay without interference and with no Chinese Communist artillery fire. The beaching operation, however, was so inept as to lead the Taiwan Defense Command to propose a halt in convoy operations until techniques could be corrected. The Chinese Nationalists rejected this delay and, on September 8, the second convoy set out with a reduced escort. Two hours after the convoy reached the beach, the Chinese Communists opened fire with a heavy barrage that prevented the landing of any supplies. Through the month of September the Chinese Nationalists sent to Quemoy a series of American-escorted convoys that came under moderate to heavy Communist artillery fire and, until late in the month, succeeded in landing only very small quantities of supplies. Attempts were also made to land supplies by aerial drop, a technique that also improved in late September. Several air battles ensued, in which the Chinese Nationalists, using the American Sidewinder missiles, markedly outclassed the Chinese Communists and destroyed a number of MIGs.

Chinese Communist propaganda, foreign and domestic, focused on the crisis during September and early October. On September 8, Soviet Premier Khrushchev, in a letter to President Eisenhower, gave strong support to the Chinese Communist position. An attack on China, he warned, would be considered an attack on the Soviet Union and the Soviets would do everything to defend the security of both states. Khrushchev also argued that the Chinese Communist operation against the Offshore Islands was a purely internal affair. During this period the Chinese began to issue a series of warnings against American intrusion into Chinese Communist territory, a series they have continued into the present. In mid-September, Chinese Communist propaganda appeared to be aimed at minimizing the consequences of their failure to take Quemoy and, at the same time, at exacerbating US-GRC relations. On September 19, Khrushchev sent a second letter to Eisenhower warning that a world war was possible and that the Soviet Union would honor its commitments to Communist China. The letter was rejected by the American Government.

THE PROLONGED BLOCKADE: REACTION ON TAIWAN AND
IN THE FIELD

From September 7 to October 6, the GRC, with U.S. military assistance and convoy support, gradually improved its ability to land supplies on Quemoy. It also continued to press for greater United States involvement in the crisis and for permission to bomb the mainland. While GRC officials still affirmed that they would try to honor

their commitment to consult the United States before attacking the mainland, they stressed that attacks on the mainland might be necessary. Apparently the GRC was still trying to manipulate events so as to draw the United States into a greater military involvement against the Chinese Communists. U.S. officials in the field, attempting to develop an accurate picture of the resupply situation on Quemoy, sought to aid the GRC resupply effort and to demonstrate to the Chinese Communists that the United States would be involved in the defense of the Offshore Islands. In addition, military officers were engaged in crash planning for possible large-scale conventional operations in the Taiwan Straits. This contingency planning produced a bitter reaction among some officials, who felt that large-scale conventional operations were unrealistic.

THE PROLONGED BLOCKADE: PUBLIC DEBATE AND DECISION MAKING

During September, public opposition to American involvement in defense of the Offshore Islands continued to mount in the United States and abroad. American officials were aware of this opposition and felt constrained by it. The United States sought to answer its critics in a series of public statements and to warn Peking that the United States would be involved in the defense of Quemoy. In a major address on September 11, President Eisenhower indicated that Quemoy would not be permitted to fall.

There was considerable uncertainty in Washington during September as to whether or not the Communist blockade could be broken by American-escorted convoys.

During this period some attention was given to the possibility of a negotiated settlement. Proposals to demilitarize the Offshore Islands, originating in the highest office of the State Department, met with considerable skepticism from lower State Department officials and from the Navy. But American officials were generally agreed both on the need to defend the Offshore Islands in the event of assault and also on the need to explain publicly the American position. At the same time, a consensus was developing that the Chinese Nationalists were seeking to drag the United States into a major military clash and that these efforts had to be resisted.

The question of whether or not the blockade could be broken became of considerable importance in Washington decision making. By September 25, American officials had concluded that the blockade could be broken and that there was no need to pursue a diplomatic course toward a political settlement.

Following Chou En-lai's public statement on September 6 urging reopening of the Sino-American talks, the United States publicly reaffirmed its willingness, privately conveyed to the Chinese Communists prior to August 23, to resume the talks at an ambassadorial level. After some further negotiations with the Chinese Communists as well as the Chinese Nationalists, U.S. Ambassador Jacob Beam held the first of the renewed Warsaw talks with Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang on September 15. During this and subsequent meetings, the United States pressed for a ceasefire in the Taiwan Straits while the Chinese Communists demanded that the United States withdraw from the Taiwan area.

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST CEASEFIRE (October 6)

On October 6, 1958, in a radio broadcast from Peking, the Chinese Communist Defense Minister announced that there would be a one-week ceasefire if the United States ceased to escort GRC convoys. Chinese Communist military fire did in fact come to a halt. Following the ceasefire, Chinese Communist propaganda began to stress disputes between the United States and the Chinese Nationalists. On October 13, the Chinese Communists announced that they were continuing the ceasefire for another two weeks. However, on October 20, the Chinese Communists announced that they were resuming their fire because an American ship had intruded into Chinese Communist territorial waters. On October 25, they said that they were again suspending their fire. This time they declared that they would not fire on even-numbered days against airfields, beaches, and wharves if there were no American escort. This odd-even day fire pattern has continued to the present writing. Following this latest ceasefire, Chinese Communist propaganda took the line that they had never been interested in capturing only the Offshore Islands but were determined instead to capture both Taiwan and the Offshore Islands at the same time.

THE CEASEFIRE PERIOD IN WASHINGTON AND TAIPEI

The Chinese proclamation that its ceasefire would continue only so long as the United States did not escort convoys touched off debates between the United States and the GRC. The GRC urged the United States to escort

convoys during the initial ceasefire period going in on the odd days, but the United States refused on the grounds that there was no military necessity for convoys. Dulles then began to press for a reduction in the Chinese Nationalist garrison on Quemoy in order to give the impression that the United States had gone about as far as it could in pursuing a policy opposed by its allies and by the American public. On October 21, Dulles arrived on Taiwan. In a series of meetings with Chiang Kai-shek, he pressed Chiang for a public statement renouncing the use of force in any attempt to return to the mainland and succeeded in getting GRC acceptance to a communiqué stating this point. It was also agreed that there would be a limited reduction of the garrison on Quemoy in return for increased U.S. military fire power on the Islands.

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CHAPTER I: THE TAIWAN STRAITS HEAT UP

Prior to July 1958 the Taiwan Straits had gone through a period of relative quiet since the last Chinese Communist probe against the Offshore Islands in 1954-55.* Periodic artillery fire had been exchanged between the two sides but at very low levels and most of it consisted of shells packed with propaganda rather than high explosives. In addition, the two sides exchanged loud speaker broadcasts across the narrow straits between Quemoy and the mainland, a scant six miles. In July 1958 signs were detected of increased Chinese Communist activity in Fukien Province opposite Taiwan. Awareness of these actions by the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) led to increased activity by the Nationalists. The U. S. Government in turn took steps to meet the increased Chinese Communist activity. By early August some United States and GRC officials concluded that a new crisis was about to break in the Taiwan Straits.

*Classified material on the 1954-55 crisis was not examined. For a brief description of the events, see Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, Harper and Row for the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, 1954, pp. 264-66; 1955, pp. 88-99. See also Tang Tsou, The Embroilment Over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang and Dulles, University of Utah, Institute of International Studies, 1959, pp. 7-9.

THE MILITARY BALANCE

Assessments of the military balance in the Taiwan Straits and the Far East and of the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union made by American officials both before and after the crisis suggested that the Chinese Communists had superiority in a clash limited to Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist forces only and aimed at an interdiction of or assault against Quemoy or Matsu. United States intervention would certainly assure the defense of Taiwan and would enable the holding of Quemoy against a blockade attempt and against an invasion but, in the view of most American officials, only with the use of nuclear weapons. During the crisis there were qualitative and quantitative improvements in both GRC and American forces in the Taiwan Straits area but these augmentations did not change the basic assessment of relative strength.

Chinese Communist Forces

In August 1958 the Chinese Communists were estimated to have approximately 894,000 men under arms organized into twelve armies. Three of these armies of 46,000 men each were in Fukien Province opposite Taiwan, and 80,000 troops, including one artillery division and two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, were believed to be within fifty miles

of the mainland coast three miles across the Straits from Quemoy.¹

A special national intelligence estimate (SNIE) in August 1958 estimated that Chinese Communist troop movements could take place rapidly and probably without detection. It was estimated that the Chinese Communists would be able to obtain a three to one superiority for an amphibious assault and could be expected to mass approximately 200,000 troops before attempting an attack on Quemoy. Such forces were estimated to be capable of successful assault operation provided the Chinese Communists also had air and naval superiority. It was estimated that by using all of their small landing craft capability, the Chinese Communists could lift three rifle divisions for assault on Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Air Force was estimated to have a good air defense and tactical support capability and a good early-warning system and could prevail over the Chinese Nationalist Air Force in any attempt to capture Taiwan.² The estimated size of Chinese Communist air and naval forces as of August 1958 is indicated in Table 1.

For possible use in a blockade effort as well as support of an invasion, the Chinese Communists had approximately 393 artillery pieces in the Quemoy area, including

thirty-six 150-mm howitzers. The guns were in place around Amoy Harbor on the mainland, on Amoy, and on two small Chinese Communist controlled islands in an arc of 240 degrees from Quemoy. Most of the gun positions were not covered in any way but there was ample room to move and replace the batteries and each could be fired from several alternative positions. The artillery was reported to be able to hit all of the Quemoy Islands except for a small part of Big Quemoy. Though the Chinese Communists had begun to manufacture many kinds of artillery, it was estimated that production was still relatively low and that therefore most of the pieces in the Quemoy area had been made in the Soviet Union. The ammunition itself was manufactured by the Chinese Communists.³ The Chinese Navy was believed to have extensive offensive and defensive mining capability, and the SNIE estimated that with some strengthening of the deployment of units currently assigned to the fleet, the Chinese Communists could effectively interdict supply landings to the Offshore Islands.⁴

Chinese Nationalist Forces

The Chinese Nationalist Army in August 1958 consisted of approximately 450,000 men of whom 320,000 were of combat capability. Approximately one-third of these troops were

Table 1

CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR AND NAVAL FORCES

Chinese Communist Navy

Destroyers	4
Submarines	16
Escort Vessels.	4
Patrol Boats	249
Mine Sweepers	31
Landing Craft	53
Other Surface Crafts.	300
Total	657

Chinese Communist Air Force

Jet Fighters.	1785
Piston Fighters	275
Jet Light Bombers	450
Piston Tactical Attack Aircraft . .	505
Land-based ASW Planes	20
Piston Medium Bombers	20
Piston Transports	260
Other Jets.	225
Other Piston Airplanes.	810
Total	4350

SOURCE: Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum, Memorandum to the Intelligence Advisory Committee, Subject: Special National Intelligence Estimate 100-9-58 ("Probable Developments in the Taiwan Straits Area") transmitting proposed Annex, "Chinese Communist and Chinese Nationalists Military Strengths and Capabilities in the Taiwan Straits Area," August 22, 1958 (Secret). Later issued as part of Annex A to SNIE 100-9-58.

on the Offshore Islands, with 86,000 troops on Quemoy and 23,000 in the Matsu group. The break down of forces on the Quemoy Islands is indicated in Table 2. The troops on the Offshore Islands were believed to be equipped with approximately thirty days of supplies and forty days of ammunition. The Chinese Nationalists had 308 artillery pieces in place on Quemoy, though only 56 of these were considered capable of effective counter battery fire.⁵

The Chinese Nationalist Navy was estimated to be primarily defensive but capable of lifting one division to the Offshore Islands in order to bolster their defense. It was believed unable to oppose successfully the Chinese Communist PT boat and submarine force, which could operate in the Taiwan Straits area. There was reported to be virtually a complete lack of coordination between the Navy and the Chinese Nationalist Air Force which, as indicated, was believed to be significantly inferior to the Chinese Communist Air Forces. The air force was reported to have a photo-reconnaissance capability within 750 miles of Taiwan and a limited night reconnaissance capability of up to 1000 miles. Reconnaissance missions were regularly flown over the mainland. Virtually all of the Chinese Nationalist military equipment was of American origin and had been

Table 2
CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCE DEPLOYMENT ON QUEMOY ISLANDS
(August 1958)

Island Forces

Big Quemoy	74,100
Little Quemoy	10,450
Ta-tan	1,300
Erh-tan	250

SOURCE: Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum, Memorandum to the Intelligence Advisory Committee, Subject: Special National Intelligence Estimate 100-9-58 ("Probable Developments in the Taiwan Straits Area"), Annex A, "Chinese Communist and Chinese Nationalists Military Strengths and Capabilities in the Taiwan Straits Area," August 22, 1958 (Secret).

supplied under the American Military Assistance Program. The strength of the Chinese Nationalist Navy and Air Force is indicated in Table 3.

Although the Chinese Communists were later to claim that the cause of the crisis was the build-up of Chinese Nationalist troops on Quemoy, there is nothing to suggest that this was in fact a very likely or very important part of the Chinese Communist motivation. Although a significant movement of troops prior to the crisis did take place between July 2 and July 13, 1958, when the 58th Chinese Nationalist Division replaced the 32nd Division on Quemoy,⁶ the only major increase in forces on Quemoy had occurred in October 1956 when the garrison was increased from 79,000 to 85,000 men. Very little military activity of consequence appears to have been carried out from the Offshore Islands. There had been a few attempts at penetration from the Islands but none had been successful. No overflights were staged from the Islands and the blockade of Amoy Harbor had been lifted by the Chinese Nationalists in July of 1957. Artillery fire from the Island was at a very low level and consisted mainly of propaganda shells augmented by the use of loudspeakers.⁷ The range of activity is indicated in Table 4, and the pattern of artillery fire in Table 5.

Table 3

CHINESE NATIONALIST AIR AND NAVAL FORCES

Chinese Nationalist Navy

Destroyers	4
Escorts.	5
Patrol Escorts	7
Mine Sweepers.	9
Miscellaneous.	110

Chinese Nationalist Air Force

Jet Fighters	450
Jet Bombers.	1
Piston Tactical Attack Planes.	9
Land-based ASW Planes.	10
Piston Transports.	143
Other Jets	46
Other Piston Planes.	167

Total Planes. 826

SOURCE: Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum, Memorandum to the Intelligence Advisory Committee, Subject: Special National Intelligence Estimate 100-9-58 ("Probable Developments in the Taiwan Straits Area"), Annex A, "Chinese Communist and Chinese Nationalists Military Strengths and Capabilities in the Taiwan Straits Area," August 22, 1958 (Secret).

Table 4

CHINESE NATIONALIST ACTIVITY FROM THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS

Prior to August 1958

Activity	Comments
Commando-type raids	During the preceding year the GRC probed the nearby mainland from both Quemoy and Matsu with small scout raiding operations of extremely shallow penetration. The largest raid, which took place on October 2, 1957, involved a party of 28 men which withdrew almost immediately after drawing machine-gun fire. The GRC forces demonstrated an ability to land larger numbers of men on the mainland by holding training exercises under Chinese Communist observation and using clearly interceptable communications.
Infiltration	The Islands of Matsu were used extensively by several GRC intelligence groups to infiltrate agents to the mainland. In July 1958, for example, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) put 150 agents in from Matsu. Quemoy was used much less extensively for this purpose. Generally, the infiltration was not successful, the agents either immediately surrendering or being captured.
Overflights	No overflights were ever staged from the Offshore Islands. The small planes which landed at the single Quemoy airfield did sometimes fly in close for observation but never penetrated over

Table 4 -- continued

	<p>the mainland. There is no air-field on the Matsu Islands.</p>
Loud speaker propaganda	<p>The GRC operated four loud-speaker stations on Quemoy and one on Matsu. Wind prevented their use one-half of the year and limited their effectiveness for the rest of the year. Average broadcasts of three or four hours were carried one or two days every week and consisted half of music and half of propaganda. The propaganda was aimed at countering the Chinese Communist propaganda directed at the Offshore Islands. It often appeared to be operating simply to keep the troops on Quemoy from hearing the Chinese Communist propaganda.</p>
Port blockade	<p>GRC artillery on Quemoy could interfere with foreign shipping entering the Amoy harbor but had not done so since July 1957. Any Chinese Communist merchant ships passing within range were fired upon. The guns on Matsu did not command the entrance to any important port.</p>
Artillery fire	<p>There was relatively less fire by the GRC in the year preceding August 1958 than in previous periods. The GRC did not fire at all from the Offshore Islands in August. During 1958, prior to the crisis, the GRC had fired 3,174 rounds from Quemoy. Two thousand of these were fired at the Ta-teng causeway and the rest were fired against the</p>

Tabl 4 -- continued

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Table 4 -- continued

mainland. Two-thirds of the shells were propaganda rather than explosives (HE). (Table 5 shows the pattern of fire during the first six months of 1956-58.)

Mining operations

There was no mining around Quemoy or Matsu. The GRC had plans to lay defensive mines to the west and north of Quemoy, but this would have required United States concurrence because the Navy Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) held the necessary explosive mechanisms.

SOURCE: State Department Telegram from Taipei, No. 357, September 10, 1958 (Secret).

Table 5

ARTILLERY EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS AND THE MAINLAND

1st 6 Mos. of Year	Total No. Artillery Exchanges	Exchanges Totaling more than 100 Rounds	Nationalist Initiated Exchanges	Communist Initiated Exchanges	Days on which only Nationalists Fired	Days on which only Communists Fired
1956	266	51	240	26	71	6
1957	288	33	262	28	52	4
1958	255	7	250	5	54	2

American Pacific Military Forces

As indicated above, in a Chinese Communist-Chinese Nationalist clash, the Chinese Communists were considered to have the capability both of establishing air and naval superiority in the Taiwan Straits and of capturing the Offshore Islands, provided they were willing to accept the large casualties that would be involved. The unknown, as far as the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists as well as the American military forces in the area were concerned, was what role American military forces would in fact be prepared to play. It was clear that if the total American military power in the area, including its atomic capability, were thrown into the balance, Quemoy could be held, but the consensus appeared to be that the United States simply did not have the conventional capability to hold Quemoy against a determined Chinese Communist attack.

On August 23 there were 144 atomic capable aircraft and missiles in positions which could support Taiwan. Sixteen of these were Naval aircraft aboard the U.S.S. Hancock. The Air Force capability was as follows: F100's, 87; B57's, 16; PM61's, 20; B47's, 5; for a total of 128. The Johnson Island B57 Squadron was on alert.⁸

United States conventional capability in the areas was as follows: The Pacific Air Force had the following units

capable of non nuclear operations: 1 F-100 Squadron at Clark Air Force Base, 2 F-100 Squadrons at Kadena, 1 F-100 Squadron at Chia-ti and 1 B57 Squadron at Naha. These units were reported to have POL, spare parts and high explosive (HE) weapons which could be employed while still maintaining a substantial part of their general war capability. In addition, the Pacific Fleet was reported to have four aircraft carriers with sufficient ammunition for 80,000 rounds per day for sixty days. The Chinese Nationalists operating in conjunction with American forces were reported to be capable of 650 sorties per day, delivering 1,300 bombs for only fifteen days.⁹

At the time of the outbreak of the crisis, the Taiwan Defense Command (TDC) had authorization from the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) to plan with the GRC to defend Taiwan and the Penghus, including planning for United States participation in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu if and when this might be ordered by higher U. S. authority.

The Strategic Balance

In the summer of 1958 American strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union was very great, possibly as great as it would ever be in the postwar period. This superiority was apparently recognized by top American

officials. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in a background press conference on September 17, pointed out to a reporter that by military estimate the United States was relatively stronger than the Soviet Union than it had been in the recent past and than it was likely to be in the future. He noted that the Soviets had tried to jump the gap between the heavy bomber and the missile period and that at that time they had neither many heavy bombers nor any missiles in production or in place. He declared:

The fact of the matter is the military estimate of the situation is that we are relatively stronger today than the Soviet Union than we have been perhaps in recent years and that we may be in the future. Because they have apparently tried to jump the gap between the heavy bomber period and the missile period, they do not have many heavy bombers and they do not have missiles in actual production and in place. So that actually I think the military situation is quite favorable in that respect at the moment.¹⁰

This view was shared by other top officials.¹¹ The Soviet leadership was also undoubtedly aware of its great strategic inferiority at the time, though it is by no means clear to what extent they had given the Chinese Communist leadership an accurate picture of the situation. The Soviets, according to Air Force Intelligence (AFCIN) estimates, had no surface-to-surface long-range missile capability in the

summer of 1958. Their bomber capability is shown in Table 7.

CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

The first sign of possible renewed Chinese Communist activity in the Taiwan Straits came on June 30 when the Chinese Communists issued a statement on the Sino-American ambassadorial talks. This statement noted that the talks had been in recess since December 1957 when the United States had proposed reducing them to the level below that of the ambassadorial rank at which they had previously been held.¹² After reviewing the events leading up to the adjournment of the talks, the statement concluded:

The Chinese Government hereby declares once again that it can neither agree to the unilateral changing of the level of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks, nor can it agree to the continued suspension of the talks on any administrative pretext. The Chinese Government demands that the United States Government designate a representative of ambassadorial rank and resume the talks within fifteen days counting from today; otherwise, the Chinese Government cannot but consider that the United States has decided to break off the Sino-American ambassadorial talks.¹³

It is not clear whether the Chinese Communist leadership, when it issued this statement on June 30, had already decided to launch a heavy artillery barrage against Quemoy,

Table 6
AMERICAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
Summer 1958

Ready Strategic Bombers

B-36.	45
B-52.	294
B-47.	1,052
Total. . .	1,391

Ready Tactical Bombers

B-57.	78
B-66.	44
Total. . .	122

Ready Air Refueling Capability

KC-97	646
KC-135.	106
Total. . .	752

SOURCE: U. S. Air Force, Statistical Digest Fiscal Year 1959 (14th edition), prepared by Directorate of Statistical Services, Comptroller of the Air Force.

Table 7

SOVIET BOMBER CAPABILITY

Summer 1958

Bulls (piston engine B-29 copy)	445
Badgers (medium range)	920
Bears (intercontinental turboprop)	68
Bison (intercontinental jets)	85
Total	1,518

SOURCE: AFCIN estimates.

as they did on August 23. The Chinese had probably decided to activate the airfields opposite Taiwan, and they might have felt that the resumption of the Sino-American talks would make it less likely that the United States would sanction GRC bombing of the bases. Peking was concerned, however, by the increasing tendency towards a tacit adoption of a two-China policy by the American Government and by other nations.

During the first weeks of July there was no perceptible increase in military activity. Chinese Communist artillery fire against the Offshore Islands continued at the normal level. For example, in the period July 9 to July 16 the Chinese fired 91 propaganda rounds and 108 high explosive rounds against the Offshore Islands.¹⁴

On July 14 the Iraqi coup took place with a suddenness that certainly surprised the Chinese Communist leadership as much as it did the West. On July 17 the People's Daily announced recognition by the People's Republic of China of the new Iraqi regime.* The People's Daily of the

*I am greatly indebted to Professor Tang Tsou of the University of Chicago for the references to Chinese language materials drawn from his own research on Communist China and the Offshore Islands. I have also benefitted greatly from several conversations with Professor Tsou about Chinese Communist strategy during the 1958 crisis.

17th also announced the opening of a "Get Out of the Middle East" campaign and the beginning of a series of rallies on this behalf.¹⁵ On the following day, the People's Daily began to link the "Get Out of the Middle East" campaign with a "Liberate Taiwan" campaign. However, the "Get Out of the Middle East" theme continued to get major attention. On July 17 a rally was held in Peking protesting U. S. intervention in Lebanon. The major address was given by Peng Chen, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Mayor of Peking. In this speech Peng declared:

[The Chinese People] have proved to the whole world that the U. S. imperialists...are not be feared. They are only a "paper tiger," outwardly strong but internally weak. It is entirely possible to defeat their aggression and provocation.

In our war of liberation the U. S. also dispatched many troops to China to carry out armed threats. But confronted with the united and powerful Chinese people who persisted in fighting, the U. S. forces ended up by sneaking out of the Chinese mainland....At present the U. S. imperialists still occupy by force our territory of Taiwan. We Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan and have full confidence that we will achieve this. The U. S. forces must get out of the territory of Taiwan! We firmly believe that the people with justice on their side will triumph in the end with the east wind prevailing over the west wind, the imperialists

are all the more definitely doomed
to failure.¹⁶

There was no mention in this period in the Chinese Communist press of the effort which Chinese Communist leadership was then making to get the Soviet Union to send troops to the Middle East.¹⁷

On July 25 the People's Daily provided its readers with the first hint of an impending crisis by reporting that President of the Republic of China Chiang Kai-shek on July 17 had cancelled all military leaves on Taiwan.* The article also reported that American planes had intruded over the mainland and dropped propaganda leaflets and that there were a number of military meetings going on in Taiwan.¹⁹

On July 26 the People's Daily announced that a major military conference had been held in China between May 27 and July 22 with more than one thousand senior officials in attendance. It reported that Chairman of the People's Republic of China Mao Tse-tung and other leaders had spoken. The article gave no indication as to what had been considered. It is still not known what was discussed at this meeting. If a military movement against the Offshore Islands was discussed, it would suggest that the move that

*Leaves were in fact cancelled on Taiwan.¹⁸

did come had in fact been planned prior to the Iraqi coup and was thus not triggered by it. On the other hand, there are at least two other subjects that might have been and were almost certainly discussed at this meeting, possibly to the exclusion of any discussion of the impending Offshore Island operation. August was to see the announcement by the Chinese Communist Government of the campaign to put every Chinese into the militia, and it is likely that this was discussed in great detail at the meeting.²⁰ In addition, ever since the launching of the Soviet Sputnik and the announcement by the Soviets of an ability to develop an intercontinental missile capability in late 1957 the Chinese had been arguing that the East Wind prevailed over the West Wind and hence it should be possible to take more vigorous action, including military action, to expand Communist influence throughout the world.²¹ It is almost certain that the implications of these two subjects for the future orientation of the Chinese Communist Army were discussed. It seems difficult to believe that in this context there would be no consideration of the possibility of a move against the Offshore Islands. Most likely it was at this conference that the decision was ratified to take advantage of the changing balance of world forces by making

some kind of move toward the liquidation of the Chiang Kai-shek regime.

On July 26 the Chinese Communists concluded a follow-up to the larger military conference with a meeting of representatives of the East Sea Fleet. The meeting honored a naval officer who had sunk a Chinese Nationalist destroyer in 1954, and various suggestions were made as to how to liberate Taiwan.²²

On July 29 the first military engagement of the crisis took place in the form of an air battle over the Taiwan Straits. Four GRC F-84 jets on a routine patrol mission in the vicinity of the Chinese Communist port of Swatow were attacked by four Chinese Communist MIG-17's. Two of the F-84's, which were on a photo-reconnaissance mission, were shot down by the Chinese Communist planes.²³

The Khrushchev Visit to Peking

On July 31 Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev arrived unannounced in Peking. There was no mention of Khrushchev's visit to Peking in the Chinese Communist press until a communiqué was issued on August 3 at the conclusion of his visit.

By the time Khrushchev arrived on the 31st, the "Get Out of the Middle East" campaign had reached the provinces

far beyond Peking, indicating that it was nearing its end. On the day of Khrushchev's arrival, a major speech was made by the Mayor of Peking and reported prominently in the People's Daily. The speech included both the Middle East and the Liberation of Taiwan themes.²⁴ On August 1, the rallies honoring the People's Liberation Army (PLA) anniversary put the "Liberation of Taiwan" theme ahead of the Middle East campaign, and rallies of this kind were held throughout the country including Manchuria and Shanghai.²⁵ On August 4, the People's Daily published the communiqué of the Khrushchev-Mao talks. The communiqué was notable mainly for its failure to mention Taiwan and for its lack of substantive content. On the same day the People's Daily reported that rallies were being held throughout the country supporting the communiqué.²⁶

There is still no reliable information as to what took place at meetings between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung. Speculation at the time centered on the possibility that the meeting had been called at the urging of the Chinese Communists in face of the proposal by Khrushchev that the Security Council meet to discuss the Middle East crisis. However, the crisis in the Middle East had abated by then and it seems unlikely that the meeting was largely devoted

to this question. Insofar as the Middle East situation was raised, Mao might well have accused Khrushchev of not taking a strong enough stand against the United States. Mao undoubtedly argued that with the changing balance of forces in the world, the Sino-Soviet bloc should take more vigorous stands in thwarting imperialism in various areas of the world:

It must have been clear to Khrushchev by that time, even if he had not been informed by the Chinese Communists, that they were planning some kind of military operations vis-à-vis the Chinese Nationalist regime. It seems likely, particularly because the defense ministers of both countries were present, that the impending Chinese Communist move was discussed by Mao and Khrushchev at their meeting. Whether or not Khrushchev and Mao agreed on the desirability of a Chinese probe against the Offshore Islands remains a matter of speculation and controversy.* Mao probably explained to Khrushchev, perhaps in some detail, the proposed Chinese Communist strategy in relation to the Offshore Islands and requested the kind of Soviet support which he felt would improve the chances of success for the Chinese military

*The more general issue of the extent of Sino-Soviet cooperation and disagreement during the Quemoy Crisis is discussed below.

move. In view of Khrushchev's unwillingness to take any action in the Middle East while at the same time he was agreeing that there had been at least some change in the international balance of power it is extremely unlikely that he would have vigorously opposed the Chinese plan to probe the American position in the Taiwan Straits. Khrushchev may well have cautioned that the Soviet Union was not in a position to support any offensive operations by the Chinese Communists, but it is also doubtful whether Mao would have requested such aid. The major issue discussed between the two Communist leaders would appear to be the timing and nature of a statement by Khrushchev or the Soviet Government in support of the Chinese Communists and aimed at deterring an American attack on China. Whether Mao asked for but did not receive a promise by Khrushchev to issue that statement prior to or during the opening days of the Chinese probe is not clear, but it does seem likely that there were at least tentative arrangements for the statement in the form of a letter to Eisenhower which Khrushchev did issue on September 7.

In the period prior to August 23 the Soviets made only a few references to the Taiwan Straits. On August 7 the Soviet newspaper Sovetsky Flot reported that the United

States and the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan were planning to invade the Chinese mainland and that American forces in the Pacific were being alerted for the operation.

A week later, in a move the meaning and intention of which is still not clear, American Ambassador to Moscow Llewellyn Thompson was told by a Soviet official that the United States and the Soviet Union must tackle and resolve the Taiwan problem sooner or later because the present situation could not go on indefinitely. The Soviets, he was told, understood American policy and thought there was a real chance of working out a solution. Thompson's comment on the exchange was that in view of Khrushchev's recent visit to Peking this probably represented more than a casual remark, though he was not able to indicate what its significance might be.²⁷ At the same time, there were reports circulated in East Europe, apparently inspired by the Chinese, that the Soviets had promised to give nuclear weapons to the Chinese.²⁸

On August 19, the Soviets gave the Chinese their first and apparently only indication of public support prior to August 23. In a Soviet commentary, broadcast only in Mandarin, the Chinese were assured that they were not isolated because the "USSR and the socialist countries stand side

by side with People's China." The broadcast warned Washington against undertaking risks.²⁹

Chinese Communist military and political activity continued at a high level following the Khrushchev-Mao meeting. On August 2 the Chinese Communist occupation of an airfield opposite Taiwan was confirmed, when aerial photographs thirty-six MIG aircraft on an airfield in Swatow. Confirmation of Chinese occupation of a second field came on August 5, of a third on August 13 and a fourth on August 18.³⁰ By August 22 there were reported to be 173 aircraft on these fields.³¹ The first overflights of the Offshore Islands since 1955 were reported in the first week of August.

On August 7 a second air battle took place when a Chinese Nationalist air-reconnaissance mission encountered Communist MIGs from the newly activated airfields. The encounter was reported by both the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists. The Communists claimed that the battle took place over Fukien Province and the Nationalists reported that it took place over the Taiwan Straits. The precise location of the planes during their encounter is impossible to determine. This was a Chinese Nationalist reconnaissance operation over the mainland, which was intercepted by the

Chinese Communists with planes from their newly activated airfields. The GRC reported that there were no losses on either side, but the Chinese Communists claimed that one GRC plane had been downed. The GRC Defense Ministry announced that there were now Chinese Communist MIG-17's at four airfields opposite Taiwan and warned the people of Taiwan to prepare for Chinese Communist air strikes.³² During the following week a number of air battles took place both over the Taiwan Straits and over the mainland area directly opposite Taiwan. The last air battle prior to the outbreak of heavy artillery firing occurred on August 14, when in a major air engagement near Foochow, two Communist jets and one GRC jet fighter were destroyed.³³ The last shelling of Quemoy prior to the period of heavy firing took place on August 18, when approximately 100 rounds were fired.³⁴

On August 9, 12, and August 18 the Chinese Communists also engaged in overflights of Quemoy.³⁵ On the 8th, 4 MIG's circled over Matsu³⁶ and on the 16th there was a Chinese Communist overflight of Matsu by thirty-four aircraft.³⁷

On August 13 the People's Daily reported that a demonstration had been held in Amoy against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek because they were creating a tense

situation in the Taiwan Straits by their military build-up. The major theme of the demonstration was the "Support the Liberation of Taiwan" campaign, although mention was still made of the Middle East situation.

In the week preceding the outbreak of intensive artillery fire there were no reported air engagements between the Nationalists and the Communists, or any shelling of the Offshore Islands or overflights of Quemoy and Matsu by the Chinese Communists. It was reported later in the People's Daily that during the period August 17 through August 30 (which included the first week of the shelling) an enlarged conference of the Chinese Communist Politburo was being held which discussed the formation of the communes and to a lesser extent the creation of the militia.³⁸

The absence of military activity in the week preceding August 23 was matched by a reduction, if not elimination, of discussion of the liberation of Taiwan in the main Chinese Communist news media. It was mainly in broadcasts to foreign countries that the "Liberate Taiwan" theme was pursued. Thus, for example, in a broadcast in Spanish from Peking on August 19, it was reported that the people of China were determined "to expel the Yankee invaders from Taiwan, and to unify all Chinese territory. They have

enough strength to do it." The Liberation Army Daily of August 21 in commenting on the arrival of an American warship in Singapore noted that this act was "closely related to the recent U. S. moves to create tension in the Taiwan area." The article declared that the United States had recently moved new weapons into Taiwan and stressed that "the Chinese People's Liberation Army has the great and glorious task of liberating Taiwan, defending China, and safeguarding world peace."

There was thus a week of relative calm before the crisis was to break out into active military action against the Quemoy Islands. This was also a period in which, as we shall see, the Chinese Nationalists, American officials in the field, and at least the lower levels of policy-making in Washington were becoming more and more convinced that a renewed campaign against the Offshore Islands was about to take place.

THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS ANTICIPATE A CRISIS

Ever since they had used Quemoy as a staging base for their retreat to Taiwan and had beaten back a Chinese Communist attempt to capture Quemoy in 1949, the islands of Quemoy and Matsu had become more and more important to the Chinese Nationalists as a symbol of their determination to

return to the mainland. In 1954 when the Chinese Nationalists, under U. S. pressure, agreed to abandon the Tachens, they heavily refortified the islands of Quemoy and Matsu and apparently were convinced that the United States Government had committed itself to the defense of the Offshore Islands now under the control of the Chinese Nationalists.

As a result of increased Chinese Communist military activity opposite Taiwan during July (discussed above), the Chinese Nationalists began to fear a possible military move in the Taiwan Straits.* On July 17 Nationalist Premier Chen Cheng told a group of GRC legislators that the Nationalists were prepared to meet any contingency in Taiwan which might stem from the Middle East crisis. He stated that there was a real possibility of a military move by the Chinese Communists.⁴¹ On July 30, GRC officials expressed their concern to American Embassy and military officials that a crisis was developing in the Straits.⁴²

On August 3, a GRC Defense Ministry spokesman publicly stated that the Soviet Union would force the Chinese Communists to start a war in Taiwan while attention continued

*During July and August the GRC continued to fly its routine reconnaissance missions over the coastal areas of mainland China opposite Taiwan. For example, in the period from July 16 to 22, ten such missions were flown with no

to be focused on the Middle East. He said that the most likely form of military action was an invasion of Matsu and Quemoy.⁴³

GRC President Chiang Kai-shek on August 4 called in American Ambassador to the Republic of China Everett F. Drumright and Admiral Roland N. Smoot, who was head of the recently created Taiwan Defense Command (TDC), for the first of what was to become a series of meetings concerning the crisis in the Taiwan Straits. At this meeting Chiang stated that the Khrushchev-Mao talks, which had just been concluded, were the most important event in the Far East in the past ten years, and he predicted that the Chinese Communists might now take military action against Taiwan. He told the American representatives that the Chinese Communists were transferring large contingents of their Air Force to South China and stressed that their military action would probably not be limited to the Offshore Islands. Chiang's interpretation was that the Soviet Union was trying to get the Chinese Communists to make a diversionary move and that the Chinese would be ready to make one. He

military activity reported.³⁹ The GRC averaged 235 overflights per month for visual and photo-reconnaissance as well as air defense. Some of the flights penetrated as far as 2300 miles.⁴⁰

Beginning the next day GRC officials sought to get the American Government of (sic) issue a public statement that

Table 8 -- continued

SOURCE: Memorandum from Commander in Chief Pacific (Signed Felix B. Stump); To: COMTAIWANDEFCON (U. S.), Subject: "Responsibility for planning, combat training, and policy advice to the government of the Republic of China," CINCPAC 5, SER. 000111, January 10, 1958, attached to Memorandum From: Chief of Naval Operations, To: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: "Chinese Nationalist Military Operations requiring and those not requiring U. S. endorsement (C)," SER. 0002222 T61, August 23, 1958 [a note was attached to the document indicating that the CINCPAC letter from Stump to the TDC constituted a consolidation of directors previously issued to the TDC] (Top Secret).

it would defend Quemoy. This effort was continued up to and beyond the outbreak of the crisis and led to the Dulles-Morgan exchange of letters* and later to the Dulles Newport statement.** Suspecting that they might be turned down on their request, the Nationalists made their first move unofficially and through military channels. The Chinese Nationalist Defense Minister, Yu Ta-wei, approached Admiral Smoot on August 5 to request that U. S. President Dwight Eisenhower issue a public statement that an attack on Quemoy or Matsu was a threat to Taiwan. Smoot informed Yu that as a political matter the request should go through the American Ambassador, who had not yet been approached. On August 7, apparently after taking Smoot's comments and other informal soundings to mean that the United States was not prepared to issue such a statement, the GRC Foreign Minister, George K. C. Yeh, formally approached Ambassador Drumright and told him that an American statement generally worded to the effect that "a Communist attack on the Off-shore Islands would be disturbing to the peace of Asia" would be in order and would be highly useful.⁴⁶

*See below, pp.

**See below, pp. 229-236.

On August 6 the GRC proclaimed a state of emergency on Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the Offshore Islands. Leave in the Civil Air Defense and police units in Taiwan had been cancelled. Non-combat visitors were ordered evacuated from the Offshore Islands and an air-raid alert was held on Matsu.⁴⁷ On the next day the GRC doubled combat air patrols and put its entire Navy on two-hour notice.⁴⁸

On August 12 a Central Intelligence Agency report, based on information from officials on Quemoy as well as Taiwan, indicated that the GRC expected a squeeze on the Offshore Islands and had made a strong private bid for a public U. S. declaration of support. GRC officials were reported to believe that the United States would be drawn into the defense of the Islands in the end and that a public declaration was most likely to prevent an attack.⁴⁹ Another effort to obtain a U. S. statement of support was made on the following day when the GRC Minister of National Defense told Admiral Smoot that he expected the Chinese Communists to continue their actions following the activation of the airfields in the following phases: (1) winning air control, (2) bombing GRC supply vessels, (3) assault on the weakest Offshore Islands, and (4) an attack on all the Offshore Islands. Yu concluded his analysis by

asking for a public statement that the United States would defend the Islands. His request was reported by Smoot to Drumright, who reported the incident to Washington.⁵⁰

On August 14 Minister of Defense Yu stated publicly that the GRC would not be provocative and would exercise restraint but was determined to "fight like hell" if it were attacked.⁵¹ On the same day, a New York Times report from Taiwan indicated that the GRC Ministry of Defense was determined to continue its reconnaissance flights over the mainland and that it expected an attack since the present tactics were similar to those used in January 1955 when the GRC evacuated the Tachens Islands.⁵²

On the 15th, in a continuation of their efforts to sound out the United States on its attitude towards an attack on the Offshore Islands, the GRC Minister of National Defense, in a letter to Admiral Smoot, formally requested U. S. advance concurrence for GRC bombing of coastal airfields if the Chinese Communists bombed the Offshore Islands. The permission was refused.⁵³ On August 19 reports were released in Taipei by the Nationalists that U. S. and GRC officials were having informal discussions on a declaration to defend the Offshore Islands.⁵⁴

While carrying on their campaign to get the United States to make a show of strength in the area and to make a public statement that it would defend the Offshore Islands, the Chinese Nationalists continued to make their own military preparations for the oncoming crisis. By the 17th of August they had completed the evacuation of dependents from Quemoy.⁵⁵ Prior to the 19th GRC intelligence officials had become convinced that an attack on one of the smaller Offshore Islands would be made within four to six weeks. If successful, it was believed this would be continued until all the Islands were seized.⁵⁶ On the 20th, in an effort to boost morale, Chiang Kai-shek visited Quemoy by destroyer.⁵⁷

GRC Army Intelligence gave Chiang his last briefing prior to the outbreak of artillery fire on August 22. It was thought that the Chinese Communists were most likely to attack Matsu for the following reasons: (a) the Chinese Communists had numerical superiority in the Matsu area but not in the Quemoy area; (b) the Chinese Communists had a slightly better air capability over Matsu; (c) the Chinese Communists would have to bring naval units south from Shanghai to support an assault. There was less risk in going into Matsu than in trying to circumvent Matsu and

going on to Quemoy. The waters near Matsu were deep enough for the use of these boats.

The briefing indicated that the situation could change if the Chinese Communists moved troops south opposite Quemoy, which they had not yet done, but noted that air superiority in the end would be decisive. The briefers also noted that if the Chinese Communists did not attack Matsu, they might take either Ehr-tan or Ta-tan, in the Quemoy group, which could be successfully attacked at any time and which once captured would be almost impossible to re-take.⁵⁸

The Chinese Nationalists were thus maneuvering into position where they were ready, and in fact apparently eager, for the Chinese Communists to begin military activity against the Offshore Islands. They had made an effort so far unsuccessful, to get the United States to commit itself to defending the Offshore Islands or to get permission to bomb the mainland if the Offshore Islands were attacked.

On the other hand, the Nationalists had accommodated with what an American intelligence source on Taiwan described as "surprising grace" to the loss of their ability to penetrate the mainland air. Except for reconnaissance

flights along the coast, the GRC was at the time of the outbreak of the crisis flying defensively only. Chinese Communist aircraft were regularly overflying the Offshore Islands, buzzing Matsu once, but had not engaged in strafing or bombing. An American intelligence observer on Taiwan reported that the GRC was showing discipline and restraint.⁵⁹

U. S. REACTION TO THE IMPENDING CRISIS

While the United States was to refuse until the eve of the crisis to issue a public statement implying that it would defend Quemoy, it began in early August to take a number of steps both at the request of the Chinese Nationalists and on its own initiative to bolster the Nationalists' military capability and to try to convey to the Chinese Communists the general American commitment to the Nationalists. These actions were taken in light of American policy and planning in relation to Taiwan and the Offshore Islands.

Security Council Planning

The last formal action of the American government at the highest levels on policy toward Taiwan and the Offshore Islands prior to the 1958 crisis had been taken by the National Security Council (NSC) on October 4, 1957, when

it had approved NSC 5723. In this paper NSC had inter alia stated the American intention to:

seek to preserve, through the United Nations actions if appropriate, the status quo of the GRC-held off-shore islands. Provide to the GRC forces, military equipment and training to assist them to defend such off-shore islands, using Taiwan as a base. U. S. forces will be used to assist the Chinese Nationalists to defend GRC-held off-shore islands from Chinese Communist attack whenever the President judges such action to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus.⁶⁰

The President's authority to defend the Offshore Islands was seen as deriving from the Congressional Formosa Resolution passed during the previous crisis of 1955. The Resolution read in part as follows:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.⁶¹ [*Italics added.*]

On April 23, 1958, the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) of the National Security Council approved a report

which summarized the progress which had been made in implementing NSC 5723. The report noted that satisfactory progress was being made on all of the objectives stated in the NSC paper concerning the Republic of China and clarified the responsibility of the various services and agencies for implementing the policies concerned.⁶² It predicted that for the immediate future the Chinese Communists would probably refrain from resorting to force but noted that the possibility remained that they might choose to apply various types of pressure against the Offshore Islands. The OCB report did indicate that the Chinese Communists had become increasingly active in intercepting GRC overflights and that this was likely to continue.

On May 29 the National Security Council in its last discussion of the Offshore Island situation prior to the signs of an impending crisis, simply "noted" the report of its Operations Coordinating Board, which did not recommend a review of policy towards Taiwan at that time.

National Intelligence Estimates

The Intelligence community on May 13, 1958, produced its annual "National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Communist China." A main element of the estimate was the prediction that events in Communist China would probably

continue to follow the same pattern as over the preceding few years. The estimate reflected the universal belief in Washington at the time that there was no Sino-Soviet conflict. It noted, for example, that "although there will almost certainly be some frictions, these are unlikely to impair Sino-Soviet cooperation during the period of this estimate."⁶³

The estimate did state, however, that there was some possibility of Sino-Soviet disagreement, in particular over areas where there was a great disparity of interest, such as in the Taiwan Straits, or where the parties differed over the risk involved in undertaking a specific action. In regard to specific Chinese Communist policy towards Taiwan and the Offshore Islands, the NIE said:

Peiping is probably concerned that, as an unwanted by-product of peaceful coexistence, there is a growing acceptance of a "two-Chinas" concept. The Chinese Communists will continue their effort to disabuse the world, and especially other Asian leaders, of any idea that Communist China will renounce its intention to gain control of Taiwan. They will almost certainly not resort to military action to seize Taiwan, so long as this would involve risk of war with the United States. They will almost certainly continue their present efforts to undermine Nationalist will and to discredit the Republic of China abroad. The possibility cannot be

excluded that the Chinese Communists will adopt a more aggressive policy toward the Offshore Islands, in part because of intense irritation and a sense of affront, in part to emphasize their determination to destroy the Nationalist Government, and in part to test U. S. intentions in the Taiwan area. If they should become convinced that the U. S. would not intervene militarily, they would seek to capture these Islands by military action.⁶⁴

Thus while the NIE did suggest the possibility of Chinese action in the Taiwan Straits and of possible Sino-Soviet disagreement, the overall thrust of the estimate tended to contradict this prediction and to suggest that the Chinese would continue in close cooperation with the Soviets, and were at least not likely to undertake military action against the Offshore Islands. The estimate did point to what was in fact the major calculation of Peking -- United States intervention to defend the Offshore Islands.

Military Operations Plan

In addition to the periodic reevaluations of policy towards Taiwan which had been carried out by the staff of the National Security Council and by the U. S. Intelligence Board, the Military in May 1958 were putting the finishing touches to a revised Operations (OPS) Plan for the defense of the Taiwan Straits.

Limited War Contingency Planning

Along with these three routine contingency planning operations by the National Security Council, the U. S. Intelligence Board, and the military, a fourth contingency planning operation for the possible defense of the Offshore Islands was underway but not completed at the time of the outbreak of the crisis.

At the request of President Eisenhower, a joint State-Defense-CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] committee had been created to study possible limited war contingencies.

The Committee had agreed on a total of twelve possible contingencies outside Europe. Half of the scenarios covered the Far East, one involving the Offshore Islands.* This latter contingency plan envisioned a Chinese Communist interdiction and an American expansion of the crisis to include atomic attack against the Chinese mainland. The first meetings of the State-Defense-CIA group on the Offshore Island contingency planning brought into contact with each other the people who were later to work together during the crisis. At the first meeting the State Department participants held out for an attempt to develop a plan which would involve the use of only conventional (HE) weapons by American forces in defense of the Offshore Islands. However the Joint Chiefs, in particular Air Force General Nathan Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, felt that the use of atomic weapons was inevitable and the planning proceeded on that assumption.

In considering how the Chinese Communists might succeed in interdicting the Offshore Islands, the committee considered the possibility of successful interdiction by the use of artillery alone. However, this possibility was played down, particularly on the advice of Chief of Staff of the

*The others in the Far East were Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Laos and Burma.

Army, General Lyman Lemnitzer, who felt that such interdiction was impossible. General Leander Doan, a former head of the Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) on Taiwan, expressed reservations and indicated that he felt artillery interdiction might be successful.* However, the study proceeded on the assumption that a Chinese Communist move against the Offshore Islands would involve aerial as well as artillery interdiction followed by American atomic attacks on mainland airfields.⁷³

The contingency paper was not yet concluded when the crisis broke out. In fact, as signs of a real crisis in the Taiwan Straits began to develop, the committee's operation changed suddenly from preparing a series of contingency papers on possible limited wars to actual planning for the crisis which was about to break out. When the shelling started, the contingency paper was rewritten in State

* Doan may have been influenced by an internal Taiwan Defense Command paper drafted in January 1958 which declared that: "Since CHICOM artillery fire can completely blanket the Kinmen [Quemoy] Island complex from its present positions on nearby islands and the mainland, it is possible that the CHICOMS may attempt to 'starve out' the garrisons on these islands primarily by the means of intermittent or sustained artillery fire, possibly supported by air. Such an operation...would be time-consuming and expensive"⁷²

by Marshall Green, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and a State Department representative on the planning committee, in an effort to fit it to the actual situation of artillery interdiction.⁷⁴

The Warsaw Talks

It will be recalled that on June 30, 1958, the Chinese Communists had presented the American Government with an ultimatum that unless the Sino-American talks were resumed in fifteen days the Chinese Communists would consider them broken off permanently. At this point the American Government had no inkling that a crisis in the Taiwan Straits might be brewing.

After carefully allowing more than fifteen days to elapse, Edwin Martin of the American Embassy in London was instructed to write to Wang Ping-nan, Chinese Communist Ambassador to Poland, telling him that American Ambassador to Poland Jacob D. Beam was available to resume the talks. Martin was to follow this by contacting Wang directly to try to arrange a meeting for the second week in August at the earliest.⁷⁵ The letter was actually delivered on July 28 with immediate follow-up by Beam in which he stated that the United States was proposing a "normal" resumption of

the talks, and that this was not the result of the Chinese Communist demand.⁷⁶ By August 8 Beam still had not had a reply to his informal approaches or to the Martin letter and was instructed to await a Chinese Communist initiative for reopening the Warsaw talks.⁷⁷ By the 15th Washington informed Beam that it was considering making public the Martin-Beam approaches so as to stress the fact that the Chinese Communists were procrastinating in responding and thereby delaying the reopening of the Warsaw talks.

By the time of the outbreak of the bombardment on August 23 no answer had been received from the Chinese Communists, though they had had a firm offer by the United States to resume the talks at the Ambassadorial level, the sole demand they had proposed for reopening the talks. They could thus be reasonably confident that the talks could be opened any time they chose to respond to the Beam-Martin approaches.

The Crisis Approaches

The first American planning for a possible impending crisis in the Taiwan Straits came in mid-July when, in response to the outbreak of the Middle East crisis, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke ordered an alert of CINCPAC forces on July 14.

With the dying down of the Middle East crisis, attention of the Pacific forces continued to focus on the possibility that the scene of crisis would switch to the Far East. For example, PACAF intelligence estimated on July 23 that the next crisis in the world would be in the Taiwan Straits, and on July 26 the Pacific Command watch reported that the Chinese Communists were increasing their combat readiness in South China.

During the early part of August, intelligence officers in the Far East became increasingly convinced that a crisis was likely to break out in the Taiwan Straits. Washington officials remained unconvinced, though they were willing to sanction a military build-up in the area in case the estimates should turn out to be correct.

On August 2 the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA both concluded that the evidence of a Chinese Communist build-up and other military moves did not suggest a Communist intention to take offensive action. American officials on Taiwan were advised that it was important to allay the concern being expressed by the GRC and to prevent the bombing of coastal airfields which were occupied by the Chinese Communists. At the same time Admiral Burke, who was the executive agent through whom orders went to

CINCPAC,* did propose a further meeting of the Joint Chiefs to continue discussion of the Chinese Communist build-up.⁷⁸

Despite the skepticism at the upper levels that offensive action by the Chinese Communists was likely in the near future, a number of steps were taken in the first two weeks of August to bolster American military capability in the Taiwan Straits, and to convey to the Chinese Communists a general sense of American commitment.

The military command structure in the Taiwan Straits had been changed in early 1958, when, with JCS approval, the Taiwan Defense Command and the MAAG mission on Taiwan were combined in a single headquarters under Vice Admiral Smoot (COMUSTDC). The Commander of Air Task Force 13 (P) became Chief of Staff and Chief of the Air Force section of the MAAG. The Army head of MAAG was put under the Taiwan Defense Commander. This reorganization provided a single point of contact between American military officials on Taiwan and the GRC.⁷⁹

*The crisis occurred just prior to the reorganization of 1958 under which orders went directly from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the unified and specified commands. At this point Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Burke was still the Executive Agent for CINCPAC operations and as such played a leading role in discussions in Washington on the crisis.

On August 1 CINCPAC, being informed of the Chinese Communist occupation of an airfield opposite Taiwan, began a crisis diary. It received and forwarded a Taiwan Defense Command request to expedite the delivery of Sidewinders to the GRC.⁸¹ On August 3 the first U. S. military move directly related to the possible impending crisis took place when six U. S. F-100's were deployed to Taiwan. On the 5th, with JCS approval, the Chief of Naval Operations directed an Attack Aircraft Carrier (CVA) group to proceed to the Taiwan area. Two ships were directed to sail up and down the Straits continuously and did so throughout the crisis. The Joint Chiefs also approved the Taiwan Defense Command request to send F-86's modified for the use of Sidewinders to the Chinese Nationalists as soon as possible.⁸² On the following day PACAF alerted its units for an impending crisis,⁸³ and requested policy guidance from CINCPAC with respect to rules of engagement.⁸⁴

By August 20, F-86s modified for Sidewinder use which had been intended for other sources had been diverted for delivery to the Chinese Nationalists, and forty Sidewinders had been authorized for delivery to the Chinese Nationalists. There had been a rotation of F-100s to Taiwan, and preparations had been made to conduct a routine air exercise off Taiwan. Additional proposals were under consideration to accelerate the shipment of equipment to the Chinese Nationalists.⁸⁵ American military moves which could be detected by the Chinese Communists prior to August 23 are indicated in Table 9. One U.S. military action not easily visible to the Chinese Communists was the placing on alert of five SAC B-47s at Guam on August 17. These aircraft had the mission of hitting the coastal airfields opposite Taiwan with nuclear weapons under night or bad weather conditions.⁸⁶

The Joint Chiefs advised the Secretary of Defense on August 6 of the steps that they had approved to increase American military capability in the Taiwan Straits. They also raised the question, which was not to be faced by the top levels of the government until after the crisis broke out, of what in fact American policy was for the defense of the Offshore Islands.⁸⁷

*Eisenhower reports that he first received word of a possible Chinese Communist move against the Offshore Islands

Table 9

U. S. MILITARY MOVES IN THE PACIFIC

Prior to August 23, 1958

Date	Move
July 14	CINCPAC Forces went on Alert Status
August 3	6 U. S. F-100's Deployed to Taiwan
August 5	2 U. S. Ships began sailing continuously up and down Taiwan Strait
August 6	PACAF Units went on Alert
August 8	6 F86D aircraft temporarily deployed to Taiwan

SOURCE: Seventh Fleet Chronology: INR Chronology June 30 to September 26, 1958; Briefs by General Lawrence S. Kuter at Z. I. Commanders Conference; Patrick Air Force Base, November 20-21, 1958 (Secret); CINCPAC Taiwan Diary; Leonard Weinstein, "Quemoy Matsu Crisis -- 1958," Weapons Systems Laboratory Research Memorandum WS241, Stanford Research Institute, June, 1960 (Top Secret).

After urging the need for the expanding of military support to the GRC and outlining the steps which the Joint Chiefs had approved, the JCS Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense continued as follows:

Because of political considerations involved in the decision to deploy additional forces to the Far East, and in possible military actions which could occur in that area, it is requested that you secure from the Secretary of State policy guidance which would assist the JCS in refining present plans to meet likely contingencies particularly with respect to Communist attack on the Off-shore Islands.⁸⁸

On August 8 the State Department through an official spokesman noted that the Chinese Communists were building air strips in the area to "increase tension and raise the spectre of war." And the spokesman continued: "We are watching the situation closely."⁸⁹

on August 6, presumably as a result of the JCS memorandum (see Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, New York: Doubleday, 1965, p. 292).

*The State Department was reported by The New York Times to be concerned but not alarmed about possible Chinese Communist action, but Brigadier General Thomas R. Phillips in the St. Louis Post Dispatch, reflecting the views of lower level officials, reported that the government was taking the build-up very seriously and that it was believed that Quemoy could not be defended without nuclear weapons.⁹⁰

On the same day a meeting was held at the State Department at which it was decided to establish liaison at the working level between State, Defense, and the CIA, and to begin contingency planning for a possible crisis in the Taiwan Straits. This was the first meeting on the impending crisis which Secretary of State Dulles attended, and he did not again attend until August 22, two weeks later.⁹¹ The Far East Bureau of State was to prepare a paper examining the political aspects of the situation, including current official policy with relation to the Offshore Islands as expressed in NSC-5723.* The CIA was to prepare an assessment of Chinese Communist intentions and possible courses of action. The Defense Department was to study the military aspects, including the military capability of the two sides. It was anticipated that the three studies would then be worked into a single contingency planning study. Although this was ultimately not done, the planning instigated by the meeting found its way into a number of papers later prepared in the three agencies.⁹²

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Walter Robertson, at the same time was sending his first of

*See above, pp.

a series of memoranda on the crisis to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Under Secretary of State Christian Herter (who was to be the Acting Secretary at many of the points during the coming weeks). In this memorandum of August 8, which was actually addressed to the Acting Secretary, Robertson noted that during the preceding week the Chinese Communists had deployed advanced-type aircraft, probably MIG-17's, to coastal airfields opposite Taiwan which were previously not operational. He indicated that there was no evidence of a corresponding build-up in ground and naval forces in Fukien Province opposite Taiwan.

In attempting to evaluate the implications of the Chinese Communist Air Force build-up, Robertson noted that it represented at a minimum a decision to defend the mainland air space against GRC incursions. Reconnaissance and other aerial operations would, he predicted, be impeded, if not prevented, in the future. The Assistant Secretary went on to say that he believed that it was "highly possible" that the move represented the first of a series of probing actions designed to test GRC and American reactions. He predicted that the next step might be to attempt to assert air control over the Taiwan Straits, with the aim of interdicting the Offshore Islands and

forcing the GRC forces to face attrition or withdraw. Robertson suggested that the Chinese Communists might be planning to provoke a crisis in order to create demands for their participation in a conference of the heads of governments of the big powers which had been mentioned in the Mao-Khrushchev communiqué of August 3. Robertson noted that a successful interdiction of the Offshore Islands would pose major problems for the United States since the loss of the Islands would be grave, involving the loss of one-third of the Chinese Nationalist armed forces. He noted that the GRC was determined to fight for the Islands and that the failure of the United States to act would severely damage GRC morale and adversely affect American relations with other of its allies.

Robertson also reported on the Drumright-Smoot conversation with Chiang on August 4.* He noted that Chiang's request for U. S. Sidewinders and the expedited delivery of F-86's and a show of force by the 7th Fleet had been implemented, but that Chiang's request for the stationing of additional F-100's on Taiwan was regarded as impractical for logistical reasons. He noted finally that the GRC had

*See above, pp.

declared a full alert of their armed forces and had taken emergency measures on Taiwan and the Offshore Islands, but that they appeared to have become calmer in the last few days.⁹³

On August 12 Gordon Gray, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Council Affairs, and the head of the staff of the National Security Council, requested the Joint Chiefs to consider a series of possible Chinese Communist moves in the Taiwan Straits and to propose American responses. The situations as outlined by Gray were:

Chinese Communist aggressive air action in the Straits.

Chinese Communist air penetration of Taiwan.

Chinese Communist blockade by sea and air of the Offshore Islands.

Chinese Communist assault on Taiwan and the Pescadores.

Gray also asked whether any public statement of the American position should be made.⁹⁴ This request to the Joint Staff was to initiate yet another contingency planning operation, a bare twelve days before the outbreak of military action. Yet among the contingencies listed by Gray and considered by the Joint Chiefs was still not

one which was to follow closely the course of events as the crisis unfolded.

The Joint Chiefs met on the 13th for a general discussion of the Taiwan situation and for an intelligence briefing. They were told that the Chinese Communists now had the capability to control the air over the coastal areas, and over the Offshore Islands, if opposed only by the GRC.⁹⁵

*In 1954 the Chinese Nationalists withdrew from the Tachens under Chinese Communist fire and with American support.

On the same day that Green sent this memorandum, Dulles left Washington⁹⁷ on a vacation which lasted from August 13-22.

At the same time U. S. Air Force Commander in the Pacific General Lawrence Kuter was requesting guidance from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Thomas B. White, as to what action the United States should take if air action against Quemoy and Matsu should lead the GRC to attack bases on the Chinese mainland. White brought this subject to Twining's attention with the suggestion that it be discussed at an NSC meeting on the 14th.⁹⁸

The National Security Council meeting on the 14th was the first session of the Council which considered the impending Taiwan Straits crisis. The NSC members discussed

a paper entitled "The Situation in the Taiwan Strait Area," which had been prepared by the NSC staff. The topic was put on the agenda by Gray, who sought a discussion but no decision. State Department officials were opposed to the discussion on the grounds that the necessary staff work had not yet been done.⁹⁹ The NSC staff paper began by quoting NSC-5723 and the Congressional Formosa Resolution, which authorized the defense of Quemoy and Matsu when necessary to the defense of Taiwan.

The third section of the NSC staff paper paralleled the memorandum which Gordon Gray had sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but which they had not yet had time to evaluate. The memorandum noted that in the light of the recently increased Chinese Communist operational capabilities to take offensive action, discussion (but no decisions) on three questions would be useful. The three questions raised were:

- a. What action should the United States take if the Chinese Communists blockade the Offshore Islands by sea and air with a view to forcing its surrender?
- b. What should the response of the United States be to a major assault on the Offshore Islands ("for

purposes of this question it is assumed that a U. S. decision to oppose by force a Chinese Communist attempt to seize the GRC-held Offshore Islands would involve a decision to use nuclear weapons on targets on mainland China.")

- c. What steps should the United States take publicly or otherwise to state its policy toward the Chinese Communist efforts to gain control of the GRC-held Offshore Islands by force?¹⁰⁰

Apparently the National Security Council merely noted the developing problem in the Taiwan Straits and the issue was referred for discussion to a meeting held the following day in the Pentagon.* This meeting was attended by the Joint Chiefs, Gordon Gray, Christian A. Herter (as Acting Secretary of State) and General Charles P. Cabell (as Acting Director of the CIA). The meeting was called by Herter, who began the session by noting that the State Department needed to know the Joint Chiefs' thoughts and general plans on the defense of the Offshore Islands before

*As far as can be determined this was the last formal National Security Council meeting held to consider the crisis; the other formal NSC machinery -- the Planning Board and the OCB -- were also inactive during the crisis.

making further moves. Reflected in Herter's question was the typical effort of State and Defense to get each other's assessment of the situation before determining policy. The Joint Chiefs, it will be recalled, a week earlier had asked the Secretary of Defense to secure from the State Department its estimate of what U. S. objectives would be so it could proceed with its military planning. Though the JCS had not yet received a response to this request, they were now being asked by Herter to give their views of the military situation so that State could proceed with political planning. In the absence of a clear Presidential decision on whether or not the Offshore Islands would be defended, and, if they were to be defended, with what means, neither State nor JCS could provide firm guidance to the other.

The absence of Secretary of State Dulles from the meeting and from Washington made it even more difficult to make any firm decisions. The discussion at the meeting turned on the questions of what the likely Chinese Communist action would be, what the United States might do to try to head it off, and what the United States should do if the Chinese Communists made a military move against the Offshore Islands.

The meeting concluded with a discussion of a point raised by Robertson as to whether or not the United States should make a public statement which might have the effect of deterring the Chinese Communists from attacking or interdicting the Offshore Islands. This was rejected in favor of a private approach through diplomatic channels, either by John Foster Dulles approaching Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko directly or by a message sent via the British Ambassador in Peking.

The meeting ended with the group agreeing that a decision needed to be taken at the Dulles-Eisenhower level

as to what the U.S. reaction would be to an air-sea interdiction campaign against the Offshore Islands.

Following the meeting at the Pentagon, Herter drafted a memorandum to Secretary of State Dulles in which he summarized the discussion and reported its conclusions.

* The Joint Chiefs of Staff, at a meeting held on the 15th, apparently after the meeting with Herter, decided in principle to build up and maintain the GRC Air Force in a position of qualitative superiority to the Chinese Communists.¹⁰² They recommended that six F-100Bs which had been earmarked for NATO be diverted to Taiwan. This request was approved by Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy on the 21st.¹⁰³

Herter recommended to Dulles that a warning be sent to the Chinese Communists through diplomatic channels. However, he cautioned that if the United States made such a warning, it must be prepared to defend the Islands. Herter suggested that Dulles confer with Eisenhower with a view towards agreeing to convey informally to Gromyko the information that the United States would prevent seizure or successful interdiction of the Offshore Islands. He also stressed the importance of considering the Congressional implications of U.S. action. If the issue came up at a Dulles press conference, Herter recommended that Eisenhower fall back on the Congressional Formosa Resolution.¹⁰⁴

The Herter memorandum was reinforced early the following week by a memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State Robertson to Dulles. In the memorandum Robertson stressed that it was time to make a decision on whether to defend the Offshore Islands. He again summarized the meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and stressed that the Joint Chiefs felt that it was highly advisable to warn Peking that any attempt to seize Quemoy and Matsu by assault or interdiction ran the clear risk of U.S. military moves to hold the Island. However, as Herter had done, Robertson noted that if

the United States did warn Peking, it must be prepared to make good and hence a decision was needed as soon as possible. If a decision should be made not to defend the Offshore Islands under any circumstances, then, Robertson recommended the United States should make an intense effort to force a withdrawal before a blockade by the Chinese Communists began, since a blockade (again under the assumption of air and sea action) would be successful. Under these circumstances the United States should not make any military moves or give any private warnings of intentions.

However, Robertson strongly stated that the United States must decide to defend the Offshore Islands under all circumstances if Taiwan was to be held. The decision to defend should be a closely held secret, but the United States should, Robertson urged, make a series of moves to deter the Chinese Communists.

The memo concluded that the United States should defend the Offshore Islands for the following reasons, even if the use of nuclear weapons were required:

1. The United States could not force a withdrawal by the Chinese Nationalists at this time.
2. An attempt to force a withdrawal would shatter GRC confidence or lead to an attack on the mainland.

3. There would be concern in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere if the United States tried to force a withdrawal.
4. A withdrawal would not liquidate the crisis since the Chinese Communists were really after Taiwan.
5. The Soviets wanted to avoid nuclear war and would restrain the Chinese Communists. The Chinese Communists would also restrain themselves if they believed the United States would defend the Offshore Islands.
6. The United States had some conventional capability and therefore blockade-running and HE bombing should be tried before nuclear weapons were used.

The memorandum concluded with the following four recommendations:

1. A decision to defend under any circumstances should be reached by the Secretary of State and the President.
2. Peking should be warned through diplomatic channels, perhaps through the Soviet Union, that the United States would defend the Offshore Islands.

3. Eisenhower should say in any case that a Chinese Communist attack on the Offshore Islands would be disturbing to the peace in Asia.*
4. There should be an increased military build-up both of U. S. and GRC forces.¹⁰⁵

*Herter, who feared that the GRC might try to drag the United States into a war with Communist China, had in his memorandum adopted Twining's suggestion that Eisenhower should simply refer to the Congressional Formosa Resolution. Robertson, as he was to do throughout the crisis, defended the GRC as a loyal ally and sought the adoption of the GRC proposal.

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Tab. 10

JOINT STAFF RESPONSE TO GRAY QUESTIONS

Situation Listed in Gray Memorandum	Joint Staff Suggested "U. S. Proposed Course of Action"
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Table 10 -- continued

Situation Listed in Gray Memorandum	Joint Staff Suggested "U. S. Proposed Course of Action"
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Table 10 -- continued

Situation Listed in Gray Memorandum	Joint Staff Suggested "U. S. Proposed Course of Action"
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floats could lift the force. The study indicated that the Chinese Nationalist forces on Quemoy were not excessive for a maximum defense effort.¹¹¹

On the same day, for the first time since August 8, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (having just returned from a vacation)¹¹² attended a meeting to discuss the crisis. In attendance in addition to State Department officials were General Twining, Admiral Burke, and CIA Director and brother of the Secretary of State, Allen Dulles. The meeting began with a briefing by Allen Dulles on the military situation, which was later to be published as an Annex to SNIE 100-9-58. The CIA Director reported that there were over 100,000 troops on Quemoy and Matsu with thirty to forty days of supplies and that the Chinese Communists had not been trying as yet to intercept supplies.

John Foster Dulles expressed misgivings about the willingness and ability of the GRC to fight and hold the Offshore Islands. He stated that he did not want to help the GRC if they would not fight to the death. He was assured by Robertson that the GRC would fight and that they could hold an attack for at least a week. Dulles then stated that if the Nationalists would hold the Offshore

Islands for at least a week against an invasion, the United States would be drawn in. It was estimated at the meeting that Quemoy could hold out against a blockade for at least thirty days. The Secretary of State stressed that the United States should continue to look as if it would welcome a fight as this tactic was most likely to deter the Communists. He expressed the view that the Chinese Communists would not start anything except by miscalculation, that is, if they believed that the United States might not intervene. The possibility of sending a note to the Chinese Communists or to the Soviet Union was discussed. It was decided, however, that this would do little good and would be less effective than actions, and might be taken by the Chinese Communists as a desire to negotiate and therefore as a sign of weakness. It was agreed that the following actions should be taken in order to suggest to both the Communists and the Nationalists that the United States would intervene in the event of a major attack:

(a) To increase GRC and American military capabilities in the Taiwan Straits:

- (1) One carrier should be added to the Seventh Fleet and three carriers should be kept in the Taiwan Straits.

- (2) A Fleet exercise should be held, but not in the Straits.
 - (3) Admiral Smoot should make a trip to the Offshore Islands.
 - (4) The United States should increase its fighters on Taiwan.
 - (5) There should be an increase in the flow of supplies, and if possible, daylight supplies, to the Offshore Islands.
 - (6) There should be a loan of three U. S. LST's to the GRC and the shipping of Sidewinder missiles to the GRC.
 - (7) There should be an increase of shipment of weapons to the GRC, including recoilless rifles, and other infantry equipment for delivery to the Offshore Islands.
 - (8) There should be a U. S.-GRC joint air defense exercise.
- (b) In response to a possible question at a press conference, Eisenhower should answer that it is doubtful that a Chinese Communist effort to capture the Offshore Islands could be a limited operation and that it would constitute a real threat to the peace. It was also

noted that he might refer to the Dulles letter in the correspondence to be exchanged between Dulles and the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Thomas Morgan. This letter was released on August 23.

(c) Drumright was authorized to clarify with the GRC its retaliatory rights in light of the 1955 Dulles-Yeh exchange, and to tell Chiang that a heavy attack on the Offshore Islands would constitute an emergency in terms of the agreement and would justify retaliation, but that a minor attack on the Offshore Islands would not. Drumright was also instructed to inform the GRC that further measures were under review to strengthen the GRC military.¹¹³

Following the meeting, the exchange of letters between Dulles and Representative Morgan was arranged. In response to Morgan's letter, which had noted with concern the reports of a Chinese Communist build-up of air power opposite Taiwan and asked for Dulles' comments, Dulles wrote in a letter released on August 23:

We are, indeed, disturbed by the evidence of Chinese Communist build-up, to which you refer. It suggests that they might be tempted to try to seize forcibly the Quemoy or Matsu Islands.

As you know, these islands have been continuously in the hands of the Republic

of China, and over the last four years the ties between these islands and Formosa have become closer and their interdependence has increased.

I think it would be highly hazardous for anyone to assume that if the Chinese Communists were to attempt to change this situation by force and now to attack and seek to conquer these islands, that could be a limited operation. It would, I fear, constitute a threat to the peace of the area. Therefore, I hope and believe that it will not happen.*114 [Italics added.]

In the letter to Morgan, Dulles had come very far towards satisfying the GRC request that he make a public statement that the United States would defend the Offshore Islands. The letter was as clear as the later Dulles statement after his conversation with Eisenhower at Newport on September 4. It went as far as Dulles could go, given his interpretation of the Congressional Resolution, and was agreed upon as soon as Dulles returned to Washington. The apparent refusal of the United States to issue such a

*The New York Times interpreted the Dulles letter as a warning to the Chinese Communists not to seize Quemoy or Matsu. The same story reported a build-up of ground forces opposite Taiwan but it was reported that this build-up was not believed sufficient for an amphibious invasion of the Offshore Islands but rather was part of the forces which had been removed from North Korea. Hong Kong observers were reported to believe that the Dulles warning would help satisfy Taipei by making a definite commitment to defend the Offshore Islands.115

warning had been part of the message to the Chinese Communists which had led them to believe that the United States might not defend Quemoy. It is impossible to say whether or not had the letter been published one or two days earlier it would have prevented the Chinese Communist attack. As a matter of fact, the artillery attack had been launched before the letter reached the Chinese Communist leadership.

After the meeting, which lasted most of the afternoon, Dulles conferred with Robertson and Herter. Dulles and Herter then went to the White House and spent a half hour discussing the situation with the President. At six that evening, Dulles and Herter returned to State to continue planning with Robertson and with Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations William B. Macomber, Jr.¹¹⁶

On the 20th of August, the Navy, in a response to a memorandum from Marshall Green at State, reported that there appeared to be no pattern to the previous Chinese Communist shelling of the Offshore Islands. The Chinese Communists, according to the Navy, appeared to have the capability to crater the airfield on Quemoy and to destroy the port facilities, but they had not done so. There was no operations plan for the U. S. air defense of Taiwan,

but such defense could be put into effect and, though it would help the GRC somewhat, it would not be decisive.

In response to a question on the possibility of some kind of escort, the Navy noted that there was no such thing as a degree of escort and the United States would either have to escort completely or not at all. They provided an estimate to Green that the latest aircraft being supplied to the Chinese Nationalists were superior to the MIGs which the Chinese Communists had.¹¹⁷

THE EVE OF CRISIS

The Chinese Communists successfully occupied the airfields opposite Taiwan without the threatened bombing attempts by the Chinese Nationalists and succeeded in sharply reducing the ability of the Chinese Nationalists to engage in overflights over the Chinese mainland opposite Taiwan. They, then, were clearly ready to go a step further in their campaign of the use of military force to secure the political objective of overthrowing the Taiwan regime. Although they were no doubt aware of the build-up in American forces in the area and of aid to the Chinese Nationalists, the American build-up had not yet assumed major proportions, and its meaning within the context of a Chinese attempt to seize Quemoy remained ambiguous.

American and Chinese Nationalist caution in response to their activation of the airfields plus the refusal of the United States to state that it would defend Quemoy probably gave the Chinese Communists some confidence in the belief that the United States would not support a defense of Quemoy and perhaps might even force an evacuation of the Islands. The Chinese Communists were then ready for a move against the Offshore Islands, their ultimate objective being to secure the collapse of the Nationalist regime.

By August 23 the Chinese Nationalists had become convinced that a move against the Offshore Islands was in the making. For the Nationalists this could only be viewed as an opportunity to involve the United States in a major military action against the Chinese Communists, which was clearly their only hope for a return to the mainland. The Nationalists' maneuver to secure a U. S. backing for defense of Quemoy can be seen, as it probably was, as part of the effort to involve the United States in what was expected to be the oncoming military move against Quemoy or Matsu, or perhaps one of the smaller Offshore Islands. The Chinese Nationalists were probably not interested in deterring a Chinese Communist move by a U. S. declaration, but rather enhancing the probability of U. S. involvement

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by securing a public U. S. commitment prior to the outbreak of crisis. Though the Nationalists acted with restraint and caution prior to and throughout the crisis, they continued to drop hints that their patience might run out, that unless strong U. S. action were taken they might be forced to take unilateral action, and that they had every right to do so under the existing U. S.-Chinese Nationalist agreements.

Most American military and civilian officers in the Pacific area and in Washington were convinced that a crisis was about to break in the Taiwan Straits. They had been striving to get both a U. S. public statement which might head off a crisis and a firm U. S. decision on whether the Offshore Islands would in fact be defended. The general assumption was that the Islands would come under attack by an all-out air and sea interdiction campaign and that the United States would defend them with atomic attacks against the mainland. All of the policymaking echelons of the Government concerned seemed to be united in agreeing that Quemoy had to be defended. They were anxious not only to get a decision from Eisenhower and Dulles but also to make it clear to them that a firm decision had to include a willingness to use atomic weapons. Dulles had

made clear on August 22 that he would support a defense of the Offshore Islands and had arranged for the letter to Representative Morgan implying a U. S. commitment to defend Quemoy. Washington was now convinced that a crisis was imminent but still reacted with some surprise when the military phase began on the next day.

CHAPTER II: THE CRISIS ERUPTS:
THE U. S. DECISION TO INTERVENE

On August 23, 1958, at 6:30 p.m., Taiwan time (5:30 a.m., Eastern Standard Time) the Chinese Communists suddenly unleashed heavy artillery fire against the Quemoy Islands. The first word of the Communist shelling of the Offshore Islands reached Washington via the Central Intelligence Agency and was reported to the State Department during the morning in a phone call from CIA Director Allen Dulles to his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Dulles passed on the information to Under Secretary Herter and Assistant Secretary Robertson, in a memorandum which is revealing of Dulles' views, which were to persist throughout the crisis and to shape significantly his behavior.* The memorandum in full is as follows:

Allen Dulles has just phoned me that the CHICOMS have reportedly been subjecting the Offshore Islands to an extremely heavy bombardment.

If this seems really serious and critical, there is perhaps room for the good offices of some acceptable third power.

*Since I have not examined classified material prior to 1958, I am unable to indicate when and for what reasons Dulles adopted the views on the Nationalists implicit in this memorandum and Dulles' later actions.

I do not feel that we have a case which is altogether defensible. It is one thing to contend that the CHICOMS should keep their hands off the present territorial and political status of Taiwan, the Penghus, Quemoy, and Matsu, and not attempt to change this by violence which might precipitate general war in the area.

It is another thing to contend that they should be quiescent while this area is used by the CHINATS as an active base for attempting to foment civil strife and to carry out widespread propaganda through leaflets, etc., against the CHICOMS regime. We are, in effect, demanding that these Islands be a 'privileged sanctuary' from which the CHINATS can wage at least political and subversive warfare against the CHICOMS but against which the CHICOMS cannot retaliate.

I wonder whether there is not the basis for some peaceful modus vivendi, although I realize that it would be extremely difficult to persuade the CHINATS not to attempt to be active against the CHICOMS. I assume that such activity is important for their morale, although I am inclined to doubt that it has any appreciable effect. We ourselves have, I understand, suspended the dropping of leaflets by balloons, etc., into Eastern Europe.

I suspect that the determining cause of change in both Communist China and Eastern Europe will be natural forces within rather than stimulus from without.

Possibly this situation could be taken to the UN Security Council as was contemplated in [sic] one stage back in 1953 or 1954.

[signed] J. F. Dulles¹

One of Dulles' primary concerns expressed in the memorandum was with the legality of the situation and with the "fairness" of what was happening. Dulles held what were later to be clearly exposed to be incorrect assumptions about the degree of military action which was going on from the Offshore Islands* and was later to be presented with the information listed above as to what in fact was taking place from the Offshore Islands. However, he was to continue to hold throughout the crisis, and to be the only one in Washington to express, the belief that the Chinese Communists had been "provoked" into their military move by some actions of the Chinese Nationalists and that if these actions could be eliminated a modus vivendi might be established. This belief was to be reflected in Dulles' actions when he visited Taiwan at the end of the crisis.

Also running through Dulles' thoughts and actions throughout the crisis was the possibility that somehow intermediaries might be used, or the UN might be brought into play, to settle the crisis short of the use of American military force. Though he was to continue to express, as

*Assuming as his State Department associates did that Dulles in the third paragraph of his memorandum was not thinking of Taiwan. For a listing of Nationalist actions from the Offshore Islands, see Table 4, p. 10.

he had in the meeting on August 22, strong support for a major show of American military strength and of the use of power if necessary to prevent a change in the status quo by force, Dulles was also a strong supporter of trying to avoid the use of military force and of seeking a peaceful solution to the crisis which might include changing the status quo ante. In suggesting negotiations, Dulles was not only seeking to prevent war but was also influenced by his recognition that a strong U. S. position was not likely to be popular with Congress.* Soon after sending the memorandum, Dulles at 11:40 a.m. left Washington for a vacation sail on Lake Ontario. He phoned the President and Herter before finally setting out. He did not return until the evening of September 1.³

The initial reaction of officials in the Far East
Section of the State Department to Dulles' memorandum was

*Dulles was concerned throughout with Congressional reaction to his policies and made every effort to keep Congress from opposing American policy on the crisis. About thirty key Congressmen were to be sent a bi-weekly detailed Confidential letter describing the situation very candidly. The letters were sent home since the Congress was not in session, despite the fact that the Congressmen did not have facilities normally required for the receipt of Confidential material. People at State, including Dulles, were always available to see Congressmen when they were in town.²

one of consternation since it was sharply at variance with their image of what was taking place in the Taiwan Straits and of the value of conciliatory steps. On the 25th a meeting of State Department officials was held in Herter's office to discuss the Dulles memorandum. While there was skepticism as to the wisdom of any of Dulles' suggestions, it was agreed that they should be thoroughly explored as possible lines of action and the arguments for and against laid out for Dulles' consideration. The Secretary's suggestion that the issue might be referred to the United Nations was laid aside, but it was agreed to explore the possible role of intermediaries (for example, Sweden, New Zealand, or the Soviet Union), although Herter expressed skepticism as to the value of such a move. In addition, it was decided that papers should be prepared on: (1) the background on the Sino-American Ambassadorial talks, (2) the possible use of the Ambassadorial talks, (3) the uses that the Chinese Nationalists were making of the Offshore Islands, and (4) Administration obligations to Congress in relation to defense of the Offshore Islands.⁴

Within a day a brief memorandum had been prepared in the Office of Chinese Affairs. The memorandum noted that

the Offshore Islands had not been an important base for GRC military operations, propaganda or subversive activity. It indicated that the Communists as well as the Nationalists engaged in subversive and propaganda activities and that Communist activity had intensified in the previous year. In response to the statements in the Dulles memorandum linking Eastern Europe and China, it was pointed out that the situations were different in that there was still a civil war in China, hence GRC activity could not be recognized as activity from outside the country unless the United States accepted a two-China policy. The memorandum recommended that the United States stress the effort to get the Chinese Communists to renounce the use of force and should publicize the low level of Nationalist activity from the Offshore Islands. It cautioned that the use of a third party would be difficult without giving the appearance of retreating. The memorandum concluded by reporting that Dulles had committed himself to consulting the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before extending coverage of the American commitment to defend the GRC to include the Offshore Islands.⁵

PLANNING FOR DECISION

Throughout the weekend of August 23 and 24 officials in the State Department and in the Pentagon worked to prepare for a meeting which was to be held at the White House on the 25th to discuss the crisis..

*On August 22 the United States and Great Britain had announced that they would suspend the testing of nuclear weapons provided the Soviet Union did not test and negotiations were carried on for a treaty outlawing nuclear tests.⁶

*In the event the message sent did not suggest as great a reliance on conventional forces as Burke had feared. See pp. 113-114.

The Political-Military Section in Navy OP-61 prepared on August 24 a paper which was adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the 25th and given to President Eisenhower by Burke at the White House meeting on the 25th. The paper stated:

(1) A major effort by the Chinese Communists to take the Offshore Islands is a beginning of an encroachment on the entire Chinese Nationalist position. It must be stopped initially or it will continue to the destruction of the GRC..

(2) Although attacks on the mainland may have to be initially conventional for political reasons, "we will require atomic strikes on the Chinese mainland to effectively and quickly stop Chinese Communist aggression."

(4) The United States must present reasonable objectives. The Chinese Communist action must be made to appear the beginning of further expansion.

(5) The United States must undertake operations which bring action to a halt quickly. Prolonged operations will diminish military capabilities for operations in other areas or for general war.

The Navy paper reflected the basic Joint Chiefs of Staff position throughout the crisis that the United States must be reasonable but firm, that nuclear weapons would have to be used if the United States went into military action, although initial operations might have to be conventional, and that prolonged operations would diminish military capability for action in general war or for military moves in other areas, both of which were possible during the crisis.

On the morning of August 25, Herter, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles, Twining, Burke, and Allen Dulles met and agreed to advise the GRC of the specifics of the U. S. military build-up which was then in process in the Far East, and which is discussed below.¹⁰

The Joint Chiefs met at 1:30 p.m. on the 25th and approved a series of papers for discussion with the President later in the day. These included a draft message to CINCPAC and the Taiwan Defense Command, a draft of a proposed public statement of U. S. policy, and the Navy background statement quoted above. The adoption of the Navy paper established the precedent that the basic position papers of the Joint Chiefs on the Offshore Island crisis would be prepared by the Political-Military and Plans sections of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, which continued to maintain close liaison at the working level with the Far East Bureau in the Department of State.

A Special National Intelligence Estimate on the situation in the Taiwan Straits was prepared in time for consideration by policy makers prior to the meeting at the White House on the 25th to consider the actions proposed by the Joint Chiefs. The estimate on "Probable Developments in the Taiwan Strait area," which was not formally published until the 26th, argued that the purpose of the Chinese Communist action was to test U. S. intentions with respect to the Offshore Islands. Assuming U. S. aid to the GRC but no direct involvement, it concluded that the Chinese Communists could successfully blockade the Offshore

Islands using air and sea power and could invade Quemoy without warning.

The Chinese Communists, the estimate stated, now considered the risk of local war somewhat less than in the pre-Sputnik period. On the question of Sino-Soviet relations, the estimate indicated, as did all joint estimates throughout the crisis, that the Soviets probably had no objection to the Chinese Communist action. It was also agreed that if the Chinese Communists came to believe that the United States would not intervene, they would probably try to seize the Offshore Islands.¹¹

WHITE HOUSE MEETING (August 25)

At the White House meeting on the 25th, the President,* after making several changes, approved the Joint Chiefs' draft telegram to CINCPAC and the Taiwan Defense Command.

*In addition to his attendance at the meetings at which the major decisions during the crisis were to be made or ratified, Eisenhower was kept informed through his Military Representative, Defense Liaison Officer and Staff Secretary to the President General Andrew Goodpaster, who attended most inter-Departmental meetings, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles with whom he conferred frequently, and in writing through a Daily Situation Report (SITREP) which was sent to him.

The message as approved contained the following points:

(1) In anticipation of continued Chinese Communist action against the Offshore Islands:

(a) Reinforce U. S. air defense capability and prepare to assume U. S. responsibility for air defense of Taiwan.

(b) Advise if augmentation from the Continental United States (CONUS) is needed to implement the U. S. responsibility for the air defense of Taiwan.

(c) Prepare to escort and protect supply ships to the Offshore Islands.

(d) Augment the Seventh Fleet if necessary.

(e) Sail the Midway from Pearl Harbor.

(f) In the event a major attack seriously endangers the Offshore Islands, prepare to assist the GRC including attacks on coastal air bases. It is probable that initially only conventional weapons will be authorized, but prepare to use atomic weapons to extend deeper into Chinese Communist territory if necessary.

(2) For your information, a SAC B-47 squadron of 15 aircraft now ready on Guam can be made available for

use in atomic attacks against mainland targets.

"This squadron has no conventional capability."

(3) The following actions are being taken:

(a) The Department of the Army is being authorized to expedite delivery of modern equipment for use of the Offshore Islands troops.

(b) The Department of Defense is authorized to dispatch a NIKE battalion to Taiwan.

(c) The Department of Defense has authorized the dispatch of three additional LST's.¹²

The only changes that were made in the JCS draft telegram to CINCPAC and TDC concerned limitations on what information was to be conveyed to the GRC. The JCS had proposed that the entire contents of the message be passed on to the GRC, but the President decided that the following items of those listed above would not be divulged:

(1) That preparations were underway to escort supply ships to the Offshore Islands.

(2) That a SAC B-47 squadron was available on Guam for atomic attacks against the mainland.

(3) That in the event of a major attack on the Offshore Islands, the United States was ready to assist

in the defense of the Islands, including coastal air attacks against the Chinese mainland.¹³

The second item prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the meeting, the proposed public statement of U. S. policy, was not approved. It read as follows:

The U. S. Government will not permit the loss of the offshore islands to Chinese Communist aggression. In case of major air or amphibious attacks which in the opinion of the U. S. seriously endanger the islands, the United States will concur in CHINAT attack of CHICOM close-in mainland bases. In such an event, the United States will reinforce the CHINAT to the extent necessary to make sure the security of these islands. This action may include joining in the attack of CHICOM bases, with atomic weapons used if needed to gain the military objective.

This position does not cover the case of harassing bombardment or attacks of the nature and scale mounted against the offshore islands in the past.¹⁴

The third item -- the background statement -- was distributed at the meeting, but no action was taken.

In view of the Chinese Communist expectations to be discussed below that the United States might well pursue an entirely different policy, it needs to be asked why

the alternative of not assisting the GRC to defend the Offshore Islands received almost no consideration among the relevant decision-makers. For a number of different reasons the President, the Secretary of State, and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff converged on the conviction that the Offshore Islands had to be held against any Chinese Communist military pressure. Dulles and Eisenhower apparently were convinced of this, very largely on the grounds that the United States simply could not permit the changing of international boundaries by the use of force. Though neither of them was convinced of the wisdom of the Chinese Nationalists trying to maintain control of the Offshore Islands and both believed that the Chinese Nationalists had put a far greater percentage of their army than necessary on Quemoy, they both were also convinced that the United States had no choice but to oppose the use of force not only for moral reasons but also because American prestige in Asia and throughout the world would be involved in any loss of the Offshore Islands to military pressure.

In addition, there were a group of officials, particularly including Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson, who were in sympathy with the views and objectives of the Chinese Nationalist

regime and believed that the stability of the regime depended on maintaining the hope of returning to the mainland. This in turn they felt depended on maintaining control of the Offshore Islands. This group also felt very strongly that the Chinese Nationalists could not be gotten off the Offshore Islands and that therefore a policy of forced U. S. withdrawal had to be ruled out as impossible to implement and dangerous to try.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in particular Admiral Burke and General Twining, seemed to be convinced that the United States had to defend the Offshore Islands for reasons other than their military importance. They recognized that the Islands were neither critical for the defense of Taiwan nor particularly useful should there be any attempt by the Chinese Nationalists to return to the mainland. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs were convinced that the United States should aid in the defense of Quemoy, basically for two reasons. First, they recognized the important psychological and political symbols that the Offshore Islands had become to the Chinese Nationalists. Second, the United States tacitly had committed itself to defending the Offshore Islands and the military felt very strongly that U. S. prestige in the Far East would be severely damaged by any unilateral

withdrawal in the face of Communist pressure. In addition, the National Security Council document on Taiwan had authorized the military to assist the GRC in strengthening the defense of the Offshore Islands and had authorized them to advise the GRC on its defense and to make plans for the assisting of the defense of the Offshore Islands when authorized by the President. The military thus felt that they had at least a moral obligation to the GRC military and government to implement the policy which had been implied in their actions. Secretary of State Dulles seems also to have been affected by the feeling that the United States had at least implicit commitment to the Nationalists to defend the Offshore Islands.

Thus, when the President met with his chief advisors on August 25th, no one disputed that the United States should assist the GRC in its attempt to break the blockade of the Offshore Islands. It was not yet clear how much aid would be required and therefore at the moment it was only necessary to reach the decision, in principle, that something would be done and to take interim steps designed both to deter any further Chinese Communist move and to build up American and GRC strength in the area.

The decision to limit the American commitment to the Islands of Big and Little Quemoy was made without disagreement on grounds that the other islands were simply completely indefensible. The statement that initial operations might have to be conventional was accepted for inclusion in the message to the field commanders also without disagreement. Although there was to be considerable disagreement in the field as to the meaning of this phrase, it seemed to be generally agreed in Washington that it did not imply a commitment to a long conventional war in defense of the Offshore Islands, but merely suggested that first actions would have to be conventional both in a last effort to deter the Chinese Communists and to make clear to the world that Chinese Communist aggression was, in fact, under way.

There was not any clear consensus in Washington as to the nature of Chinese Communist intentions in beginning the artillery attack on Quemoy. It was recognized that the Communist Chinese interest was in Taiwan and not in the Offshore Islands per se, but there was no clear notion of how the Chinese Communists would hope to proceed from an attack on Quemoy to an attempt to bring Taiwan under their control. No one seriously expected, however, that the

Chinese Communists would launch a military attack on Taiwan even if they captured Quemoy. Even in relation to Quemoy, there was no information on which to base an adequate assessment of Chinese Communist objectives. It was believed that the Chinese Communists might be contemplating either an all-out blockade of the Islands or an actual military invasion. In either case it was believed that the Chinese Nationalists probably could not hold out on their own and, therefore, that American intervention would be necessary and would be forthcoming to the degree required to hold the Islands. At this stage, partly perhaps because Dulles was not present, no consideration was given at the meeting with the President to possible diplomatic moves designed either to determine Chinese Communist objectives or to seek to negotiate an end to the crisis.

The primary concern of American officials at this point was trying to deter the Chinese Communists by making clear that the United States would be involved in any military action in the Taiwan Straits. Yet the Joint Chiefs' proposal that a public statement be issued committing the United States to the defense of Quemoy was rejected. It was recognized that such a statement might

well contribute to deterrence, but it was believed that it would complicate America's relations with the GRC and America's allies, as well as complicate the domestic situation in the United States. At the same time it was felt that military actions would be much more important than words in communicating to the Chinese Communists and a vigorous program of American military demonstration in the Far East was implemented.*

American officials had no doubt that a policy of defense of the Offshore Islands would be unpopular, both among America's allies and the general public in the United States. It was believed that any clear statement of American involvement in the defense of the Offshore Islands would intensify criticism from these groups and the pressure for negotiations or for a change in policy. In addition, Eisenhower and his advisors interpreted the Formosa Congressional Resolution as indicating that the United States could not defend the Offshore Islands unless their defense was related to an attack which appeared to threaten Taiwan. It was felt that the military action in the area

* See Table 13, pp. 134-136. Eisenhower writes that he directed the Defense Department to leak word of the planned military build-up to the press (see Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 297).

did not yet justify such a finding and that in fact such a finding was unlikely to be desirable until an actual invasion was in progress or a blockade appeared close to success. This consideration alone would probably have been sufficient to lead the administration not to make a formal public commitment to the defense of the Offshore Islands.

But even more critical in the eyes of many officials was the need to keep the GRC somewhat unclear about American intentions and American commitments.

Thus when meeting with his advisors on August 25,
Eisenhower was acutely aware of the multiple audiences that

*Eisenhower cites the Nationalist desire for a big war and the small island problem as his reasons for rejecting the proposal to issue a public statement. He incorrectly states that the Joint Chiefs were against a firm public commitment to the defense of Quemoy. (See Waging Peace, pp. 295-96.)

he faced. He wanted most of all to convince the Chinese Communists that military action would be dangerous and involve a clash with the United States. At the same time he was constrained by pressures and anticipated pressures from Congress and the American public, from America's allies, and from the Government of the Republic of China. Thus the firm decision to participate in the defense of the Offshore Islands was shrouded in some public ambiguity which, it was hoped, would not interfere with communicating with the Chinese Communists.*

*The press reported that the President had met with General Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others. Presidential Press Secretary James Haggerty stated that it was simply a routine meeting with the situation in the Taiwan Straits being watched very closely. The New York Times reported that it was generally assumed in Washington that the talk included a review of the state of the readiness of the Seventh Fleet, and that speculation in the State Department was that the Chinese Communist objective might be diplomatic and not military. Informed sources reported that the United States was urging the GRC to refrain from retaliatory attacks against the Chinese Communists.¹⁶

At the same time the press reported the first instance of public disagreement with American policy in a statement by Senator Wayne Morse that he would oppose American attempts to help the Chinese Nationalists defend the Offshore Islands.¹⁷

RESPONSE IN THE FIELD

The decisions made at the White House meeting were communicated via military and political channels on the evening of the 25th to U. S. military and civilian officials in the Pacific and on Taiwan.^{18*}

**In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had received a general directive from the President authorizing them to prepare for the use of atomic weapons in any situation larger than a very small brush fire war.²⁰ Although a PACAF order²¹ had required all bombers to have an HE capability as well as a nuclear capability,²² in fact other more

It was therefore not surprising that the order to prepare for conventional operations was received with some consternation by CINCPAC officials and in particular by General Lawrence Kuter, the head of PACAF, who was probably not privy to Burke's explanation and warning to Felt of the reason for including the clause* and was to express continual embitterment at the notion that a conventional war might be fought in the Taiwan Straits. Nevertheless, CINCPAC moved as quickly as possible to develop contingency plans for conventional operations in the Taiwan Straits.

specific orders given to the Pacific Air Force had required them to concentrate on developing their ability to deliver atomic weapons. Toward the end of 1957, PACAF units received a message ordering them to give first priority to improving their "capability to deliver conventional [sic] atomic weapons" using various delivery systems and techniques. Lowest priority was to be given to "the development of the capability to deliver obsolete [i.e., high energy] weapons."²³

*See p. 107.

Table 11

CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE TO CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTION

Chinese Communist Action	U. S. - GRC Action

SOURCE: Navy Message ADMINO CINCPAC to CINCUSARTAC/CINC-PACFLT/CINCPACAFMDC, 250800Z, August 1958, August 25, 1958, No. 6027 (Top Secret).

Table 12

SEVENTH FLEET GUIDANCE

Table 12 -- continued

SOURCE: Navy Message CNO to CINCPAC, 241533Z August 1958,
August 24, 1958, No. 2269 (Top Secret).

States was in fact committed to the defense of the Offshore Islands. In addition, naval forces in the area were augmented and a number of U. S. officials visited Taiwan. The extent of activity is indicated in Table 13. The contrast with actions prior to August 23 can be seen by comparing Table 13 with Table 9, p. 65.

While American military commanders in the field moved to implement the directives approved by Eisenhower on the 25th, they also were relaying to Washington their estimates of the situation and their reactions to evolving U. S. policy.

On the 24th, prior to the receipt of JCS orders by the military commands, the Commander of the Seventh Fleet reported to CINCPACFLT that he still considered an ambiguous stand best and was opposed to openly advising the GRC of American intentions to defend the Offshore Islands. He felt that this would provide irresistible "bait" to the GRC to create a series of incidents that would eventually involve the United States. He also stated that the uncertainty in the U. S. position would complicate the Chinese Communist planning and might be a better deterrent than an open stand.

At the same time the Commander of the Seventh Fleet expressed alarm at the lack of policy guidance to the

Table 13

U. S. MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PUBLIC ACTIONS

August 23 - August 30

Date	Political Moves	Military Moves
August 24	Dulles-Morgan Letter	Aircraft Carrier <u>Essex</u> leaves Taiwan - Sixth Fleet to join Seventh Fleet in Pacific U. S. holds Air Defense Exercise over Taiwan Taiwan Patrol augmented by the addition of 2 aircraft carrier groups - 1 group joins the Southeast Taiwan Fleet and the other the North-east.
August 26	American Pacific Military Commanders meet on Taiwan	5th Air Force goes on alert 7th Fleet aircraft begin series of daily surveys of Taiwan Straits (action closely followed by Chinese Communist radar)
August 27	Eisenhower at Press Conference says the Offshore Islands are now more important to the defense of Taiwan	Aircraft Carrier <u>Hancock</u> and 4 destroyers arrive south of Taiwan

Table 13 -- continued

Date	Political Moves	Military Moves
August 27 continued	Navy announces that the <u>Essex</u> is on route to join the Seventh Fleet	
August 28	The State Department in a comment on a Chinese Communist broadcast to Quemoy warned the Chinese Communists against trying to seize Quemoy	<u>Hancock</u> in South and aircraft carrier <u>Lexington</u> with 4 destroyers in the North conduct air defense exercises U. S. 16th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron of F-86's deployed from Japan to Taiwan
August 29	U. S. announces in Washington that it is continuing to reinforce its Pacific Fleet	
August 30	U. S. announces it is sending more jet fighters to the Pacific	Seventh Fleet ships begin preparations for escort of GRC supply ships
August 31	Secretary of Army Brucker and General White arrive on Taiwan	

SOURCE: CINCPAC Historical Division, "CINCPAC Taiwan Dairy," August 1958-December 1959 (formerly Top Secret, downgraded to Secret); "Chronology of Major Events in Off Shore Islands

Table 13 -- continued

Crisis," (mimeo, no date or author indicated) attached to a memorandum from: Commander 7th Fleet, To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-09b9), Subject: 7th Fleet Command History (U), OPNAV Report Symbol 5750-5, SER: 002-00143, September 17, 1958 (Secret); Arthur C. O'Neill, Fifth Air Force in the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958, December 31, 1959 (Top Secret); Navy Message CINCPACFLT to CNO, 2404212, August 1958, No. 5795 (Top Secret); Navy Message COMSEVENTHFLT to CTG 77.5, 2415582, August 1958, No. 5981 (Secret); Navy Message COMSEVENTHFLT to TDC/CTG 7717, 2505042, August, 1958, No. 6264 (Secret); Navy Message COMSEVENTHFLT to CINCPACFLT, 2614152, August 27, 1958, No. 6489 (Secret); The New York Times, August 24, 1958, August 27, 1958, August 28, 1958, August 29, 1958, August 30, 1958, August 31, 1958, September 1, 1958.

operational commanders in the field, which he reported was a great complication to planning.

Admiral Smoot reported to Felt on the 24th his belief that if the Offshore Islands were attacked by Chinese Communist aircraft, the GRC would attack coastal fields and this would lead to U. S. involvement. He cautioned that if interdiction became effective it might be necessary to try U. S. air cover and naval escort for resupply. He urged the United States to make clear that it would replace any GRC ships lost in resupply operations. The GRC, he reported, would fight to the death for Quemoy. Once

Quemoy was attacked it would be impossible to withdraw from the Island or to reinforce it. A recent staff study, he noted, had indicated that Quemoy could hold out for from five to seven days without U. S. help.²⁹

On August 26 both CINCPAC and CINCPACAF provided estimates of the situation to Washington, the CINCPAC evaluation going directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCPACAF evaluation going through Air Force channels to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Though

*This deployment was not authorized by the Defense Department until August 28, and the redeployment did not begin until September 1.³¹

there was basic agreement between the two commanders on the need to defend the Offshore Islands, there was considerable disagreement on the question of the possible role of a conventional defense, which was to continue throughout the crisis and to plague relations between Admiral Felt and General Kuter. It was to lead Kuter to become increasingly bitter about what he felt to be the lack of vehemence with which Felt opposed the decision of the President, transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to try to engage in conventional operations in the defense of the Offshore Islands.

*I have not seen this Annex.

On the general question of Chinese Communist intentions, Kuter was in less disagreement with his immediate superior, Admiral Felt. He advised the Chief of Staff of the Air Force that the Chinese Communists were aiming to trigger a GRC reaction and make the GRC appear to be the aggressor, and probing U. S. policy as a start in an interdiction program. He predicted, however, that the Chinese Communists would avoid use of massive air power against Quemoy in fear of U. S. retaliation but that they would probably assault one of the smaller Quemoy Islands (that the United States had decided not to defend) within forty-eight hours. He felt that the GRC would not take much more provocation without attacking targets on the mainland, but that the United States should use all of its efforts to prevent mainland bombing while making a strong show of force, which he felt could be successful in preventing a Chinese Communist all-out sea and air effort against Quemoy and Matsu.³⁶

Kuter made it clear here and in other messages through Air Force channels that he was much less convinced than were other American officers in the field that it was in the interests of the United States to defend the Offshore Islands. He was equally vehement in his belief, in contrast

to the other officers in the field, that it would be disastrous to attempt a conventional defense of Quemoy.

On the next day Kuter, in a personal message to General Gerhart, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, stated his belief that the United States should keep out unless it were prepared to use its strongest weapons. He expressed surprise about the JCS statement that SAC B-47's on Guam had no capability for HE* since on or before November, 1957, he had been informed of a high level decision that all bombers, fighter bombers and strategic fighters were to maintain a dual capability. He continued:

On the one hand I would like to give three rousing cheers to the JCS statement. On the other hand it seems inconceivable that the United States might put fleet and marine aviation PACAF into a high explosive air war, and SAC should be incapable of entering the fight.

He expressed the belief that SAC must come in if an HE war were to take place, however distasteful this might be.³⁷ In response General Gerhart informed General Kuter on August 29 that the Air Force could not agree in principle

*See above, pp. 113-114.

with the use of SAC for nonnuclear operations. He confirmed that the units on Guam did have racks for HE weapons but that ten hours were needed for conversion. He shared Kuter's concern with the inadequacy of current HE forces.³⁸ Two days later Kuter, in a personal message to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, replied that he, too, abhorred the use of SAC for HE missions. However, he continued, if he were ordered to fight an HE war, he needed to use these forces. One B-36 could deliver more HE than a full squadron of F-100's.

If we must fight the war with HE weapons [he continued] it is in the best interests of the security of the country that part of the load be carried by the great bomb-carrying capability of the B-36's or B-47's rather than expending the entire EWP [Emergency War Plan] forces of this command which have also been organized, trained and equipped and positioned for the primary mission of nuclear strikes in general war.³⁹

Like his military counterparts in the field, U. S. Ambassador to the Republic of China Everett Drumright was moving in the period immediately following the Chinese Communist intense bombardment to implement the actions approved in Washington and at the same time to provide his assessment of Chinese Communist actions to his State Department superiors. Immediately after the outbreak of the

fighting, Drumright reported to Washington that he believed the Chinese Communists were probing and testing the U. S. reaction. He reported that the Chinese Communists clearly had not had time to evaluate the Dulles letter to Representative Morgan, but he felt that if the attack continued for several days, the United States should deliver a more explicit warning of the probable course of action should the attack continue. He wrote:

I believe that if we are prepared to commit ourselves, and I think we have no, repeat, no honorable alternative but to do so, we should by all means make our position clear to Reds. If we do, I believe Reds will draw back. If we do not, Reds are likely to continue probing until we are engaged in hostilities with them. 40

Thus the outbreak of Chinese Communist artillery fire led Drumright, as he was to continue to do throughout the crisis, to urge that the Administration issue a strong public statement that it would defend Quemoy. Drumright recognized that the Dulles-Morgan letter went a long way in this direction, but he still suspected that it was not unequivocal enough, and that a stronger statement would have to be made to halt the Chinese Communist artillery action. Drumright, who was a strong supporter of the Chinese Nationalist regime and had excellent working relations with

Chinese Nationalist President Chiang Kai-shek, was less worried than were the military officials in the field and some officials in Washington over the possibility that an unequivocal U. S. statement would put the GRC in a position, which they would not pass up, to maneuver the United States into a military operation with the Chinese Communists. Downgrading this danger and recognizing that the United States was in fact committed to defending the Offshore Islands, Drumright saw no reason why an unequivocal statement should not be made.

CHINESE NATIONALIST REACTION

Drumright's telegram was sent after he and Admiral Smoot had seen Chiang Kai-shek at 6:00 p.m. (5:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time) on the 24th. Chiang told them that the GRC would consult the United States before attacking the mainland if this were at all possible. Drumright, in reporting this, stated that he believed the GRC was exercising great restraint and would make every effort to consult. Chiang had said that he would appreciate a further public statement, but would not insist upon it if the United States did not find it possible. (Nevertheless, as was noted, Drumright did urge that one be made.) Chiang also asked if it were possible for the Offshore Islands to

be incorporated into the treaty area. At the same time he stressed that the GRC desperately needed U. S. aid immediately.⁴¹

Admiral Smoot in his report of the same conversation noted that Ambassador Drumright had told Chiang Kai-shek in a response to a request for stand-by authority to bomb the mainland that the letter of December 10, 1954, between Dulles and Yeh had a basic applicability to this request. Drumright noted that the U.S. Government did not question the GRC's inherent right of self-defense but expected the GRC to consult concerning any use of force "unless attacks are mounted of such magnitude and determination as clearly to require GRC retaliatory action of an emergency character." In any event, the United States did expect consultation to the extent feasible.⁴²

At the same time the GRC Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Hollington Tong, was approaching the State Department asking for a U. S. statement that any major attack on the Offshore Islands would represent a threat to the security of Taiwan. He reiterated that the GRC would live up to its commitment to consult the United States before retaliating against the mainland, but he warned that morale on the Offshore Islands would deteriorate

if no retaliation were made for heavy persistent attack. The State Department representative with whom Dr. Tong spoke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs James Graham Parsons, replied that it would probably be more useful to demonstrate U.S. intentions by actions rather than by words.⁴³ This conversation was reported to Drumright for his information.⁴⁴ On the same day, Drumright was requested to see that American military officers in the area avoided action which might be provocative and to request the GRC to do the same.⁴⁵

On the receipt of the JCS message (#947046) discussed above,* Drumright and Smoot met again with Chiang Kai-shek at 6:30 p.m. on August 26. Smoot reported to Chiang those sections of the JCS message which he had been authorized to reveal stressing the augmentation of U.S. forces and the increased military aid to the GRC. Chiang expressed his appreciation and then launched into a prolonged discussion of the Chinese Communist tactics in the crisis. His evaluation was that the Chinese Communists had adopted the tactic of creeping interdiction of Quemoy. He stressed in particular the PT boat danger and said that shelling, bombing and PT boat action would soon cut off the Offshore

* See pp. 113-116.

Islands. Morale would decline rapidly after the cutoff, and then the Chinese Communists could seize Quemoy easily. He intimated that the GRC could not prevent this action and expressed a hope that the United States would take emergency action to keep the Taiwan Straits open. GRC Defense Minister Yu, who was present, asked again for a public U. S. statement of support. According to Drumright, Chiang pleaded so much for U. S. help that he seemed to be overlooking the help already being given. Chiang urged the use of the American Seventh Fleet to keep the Taiwan Straits open. Drumright reporting on the meeting stated that, "I believe we should lose no time in telling him [Chiang] that we propose to help in keeping Taiwan Strait open to the OSI," and he again requested a more direct warning to the Chinese Communists of the likelihood of U. S. intervention in the hope of deterring them.⁴⁶

Smoot reporting on the same meeting noted that the reaction of Chiang was that of an anticlimax. He reported that the GRC feared an all-out Chinese Communist effort to isolate Quemoy, including use of submarines, air, torpedoes, and mines. Chiang pressed for concrete U. S. action, but seemed to have no clear idea of what he wanted. The portions of JCS 947046 which Smoot had been instructed not to

reveal were, Smoot believed, just what Chiang wanted to hear.* Just as the information that the United States was preparing to escort Chinese Nationalist ships to the Offshore Islands would have delighted Chiang and his advisors, Smoot felt, and he joined Drumright in pressing for a public statement of U.S. support.⁴⁷ On the 27th Drumright reported that, although morale in Quemoy appeared to be high, Chiang Kai-shek continued to be upset by the possibility of a successful interdiction campaign. The best estimate available, according to Drumright, was that Quemoy could hold out for thirty to forty-five days under effective blockade and that even under optimum amphibious attack conditions U.S. officers estimated that it would take a week for the Chinese Communists to capture Quemoy by a massive invasion.⁴⁸ In a later dispatch Drumright reported that the GRC expected an invasion of the Tans but only an attempt to interdict Quemoy.⁴⁹

The Nationalists continued their campaign to get stronger American support. In a conversation with Drumright and Smoot, Defense Minister Yu pointed out that the John Foster Dulles letter to Morgan was not succeeding in deterring the Chinese Communist attack on Quemoy and that therefore another more explicit warning, private or

* See p. 115.

public, should be given to the Chinese Communists.⁵⁰ Also on the 27th, Chiang Kai-shek sent the following letter to President Eisenhower:

A CIA dispatch of the following day reported that the GRC genuinely feared that the Offshore Islands would become untenable over a period of weeks or months if heavy Chinese Communist pressure continued. However, the report noted that GRC leaders were inclined to over-argue the case and exaggerate the imminence of the danger in order to assure maximum U.S. support. Sources within the GRC confirmed the American estimate that the Chinese Nationalists could resist an all-out assault on Quemoy for four to five days.

On the 28th, in a message to CINCPAC, the Taiwan Defense Command reported that the critical issue was the logistic supply of Quemoy. Artillery fire renders the Quemoy airfield useless and the landing beaches useful only on a hit-and-run basis, Smoot reported. Convoying,

*The letter is summarized by Eisenhower, in Waging Peace, p. 298.

even with U. S. help, would not get material on the beaches. The Chinese Nationalist counter-battery fire had been ineffective and while it might get better, the message continued, it would never completely control the situation. Shore bombardment, using GRC ships, was totally impractical. Chinese Air Force air bombardment of the gun emplacements was practical but only with great expense and limited effectiveness, which would only be temporary and would probably provide ammunition for Communist propaganda as well as possible triggering of Communist counter-action. The message continued by noting that while the Islands were garrisoned to hold out for thirty days, in the view of GRC authorities this capability disregarded the human factor of being under continuous pounding. Smoot believed that GRC officials were panicky and visualized a break coming in a matter of days. However, direct consultation with senior U. S. Army advisors on Quemoy indicated to him that the garrison was calm and highly motivated. He foresaw no deterioration for the next fifteen to thirty days. The Taiwan Defense Commander noted that the morale factor required immediate demonstration that the United States and the GRC were with the Quemoy garrison to the end. There was a need for critical

decisions then -- not thirty days later. He recommended that:

- (a) Task force 72 should initiate convoy assistance then with ships acting primarily as radar pickets for warning but "prepared to defend under attack";
- (b) tractors, trucks, etc., be rushed for employment;
- (c) the Taiwan Defense Command be given authority then to concur in Chinese Air Force bombardment, including napalm, of selected enemy gun positions as coming within the meaning of the GRC emergency measures for self-defense;
- (d) the Seventh Fleet ships should adopt more aggressive patterns of action limited to international waters in order to invite provocative action from the enemy.⁵²

CHAPTER III: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PROBE:
(August 23-31)

MILITARY ACTION

The Chinese Communist move which had led to the consideration of the problem of the Offshore Islands at the highest levels of the American Government and to the decisions and action discussed in the previous chapter was a sudden, intensive artillery fire barrage against the Islands of the Quemoy complex on the 23rd of August, 1958. The shelling began at 6:30 p.m. Some 40,000 shells were fired during the day at Big and Little Quemoy and Erh-tan and Ta-tan.*¹ Approximately 92 Chinese Nationalist soldiers were killed and 300 wounded. The principal target of the initial bombardment was the GRC Quemoy defense headquarters area. At the time of the outbreak of the bombardment a ceremony was in process to welcome Chinese Nationalist Defense Minister Yu to Quemoy. The attack

*The Chinese Nationalist Defense Ministry announced the shelling and noted that it came from the vicinity of Amoy, but it did not reveal the number of casualties from the attack. Chinese Nationalist Read Admiral Lin said that the shelling might or might not be the prelude to an attack on Quemoy or a diversionary move for such a possibility on Matsu.² He reported that the GRC retaliated with artillery fire. It was not until September 1 that the Western press was able to report the rough estimate that 200 GRC soldiers had been killed or wounded in the first day of Chinese Communist artillery fire.³

barely missed wounding Yu and seriously wounded Major General Lin, Army Chief of Staff, and resulted in the deaths of three Deputy Generals of the Quemoy Defense Command.*

The precise timing of the initial bombardment was probably related to the welcoming ceremony for the Defense Minister in an effort to demoralize the garrison by killing the commander of the garrison and his deputies as well as the Chief of Staff of the Chinese Nationalist Army and the Chinese Nationalist Defense Minister. Because the attack was centered on the Defense Command Headquarters, most of the damage in addition to the military casualties was to the communications facilities of Quemoy. In addition to the firing on Big Quemoy Headquarters, some fire was directed against Little Quemoy and the Islands of Erh-tan and Ta-tan. The firing against the two smaller islands in the Quemoy group continued in the early hours of the 24th. Major artillery fire was not to be resumed

*In an effort to reduce the morale impact of the casualties to high military officers this information was very tightly held by Chinese Nationalist officials and reached the United States only through Intelligence sources.

again until the afternoon of the 24th at approximately the same time (i.e., 6:00 p.m., Taiwan time).⁴

In addition to the heavy artillery fire against Quemoy, eighteen rounds of propaganda shells were fired at Matsu. This was the first and last attack on Matsu during the crisis.⁵ Also on August 23 an air engagement took place in which eight Chinese Nationalist planes clashed with three Chinese Communist MIG's with no damage reported on either side. This was the first air engagement since August 14.⁶

The Chinese Communists began the use of torpedo boats on the first day of the crisis and brought about a near crash with the American destroyer, Hopwell, which was patrolling the Taiwan Straits. A flotilla of Communist torpedo boats entered Lialo Bay on the south coast of Quemoy while two GRC landing boats were heading toward shore. The Communist torpedo boats sank one Nationalist ship and damaged the other landing craft. The U. S. destroyer Hopwell was ten miles off Quemoy and radioed for instructions. She was ordered to aid the damaged ships but not to fire on the torpedo boats unless fired upon. The torpedo boats circled the Hopwell and departed.⁷ As a result of this incident U. S. ships were authorized to

drive off or destroy surface craft firing on friendly ships in international waters.⁸

On the 24th the Chinese Communists fired 36,000 rounds of high explosives against the Quemoy complex, and the GRC responded with 8,273 rounds.⁹ The artillery fire, as indicated in Table 14, continued but at a substantially lower rate through the first days of September when there was a temporary cease-fire.

In addition to the exchange of artillery fire the Chinese Communists for the first and only time during the crisis bombed Quemoy, dropping eight 500-pound bombs on the west beaches of Quemoy. Eight Chinese Communist MIG's were involved in the operation, coordinated with the artillery fire.¹⁰

Also on the 24th two night naval engagements took place near Quemoy. The clashes resulted from a Chinese Communist attempt at landing on the small island of Tung-Ting in the Quemoy complex. The first attack involved four Chinese Communist gunboats and six small landing craft while the second involved five Chinese Communist gunboats and thirty motorized junks. According to the GRC Ministry of National Defense, several enemy ships were sunk and the attack was driven off by seven Chinese

Table 14

ARTILLERY FIRE: AUGUST 23 - SEPTEMBER 5

		Chinese Communists	Chinese Nationalists
August	23	40,000	5,200
	24	36,000	8,273
	25	3,213	5,000
	26	3,580	180
	27	11,660	0
	28	12,730	2,480
	29	16,200	2,250
	30	400	0
	31	800	0
September	1	1,350	3,130
	2	1,530	150
	3	300	0
	4	210	110
	5	0	608

SOURCE: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis, Intelligence Report No. 7805, "Chronology of Taiwan Straits Developments, June 30-September 26, 1958," (Prepared by Division of Research and Analysis for Far East), September 29, 1958 (Secret); CINCPAC Historical Division, "CINCPAC Taiwan Diary," August 1958-December 1959 (formerly Top Secret, downgraded to Secret); TDC Daily SITREPS [Situation

Table 14 -- continued

Reports], TDC file #3482 consisting of a daily telegram to CINCPAC, September 3, 1958 to October 17, 1958 (Secret). The three sources give somewhat different figures; where there were differences the CINCPAC figures were used.

Nationalist Patrol craft. The GRC lost one LSM (landing craft, mechanized) and had one LST (landing ship, tank) damaged.¹¹ Prior to September 3, when they were advised of U. S. escort plans, the Nationalists made five attempts to land an LST with troop replacements and several ships. These efforts were turned back by Chinese Communist PT boats and artillery fire.¹²

On the 25th two more air engagements took place, in the first of which eight F-86's opposed 8 MIG's, and 2 MIG's were downed, one destroyed. In the second, 16 F-86's opposed 15 MIG's, and 2 MIG's were destroyed.¹³ Following this there was a slackening in the sea and air activities of the Chinese Communists. In fact, there was not to be another air battle until September 8 nor would there be any further PT boat activities by the Chinese Communists for the rest of August, apparently because of the failure of the Chinese Nationalists to send any ships to Quemoy.*

By the 29th, according to a CINCPAC report, the Chinese Communists had moved at least three (and possibly

*According to one press report, Nationalist efforts to land supplies by ship at night were frustrated by Communist PT boat action.¹⁴ There is no confirmation of this in the classified materials I have seen.

two more) armies into the area opposite Taiwan and had augmented their naval forces. The report stated that there was possibly adequate aircraft for a military operation against Quemoy now assembled opposite the Offshore Islands.¹⁵ The Chinese Communists had also been reported to have occupied a fifth coastal airfield.¹⁶

PROPAGANDA

The Chinese Communist press and radio presented a reasonably accurate description of what was taking place in the Taiwan Straits during late August 1958. The People's Daily of August 24, for example, reported prominently, if briefly, on page one that on the afternoon of the 23rd one supply ship of the Chiang Kai-shek army which was on its way to Quemoy was attacked by Chinese Communist artillery on the Fukien front. A report on page three of the People's Daily noted that a U. S. cruiser had been seen near Quemoy.*¹⁷

On August 25 the People's Daily supplied a more detailed report of the events which had taken place on the 23rd. It repeated that the Chinese Nationalist supply ships had been driven back, but also reported that at

*The "cruiser" may have been the "destroyer" Hopwell referred to above.

5:30 p.m. on the afternoon of the 23rd, the Chinese Communist guns had launched a short attack not only against Chinese supply ships carrying troops to Quemoy but also against the Chinese Nationalist troops on Quemoy. The bombardment was reported to have lasted seventeen minutes and to have scored a hit on a ship in Lialo Bay.*18

On the 26th the People's Daily very prominently reported the action of Chinese Communist torpedo boats and artillery on the Fukien front. It reported that at 3:18 p.m. on the 24th GRC artillery on Quemoy suddenly bombarded coastal islands in the hands of the Chinese Communists in order to cover a GRC ship attempting to enter Lialo Bay. Chinese Communist artillery, the paper stated, attacked the Chinese Nationalist artillery and fired on the ship as well as the supply ship which had been hit on the 23rd and which had remained in the Bay. The second Chinese Nationalist ship was hit and both ships tried to

*Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi was reported on August 25 to have made a statement at a diplomatic reception right after the bombardment began, of which conflicting reports reached Western sources. Some claimed to have heard him say, "We have already begun the liberation of Quemoy and Matsu," and others heard, "We are about to liberate the Offshore Islands."19 This is the only diplomatic activity by the Chinese Communists during August in relation to the events in the Taiwan Straits.

escape. The Chinese Communist torpedo boats, according to the People's Daily story, intercepted the ship, damaged one, and sank the other.²⁰ On the same day the People's Daily took note of the Dulles letter to Morgan and denounced it as interference in the internal affairs of China.²¹

Chinese Communist propaganda in the first few days of the intense artillery fire and active PT boat operations avoided any dramatic claims and confined itself to a description of what was taking place in the Taiwan Straits. There was clearly no effort to suggest that a major international crisis had begun or that a threat to the United States had been made: rather the Communist activity was portrayed as a routine outbreak of military action in the continuing civil war.

Soviet propaganda during this period seems to have reflected the same desire to play down the importance of the Chinese Communist military action. For several days the Soviet news media did not report on the events in the Taiwan Straits. The only indirect reference came in a speech by Soviet Premier Khrushchev, which was reportedly delivered on August 13 but not printed in Pravda until August 23. In the speech Khrushchev declared that in

surveying the international scene he saw no developments which could lead to war in the immediate future.²²

The first explicit Soviet commentary on the Quemoy operations occurred on the 27th with the Soviet press citing a TASS (Soviet News Agency) dispatch from London which referred to action by the Chinese Communist shore batteries.²³ A day later on the 28th another Soviet publication was to refer to the Chinese shelling as a punitive retaliation for the attempt by the Chinese Nationalist ships to land supplies on Quemoy.⁴

Izvestia on the 27th referred to the tension in the Far East and attributed it to the U. S. ruling class. It listed a series of "provocative" actions by the United States, including putting arms on Taiwan and helping to reorganize Chiang Kai-shek's armies. It quoted Chiang as saying that preparations were almost complete for a return to the mainland.²⁵ On the following day Moscow Radio blasted the U. S. Far Eastern moves and said the United States had decided that the Offshore Islands were not essential for the defense of Taiwan but that the GRC troops were staying there for political reasons.²⁶

The People's Daily of August 28 reported that the Ministry of National Defense had on the 27th commended

certain units of the Chinese Communist Navy which had distinguished themselves by seriously threatening the sea-line of communication between Quemoy and Taiwan. It called on the sea units to coordinate closely with ground and air forces and to be ready at any time to deal an even greater blow to any attempted Chiang Kai-shek reinforcement.²⁷ Two days later, on the 29th, the Ministry of National Defense commended the artillery units for their activities during the past week. Gunners were cited for their action which prevented the Chiang Kai-shek regime from supplying Quemoy and for the damage which it had done to the military establishment on Quemoy.²⁸

On the 31st Pravda made its first formal comment on the developing situation in the Taiwan Straits. The "observer" article said that the Soviet Union would give Communist China "moral and material aid" and warned that any U. S. aggression would only lead to a spreading of the war. It stated that any threat against the Chinese Communists would be considered a threat against the Soviet Union and it warned the United States against believing that hostilities against China could be localized. The situation was described as an internal affair of the Chinese Communist people.²⁹

Beginning on the 27th and continuing in increasing intensity until September 2, Peking Radio in a series of broadcasts only in the Taiwan area called on the Quemoy garrison to surrender. Neither the home nor the international services of the New China News Agency (NCNA) or the Peking Radio carried the broadcast.³⁰ The broadcast on August 29 warned the Quemoy garrison that it was as "hopeless as a pair of turtles entrapped in a flask," and continued:

Chinese Compatriots on Quemoy and Matsu: the day has come for you to be liberated from utter distress. Arise quickly! Do not be fooled by the deceptive propaganda carried out by the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique. Arise to welcome the People's Liberation Army and to wipe out the Chiang bandit troops that continue to resist the liberation, so that you will be able to return to the embrace of your fatherland to lead a happy life.

Officers and men of the Chiang armed forces on Quemoy and Matsu: you have come to the critical moment of choice between life and death. Do not continue to stake your lives on the United States and Chiang Kai-shek. There is a road to life open for you -- kill the U.S. advisors and defect to our side. There is no other way out.³¹

On the following days the Communist broadcasts were directed personally to the commanders of the garrisons on Big and Little Quemoy urging them to surrender and promising

them high positions if they did so. The broadcasts warned that the alternative was destruction. The situation on the islands was described as hopeless:

The PLA [People's Liberation Army] air and naval forces are capable of block-
ading these islands, cutting off all
sea and air support by the Chiang armed
forces as well as military supplies.
All these islands are short of water,
food, fuel, and medical supplies, nor
will the Chiang troops find any means
to replenish the supply of ammunition.³²
[Italics added.]

CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY

An assessment of why the Chinese Communists launched a move against the Offshore Islands in August 1958 must begin with a consideration of the mood of the Chinese leadership at this time. Both domestically and in foreign policy, 1958 marked a major turning point in development within Communist China. Domestically, mid-summer of 1958 represented a period of a marked swing to the Left. There was a great confidence on the part of the leadership stemming from their belief, which had probably become firm several years before, that the survivability of a Communist regime in China had been assured by their ability to establish effective control over all the mainland and their elimination of any active opposition from any part of the

population. There was also a certain amount of frustration since the problems of agriculture remained to be solved. It was this combination of confidence and frustration which led the Mao regime to feel that a new and dramatic impetus had to be given to their effort to make China into a great economic power. Thus it was in the spring that Peking announced the "great leap forward" in industry and during the crisis announced the formation of the communes and militia.

In foreign policy there was a similar mixture of confidence mixed with frustration on several key points. On the positive side the Chinese believed that a major shift in the balance of world forces was taking place with the development of Soviet industrial and technological power as represented by the Soviet Sputniks and intercontinental missiles. The Chinese Communists began to talk of the East Wind prevailing over the West Wind and during the Quemoy crisis to resurrect and to stress the paper tiger theme.* They were urging the Soviet Union to be more aggressive in dealing with American and other Western moves throughout the world.

*Just after the crisis the Chinese re-issued a pamphlet, Comrade Mao Tse-tung on "Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers," Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1958.

The Chinese, as well as the Russians, may have been led to believe that there was a reduction in American willingness to defend its interests based on the coming major changes in the military balance of power. In fact, the Soviet move in Berlin several months after the Taiwan Straits crisis (which may in fact have been planned prior to the crisis) probably reflected this belief that, though the military balance of power had not yet changed, American will and determination had changed as a result of the dramatic demonstration of Soviet technological capability, which seemed to promise a forthcoming change in the military balance of power.

Chinese frustration in her foreign policy in 1958 was related to three factors: the growing Sino-Soviet disagreements, the failure of the Bandung spirit and the spirit of the five principles to produce a major shift in the alliance of nations in the Pacific area, and the failure to eliminate the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan. We now know that the period 1957-58 marked the beginning of the intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the disagreement between Russia and China as to what the meaning was of the changing balance of forces and how hard the Sino-Soviet bloc could push in extending the area of

Communism against Western resistance. The Chinese may have believed that their dispute with the Soviet Union might eventually become apparent to the Western powers and hence damage the credibility of the Soviet deterrent threat against American nuclear attacks on Communist China. In addition, the growth of the Sino-Soviet dispute could lead to a reduction in Chinese Communist military capability in terms of modern weapons vis-a-vis the Chinese Nationalists, who were continuing to be supplied with new weapons by the United States. Thus the growing Sino-Soviet disagreements created not only frustration but pressure to move before the disagreements became more intense.

In 1954-55, Chinese Communist foreign policy had swung sharply to the Right with the Chinese participation in the Bandung Conference and the signing of the agreement of five principles of peaceful coexistence with a number of Asian countries. The Chinese Communists may have expected that these agreements would pave the way for increased Chinese Communist influence in these countries and a gradual shifting in the Asian balance of power. By 1958, the Chinese seemed to have become convinced that they had overestimated the efficacy of a soft line and were to adopt a hard line not only in the Taiwan Straits, but in Tibet, Japan, and elsewhere.

The Chinese continued to be frustrated by their inability to eliminate the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan and thus to end the long Chinese civil war. With the hopes of a quick capture of Taiwan dashed in 1950 by the American decision to interpose the Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland, the Peking regime had been searching for a way to bring down the Nationalist regime and to end the existence of a rival claimant not only to the control of the Chinese mainland but also to recognition by other governments and the United Nations as the government of China. The Peking regime probably believed that morale in Taiwan was at a low point in 1958 because of the great economic and political progress being made on the mainland. The hope of returning to the mainland among Chiang's followers was clearly at a low ebb. In addition, the Chinese Communists may have believed that the American commitment to the defense of the Offshore Islands and of Taiwan had become less firm because of the changing balance of forces. The anti-American riots on Taiwan in 1957 may have led Peking to overestimate GRC-U. S. differences and to feel that these differences could be exploited. If the U. S. stood by and allowed Quemoy to fall, GRC confidence in the U. S. might be shaken to the

point that a deal with the mainland began to seem desirable. Finally, the Chinese Communists probably felt that in this period of confidence and of a Left move in foreign policy that they should make some kind of effort to seize their most important foreign policy objective -- Taiwan. It was clear to them that a direct move against Taiwan was not only militarily infeasible, but also very dangerous and hence that the only hope of getting Taiwan was to put pressure on the Offshore Islands.

In addition to capturing Taiwan, the Chinese Communists had shown an interest in driving the United States from the Western Pacific as a whole, and eliminating the United States as a major military and political power in the Asian area. In connection with this, the Chinese Communists had been interested in demonstrating U. S. lack of resolve not only to the Soviet Union but also to countries on the Chinese periphery. Correspondingly, they were interested in demonstrating Chinese Communist military strength, as would be shown by their ability to capture Quemoy, and political will not only to the world at large to establish their claims of being a world power but also to Asian states which they hoped would recognize the need to accept general Chinese Communist political direction.

In order to secure these objectives, the Chinese Communists apparently wanted to undermine the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan by capturing Quemoy. They hoped to create the possibility of taking over Taiwan by subversion or by a political arrangement with a group which might overthrow Chiang, by capturing the Quemoy Islands on which Chiang had staked much of his prestige and on which he had placed one-third of his combat-ready military forces. Though the U.S. Government and Chiang Kai-shek shared with the Chinese Communists the belief that if Quemoy fell, Taiwan would soon fall by subversion, it is not clear if anybody had a carefully worked out scenario as to how this might take place. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists probably had a general belief that the rapid deterioration of morale on Taiwan which would occur because of the fall of Quemoy and the loss of a large part of the Chinese Nationalist military capability would open the way for subversive moves. It might lead, for example, to a fall from power of Chiang Kai-shek and a seizure of power by other Chinese Nationalist leaders who were willing to make a deal with the Chinese Communist regime. Both before, during and after the crisis, the Chinese Communists were to make overtures to Chiang Kai-shek

as well as to other leaders of the Kuomintang to return to the Fatherland, and to accept positions with the Chinese Communist regime. They were to offer Chiang Kai-shek in the closing days of the crisis a governorship over Taiwan and participation, if he desired it, in the Central Chinese Communist regime. Whether or not they had any particular scenario in mind or any precise plans for subversion on Taiwan after the fall of Quemoy, it was not unrealistic for the Chinese Communists to assume that there was at least a possibility that Taiwan would fall if Quemoy were captured. Given that this was their only hope of capturing Taiwan, the Chinese Communists may have decided that this was a risk worth taking and may in fact have convinced themselves that Taiwan was more likely to fall by subversion than it actually was. However, it must be emphasized that the Chinese Nationalists and Americans on Taiwan shared with the Chinese Communists the belief that the fall of Quemoy might well lead to the fall of Taiwan.

Whether or not the capture of Quemoy would lead immediately to the fall of Taiwan, it would succeed in demonstrating not only to the GRC but to other Asian countries the U. S. lack of willingness and lack of resolve. Though the United States commitment to defend Quemoy had

never been a very precise one, it was felt in at least some countries in Asia, including South Korea, that this was a test of American determination and American will. Certainly the expectation of other Asian countries that the United States would defend what they considered to be their vital interest would have declined substantially had the United States refused to join with the GRC in the defense of Quemoy, and either had insisted upon an evacuation or stood by and allowed a large part of the GRC army to fall to the Chinese Communists.

This probe with the hope of capturing Quemoy was, of course, not without its risks to Peking. However, as will be made clear, Peking recognized and sought to guard against the risks. Not only might it have led obviously to U. S. or GRC retaliation against the Chinese mainland, but it also could have led to a U. S. forced evacuation by the Chinese Nationalists not only of Quemoy but also of the Matsu Islands, thus paving the way for a de facto recognition of a two-China situation by the United States, by the United Nations, and by a number of American allies and neutrals if not by either of the Chinese regimes. The Chinese were to demonstrate later on in the crisis that they were not interested in a negotiated settlement which

would give them control over all the Offshore Islands in return for at least implicit acceptance of a de facto two-China situation. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists probably felt that this was a risk worth taking in the belief that if the United States forced an evacuation from the Islands, it might well lead to an overthrow of the regime on Taiwan. In addition, there was the possibility that if the United States either stood by and allowed Quemoy to fall or forced an evacuation from it, the Chinese Nationalists would maintain control of Matsu, making a de facto two-China solution less likely. Though the Chinese Communists may not have put great weight on the value of Matsu remaining under Chinese Nationalist control, they probably gave it some consideration, and this plus their general propensity to concentrate on a single area probably accounts for their failure to move simultaneously against Matsu.

Thus, on August 23, the Chinese Communists launched a combined artillery and naval effort designed to blockade Quemoy and force its surrender. The success of the Chinese Communist effort during the next two weeks in blockading Quemoy and preventing any Chinese Nationalist ships from reaching the Offshore Islands (as well as U.S. evaluations

of the effectiveness of a Chinese Communist artillery-PT boat blockade of Quemoy) suggests that the Chinese Communists with the use of their PT boats, and perhaps submarines and mines, as well as their artillery fire, could have successfully cut off Quemoy had the GRC not been aided by the United States in its efforts to resupply the Offshore Islands.

This seems then to have been the basic Chinese Communist strategy with which they began the crisis. The Chinese Communists hoped to isolate and ultimately to capture the Island of Quemoy against a Chinese Nationalist defense. The Chinese Communists probably considered two possible alternatives, both of which depended on the United States not being willing to aid the Nationalist defense of Quemoy. They might have assumed the United States would force the Nationalists to withdraw from Quemoy as they had forced the evacuation of the Tachens in the face of Chinese Communist artillery fire in 1955. Alternatively, the Chinese Communists may have assumed that the United States would either be unsuccessful in forcing the withdrawal or would not try to force the withdrawal and that the GRC would make a major military effort to hold Quemoy without American help. This effort

would ultimately fail, leading to the capture of the Island and the garrison and a heavy morale and political and military loss to the GRC.

The Chinese Communist strategy then fully depended on the hope that the United States would either stay out or would force a Chinese Nationalist withdrawal from Quemoy. There were several reasons why the Chinese Communists may have held to this belief, including the change in the military balance and the U. S. actions in the Middle East.

The GRC's reaction to the Chinese Communist activation of their jet airfield opposite Taiwan may have also given the Chinese Communists reason to hope that the United States would put pressure on the GRC to evacuate the Quemoy Islands or at least would stay aloof. Chiang Kai-shek had made public statements declaring that were the Chinese Communists ever to occupy these airfields, the GRC would be forced to bomb them. In fact, he made no such move and the Chinese Communists may well have attributed this (correctly) to American pressure not to take action against the mainland. In occupying the airfields, the Chinese Communists clearly showed concern with the possibility that they would be attacked; they occupied them slowly,

one at a time, and placed only a small number of planes on each field, so that if there were an attack a large part of their air force would not be destroyed. The absence of Chinese Nationalist attacks on the airfields gave Peking reason to believe that the United States was exercising great restraint on GRC action.

The GRC had been pressing the United States since July, when they had begun to believe that there would be a Chinese Communist probe against the Offshore Islands, for a public American statement that the United States would assist in the defense of Quemoy. As was indicated above, every American official of importance on Taiwan had been approached by his Chinese Nationalist counterpart proposing such a statement, and the GRC Ambassador to Washington had also made some representation to the American Government asking for a public statement. The volume of activity in this regard on Taiwan, including leaks by the GRC, suggests that the Chinese Communists would have become aware of this effort and might have taken the American refusal to give such a statement as a further indication that the U. S. might not be prepared to defend Quemoy.*

*It should be noted that the United States did make some slight increase in its military force and put some

Thus, on balance, the Chinese Communists probably concluded that the possibility of gaining their most important foreign policy objective, Taiwan, was worth the risks involved in their probe. The speed with which, as we shall see, they seemed to have adjusted to its failure suggests that they were somewhat aware of the possibilities that the probe would not succeed.

forces on alert in the Taiwan Straits area in the period prior to the outbreak of the crisis. However, much of this activity was in connection with the moves in the Middle East. Pacific forces went on alert because of the general military activity of the United States, and in fact had gone off alert by mid-August (see Table 9).

CHAPTER IV: THE U. S. DECISION TO ESCORT

Following the White House meeting on August 25, which had authorized a U. S. military build-up in the Taiwan Straits and preparation for escort to the Offshore Islands should that become necessary, the working levels in State, Defense, and CIA continued to grope with the problem of what the Chinese Communist intentions were, and what the proper U. S. response should be. They were confronted with reports from the field (discussed in Chapter II) which indicated that Quemoy might ultimately be successfully blockaded by the Chinese Communists without air action unless the United States aided the Nationalists. It was also reported that the Chinese Nationalists would not accept an indefinite blockade of Quemoy, even if the Islands were not seriously threatened and might at any point, because of declining morale or a desire to expand the conflict, resort to bombing of the mainland. The possibility of an invasion of one or more of the Islands continued to loom as a possibility which required contingency planning. A letter from Chiang to Eisenhower was also to arrive, necessitating a response to his requests for increased American involvement.* It thus became

*See above, pp. 152-153.

increasingly clear that more specific high-level decisions were needed.

PLANNING FOR DECISION

On August 27, the Far East Bureau of the Department of State urged the Secretary of State to secure a high-level agreement on the military steps which it believed were necessary to deter Chinese Communist attack on the Offshore Islands. The memorandum noted that the Chinese Communists might not be deterable and that the United States might have to use atomic weapons, perhaps initially only one or two low-yield weapons, on the Fukien airfields to prevent an invasion of Quemoy. However, it warned that more extensive U. S. attacks might be necessary and that SNIE 100-9-58* had predicted that extensive U. S. nuclear attacks would bring a Soviet reaction with nuclear weapons on Taiwan and the Seventh Fleet and possibly against other U. S. forces and bases in the Far East. The memorandum concluded by noting that there was a need to try to avoid nuclear war by deterring the Chinese Communists and that therefore the United States should:

*See p. 113.

- (1) provide 8-inch howitzers* or other guns needed for hitting Red shore batteries with high explosives;
- (2) initiate convoy or partial convoy;
- (3) initiate U. S. air drops;
- (4) initiate U. S. air escort;
- (5) plan for conventional attacks on the mainland.

However, the Far East Bureau memorandum cautioned that the Department of Defense had said that it would not consider local defense without the use of nuclear weapons. It was therefore necessary for the President to direct State and Defense to agree on a series of nonnuclear and then limited nuclear moves.¹

Also on the 27th, a series of phone calls took place between Parsons, Dulles, who was still on vacation in Canada, and Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter. In the initial phone conversation between Parsons and Dulles, the Secretary was told that the artillery bombardment had abated considerably and that a letter (quoted

*Although the press was to play up the nuclear capability of the 8-inch howitzers, they were sent to Quemoy to bolster the Nationalist high explosive capability. The 8-inch howitzer is an effective dual capable weapon, but there were no contingency plans during the crisis for delivering nuclear shells with it.

above)* had arrived from Chiang Kai-shek addressed to Eisenhower calling for increased American participation. Parsons told the Secretary that he believed that Chiang was exaggerating the situation and that the United States should not be stampeded into action. Dulles, during a return phone call to Herter, was told by the Acting Secretary that the State Department was evaluating the use of intermediaries but that he did not think it was a good idea. Dulles responded that he thought it might be desirable to use intermediaries. He opposed using Ambassador Thompson in Moscow to send a message, but stated that he was attracted by the idea of asking India to act as an intermediary to transfer a message to the Chinese Communists.²

In addition to his phone conversation with Dulles, Parsons submitted a formal memorandum to the Secretary, recommending actions which should be taken in response to Chiang Kai-shek's letter to Eisenhower. Parsons recommended increased U. S. support in the form of rushing 8-inch howitzers to Quemoy for silencing the shore batteries with high explosives and augmenting amphibious capabilities

*See pp. 152-153.

of the Nationalists plus U. S. convoy or partial convoy and U. S. air escort of convoys.³ In responding to Chiang's letter of the 27th, on the next day, Eisenhower simply wrote that he had received Chiang's important message and appreciated it. He said that he could not give an immediate reply, but that the requests contained in it were being considered (as they were) at the highest levels.⁴

While preparing for a meeting scheduled for August 29 at the White House, the Government in its public statements sought to convey to the Chinese Communists its determination to prevent the fall of Quemoy. On August 27, the President held a press conference at which he declared, in a statement which moved further towards justifying the defense of Quemoy under the authority of the Congressional Resolution, that the Offshore Islands were now more important to the defense of Taiwan than they were three years ago. He said the Offshore Islands had become more important because the Chinese Nationalists had then deployed about a third of their forces to certain of these Islands and that made for a closer interlocking between the defense systems of the Islands and Taiwan itself than was the case before. He refused to speculate on possible defense of the Offshore Islands and said that the Dulles

letter to Representative Morgan was the best thing that could be said at the moment.⁵

The President was asked at his press conference if U. S. commanders in the field had authority to use atomic weapons at their own discretion, and replied that, "It's not possible to use these weapons except with the specific authority of the President." However, he went on to say that he could not remember if there were specific circumstances of self defense in which this prohibition would not apply.*⁶

On the next day the State Department issued another warning to the Chinese Communists which read as follows:

The Department of State has taken note of the broadcast of the Fukien Command of the Chinese Communist Army, rebroadcast by Peiping Radio late yesterday [August 27] in which Peiping states, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army has determined to liberate Taiwan, a territory of the fatherland, as well as the Offshore Islands and the landing on Quemoy is imminent." The fact that the Offshore Islands are related intimately to Taiwan in this Peiping radio threat confirms what Secretary Dulles said in his recent letter to Mr. Morgan, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The Secretary pointed out

*There were, however, no such circumstances. The President's statement was apparently not a calculated threat.⁷

that the ties between the Offshore Islands and Formosa have become closer, that their interdependence has increased, and that he believed that it would be "highly hazardous" for anyone to assume that if the Chinese Communists were to attempt to change the situation by force and now attack, or seek to conquer these islands, that could be a limited operation.

This direct threat and the massive bombardment of Quemoy come as stark reminders of Peiping's militarism and aggressive expansionism and are in direct contrast to Peiping's repeated professions of peaceful intentions.*8

On the morning of the 28th, a series of internal memoranda were prepared in preparation for a meeting later that day which was to draw up a plan for a meeting with the President on the 29th. An internal State Department memorandum by Green proposed that a series of questions be sent to the Navy for possible answers:

- (1) Is there a pattern of Chinese Communist shelling?
Can they crater the airfields?

*The American press speculated on the basis of the Eisenhower statement at his press conference and the John Foster Dulles letter that the Administration was now committed to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. It was reported that officials believed that the GRC had put its strength on the Islands to limit U. S. freedom of action.⁹

- (2) Are there U. S. plans to take over the air defense of Taiwan? How effective would this be?
- (3) How can U. S. escort operations be implemented?
- (4) What are the relative capabilities of the latest TAC (Tactical Air Command) aircraft relative to the MIG-15 and 17?
- (5) Do the Chinese Communists depend on Amoy area airfields? If not, could Chinese Communists control the air over the Offshore Islands? Could the fields be taken out with conventional bombs?
- (6) How many military warning steps are there before the United States must begin selective nuclear bombing of airfields?¹⁰

Another State Department memorandum prepared in Chinese Affairs for Robertson reevaluated the question of the defense of the smaller Offshore Islands in addition to Big and Little Quemoy and the five major Matsu Islands. The estimate of the Office of Chinese Affairs was that the loss of the small Islands would not have a serious effect on GRC morale. However, the loss without U. S. reaction might encourage further Chinese Communist probing against the main Offshore Islands and affect morale in the Offshore

Islands because of the uncertainty involved. The memorandum predicted that the GRC would try to defend the smaller Islands but, except possibly for Ta-tan, would not make a major commitment. There had never been, the memorandum noted, a specific U. S. commitment with regard to the small Islands.¹¹

In the Pentagon an internal Navy memorandum was prepared that proposed to the Chief of Naval Operations that he support the State Department suggestion that 8-inch howitzers be rushed to Taiwan. It was noted that Navy forces were already preparing for escort and air defense of Taiwan and it recommended that the GRC be permitted to retaliate with bombing raids on the shore guns.¹²

At the same time the Air Staff was advising the Chief of Staff of the Air Force that it continued to believe that the United States should issue a warning to the Chinese Communists that, unless the present attacks were discontinued, the United States was prepared to participate actively with the GRC by taking retaliatory measures against the source of the attack.¹³

Later in the day (August 28), a meeting was held at the Pentagon in the office of the Acting Secretary of Defense Quarles, at which were present members of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff as well as Acting Secretary of State Herter and the Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, General Cabell.

The meeting was aimed at agreeing on a course of action to be recommended to the President at a meeting to be held on the following day. Admiral

Burke presented a paper to the meeting outlining a proposed course of actions in the current "Phase A" situation. He suggested:

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WHITE HOUSE MEETING (AUGUST 29)

At the White House meeting a series of proposed GRC and U. S. actions were discussed.

There was extensive discussion of the problem of escorting and U. S. participation in GRC convoys.

*This was not made clear in passing the authority on to the GRC. See p. 209.

The message approved by the President for transmittal to the field authorized the commanders in the area to escort and convoy to within three miles of Quemoy to the extent that GRC forces could not fulfill this task. They were directed to maintain freedom of the sea by actions

confined to international waters. The Taiwan Defense Command was authorized at his discretion to assume responsibility for the air defense of Taiwan. In the event of a Chinese Communist air attack against Quemoy and Matsu, GRC aircraft were assumed to have the right to pursue, i.e., to follow aircraft to bases and "attack aircraft at those bases."* Smoot was also instructed to make clear to the GRC that the United States did not share the notion of the inevitability of the loss of the Islands by bombardment. He was informed that the shipment of twelve 8-inch howitzers was being expedited, including six with conventional ammunition from Okinawa.**

*This was in contrast to U. S. planes which had only the right of hot pursuit over the mainland in certain situations but which could not bomb the mainland without Presidential approval.

**The press the next day was able to report very little of what had occurred at the White House meeting. In fact, The New York Times, for example, noted only that Eisenhower had conferred with Herter on the military situation in the Far East and the shelling of Quemoy.¹⁷ Chalmers M. Roberts in the Washington Post was able to report new indications that Eisenhower would help if the Chinese Communists attacked Quemoy and Matsu. Speculation was that the GRC would be allowed to bomb Communist China if an all-out attack on Quemoy took place, and that then the United States would follow with bombing raids on the Chinese mainland. Roberts reported correctly that, though the Chiefs of Staff view the Offshore Islands as unimportant militarily, they are prepared to defend them.¹⁸

By the end of August, the press was beginning to reflect the deep concern which U. S. officials were beginning

The President and his advisors in making the decision at this meeting to authorize escort to within three miles of Quemoy and to permit U. S. assumption of responsibility for air defense of Taiwan, as well as authorizing the GRC to attack bases on the mainland in the event of an air attack against the Offshore Islands, acted in response to these and other requests from Chiang Kai-shek and American officials in the field. In addition to requesting convoy all the way in to the Offshore Islands, Chiang also asked for a public statement by the United States that an attack on Quemoy would constitute an attack on Taiwan, which would be resisted by the United States. Drumright, Smoot and Felt had all concurred in the proposal for a public U. S. statement and had urged convoy all the way in. The officials on Taiwan, Smoot and Drumright, had joined GRC officials in urging that the Chinese Nationalists be given permission then to attack the mainland artillery positions. However, Felt had advised that he did not think this was necessary as yet.

to feel that the Chinese Communists would in fact seek to invade some of the smaller Offshore Islands, and that there was now deep concern about the possibility of large-scale hostilities with the Chinese Communists.¹⁹

In deciding how to react to these suggestions for additional action, American officials were confronted with several possible dangers and lines of action to meet them. Reports from the field, as well as the Special National Intelligence Estimate, had indicated that both an invasion of Quemoy and a successful interdiction were possibilities and therefore action was needed to deal with both contingencies. In devising a course of action, American officials felt considerable restraint from the Formosa Congressional Resolution. They felt that this Resolution specifically made it impossible for the United States to comply with the request that it issue a formal statement that it would defend Quemoy from attack. It was felt that this statement could only be issued after an attack had begun and the judgment could be made that it somehow did threaten the security of Taiwan. Thus despite the fact that a preliminary decision to defend the Offshore Islands had been made several days previously and more detailed plans would be approved within a few days, top American civilian officials agreed unanimously that they could not issue a public statement.

Also influencing a decision on the possibility of a statement of any kind or even a significantly greater U. S.

involvement was the dispute among U. S. officials as to whether or not the Chinese Nationalists were making less than an all-out effort on their own to resupply the Islands. A number of officials in Washington, including Herter, Burke, Quarles, and Twining believed that there was at least a strong possibility that the Nationalists were dragging their feet.* Other officials, while doubting that this was the case, were nevertheless prepared to try a limited U. S. involvement to see whether it would be sufficient to break the blockade.

In considering what was necessary to deter a Chinese Communist invasion, American officials believed that a determined show of American strength and American involvement would accomplish this purpose. A number of steps had been authorized to augment the U. S. military presence in the Taiwan Straits and to increase GRC and American strength in the area. It was hoped that these efforts plus the U. S. involvement in the convoy operations would be sufficient to deter an attack, although planning was to proceed on what should be done in the event that the Chinese Communists could not be successfully deterred.

*Smoot was also to come to this conclusion fairly early in the crisis, but he was never to convey this belief to Washington.

There were apparently several reasons for this decision, not the least important was the legal question of not entering the territorial waters of Quemoy. It was the view of American officials that to enter the territorial

waters during military operations would be to imply a commitment to defend the Islands which in turn would imply that the Formosa Resolution had been invoked. Thus, given that they were not prepared to invoke the Resolution, some officials felt that escorting beyond three miles was not possible. In addition, most U.S. ships which would be involved in the escort could not get any closer than three miles to Quemoy and it was believed that escort to this point would be sufficient to protect against most Communist PT boat action and should enable successful escort operations. In addition, all but one or two of the Chinese Communist guns had ranges which would not have enabled them to reach American ships which were beyond the three-mile limit from Quemoy. Thus, for a variety of reasons, it was agreed that escort would be kept to within three miles of the Islands with the feeling that this should be sufficient to enable successful resupply.

In this second White House meeting, the American Government moved further towards a complete involvement in the defense of Quemoy, while avoiding a public statement because of domestic legal and political pressures. The United States undertook to assist substantially in the effort to break the blockade while attempting to deter an invasion

attempt by a show of American military strength. The decision which remained to be taken was on what precisely the United States would do in the event of an invasion, and it was to this task that American planners were in turn following the White House meeting on the 29th.

The proposal that the GRC be authorized to bomb artillery positions on the mainland was turned down on grounds that it was unlikely to be successful in neutralizing the artillery fire and that it might lead to a substantial expansion of the war if the Chinese Communists reacted by bombing Quemoy or Taiwan. The recommendation was seen largely as being an attempt to improve GRC morale by not leaving them seemingly in a position of simply standing by and allowing the artillery fire to go on. It was felt, however, that the other moves that were being authorized would at least for the time being be sufficient to overcome any danger of a collapse in morale on Quemoy.

IMPLEMENTING WHITE HOUSE DECISIONS

Following the White House meeting, JCS message #947298 was sent to TDC and CINCPAC embodying the agreed instructions and advising them that these decisions had resulted from a White House meeting on August 29, 1958, in response to a request from Chiang Kai-shek.²⁰

The Task Force ships were ordered in line with the original CNO to CINCPAC message to provide convoy protection and escort to GRC supply ships to Quemoy and Matsu up to three miles and to the extent that the GRC could not perform the task alone.²⁵

The Commander of the Seventh Fleet, in a message to all his subordinate forces on September 2, gave them permission to give all possible support in protecting Chinese Nationalist ships whether attacked by surface, air or

subsurface in international waters. They were warned, however, not to provoke fire or invite exchanges with shore batteries. The message concluded: "Remember, the shot you fire will be heard around the world, maybe in the floor of the U. N., be right; however, the objective is to get the supplies through."26

Smoot reported on September 2 that in order to assume responsibility for the air defense of Taiwan he needed one all-weather squadron in south Taiwan and one in the north as well as additional communication facilities. He informed

CINCPAC that these would be available on September 9 and that he would approach the GRC on the 12th.

Also following the White House meeting on the 29th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that CASF XRAY TONGO, a TAC mobile unit, be deployed to Taiwan.²⁹

On August 31 Drumright and Smoot met with Chiang to inform him of the decisions reached as a result of his letter to Eisenhower. On the basis of JCS #947298

Smoot outlined the American position as follows:

In the event that the Chinese Communists launch air attacks on the Kinmen [Quemoy] or Matsu Islands and such attacks are met by GRC aircraft, the Government of the United States would consider that the GRC's inherent right of self-defense would include GRC air attacks on Chinese Communist aircraft conducting such attacks and that the right to pursuit exists [sic.]. In other words, GRC aircraft would be justified in following Chinese Communist aircraft to their bases and attacking aircraft at these bases.³⁰

Nevertheless, the message conveyed to him was one that he

Quemoy defenders might be strangled and CINCPAC, in a message commenting on the Drumright telegram, concurred in this assessment. Felt noted that the situation was virtually at Phase II of JCS #947298 and recommended that he be authorized

to provide escort and air cover into the territorial waters of Quemoy, and up to each coast and beach to insure that the supplies landed. He felt that the Chinese Communists should be informed in advance of this and that he would interpret his orders and issue instructions to neutralize any Chinese Communist interference whatever in the accomplishment of this mission.³² Thus neither the GRC nor American officials in the field were satisfied and were to continue to press for a U.S. escort all the way to Quemoy and for authority to bomb the mainland.

CHAPTER V: THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

REASSESS THEIR STRATEGY

(September 1-7)

MILITARY ACTION

The intense campaign of military pressure against the Offshore Islands by the Chinese Communists was to taper off almost entirely during the first two days of September and then halt completely for a week. On September 1 the Chinese Communists fired only approximately 1,500 rounds against the Offshore Islands.¹ The pattern of fire until U.S. escorted convoys began on September 7 is indicated in Table 15. On September 1 the biggest surface engagement of the crisis took place near Quemoy as the Nationalists attempted to land supplies.* According to the Chinese Nationalists eleven Chinese Communist PT boats were sunk and one was damaged.^{2**} According to the People's Daily account of the same incident, the Chinese Nationalists at 9 p.m. on September 1 sent a patrol boat,

* For the first time in several days the Nationalists retaliated by firing 120 shells.

** There were no American ships in the vicinity and hence accounts of the engagement must be based on Chinese Nationalist sources.

Table 15

ARTILLERY FIRE: AUGUST 31 - SEPTEMBER 8

Date	Chinese Communists	Chinese Nationalists
August 31	800	0
September 1	1350	3130
2	1530	150
3	300	0
4	210	110
5	0	608
6	0	60
7	0 ^a	0
8	53,310	0

SOURCE: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis, Intelligence Report No. 7805, "Chronology of Taiwan Straits Developments, June 30-September 26, 1958," (Prepared by division of Research and Analysis for Far East), September 29, 1958 (Secret); CINCPAC Historical Division, "CINCPAC Taiwan Dairy," August 1958-December 1959 (formerly Top Secret, downgraded to Secret); TDC Daily SITREPS [Situation Reports], TDC file #3482 consisting of a daily telegram to CINCPAC, September 3, 1958 to October 17, 1958 (Secret). The three sources give somewhat different figures: where there were differences the CINCPAC figures were used.

^a First convoy.

a gun boat and four landing ships with supplies towards Quemoy, and the Chinese Communist Navy attacked the ships and drove them back.³ No supplies were landed.

On September 2 another naval encounter took place. A GRC convoy heading for the Quemoy beaches was attacked by Chinese Communist torpedo boats in the Quemoy Lialo Bay. The Chinese Nationalist Ministry of Defense said that the attack was beaten off, with five Chinese Communist torpedo boats sunk and six on fire. One GRC ship was damaged,⁴ and no supplies reached the garrison. Several attempts by the GRC to land a ship carrying troop reinforcements ended in failure.⁵ On September 3 a GRC convoy was turned back by Chinese Communist PT boats.⁶ On September 3 only approximately 300 rounds were fired. This was to fall off to 210 on September 4, and no fire on September 5, 6 and 7.

DIPLOMACY AND PROPAGANDA

On September 1 the People's Daily reprinted the Pravda Observer article quoted above which gave strong support to the Chinese Communist position.⁷ The People's Daily on September 2 reported criticism in the West of the American position, citing statements by Senator Wayne Morse and an editorial in The Washington Post.⁸ Criticisms of the American position in the Western press were to be

reported by the People's Daily in some detail throughout the crisis. On September 3, broadcasts to Quemoy came to an abrupt halt.

On the next day the Chinese Communists announced an imposition of a twelve-mile limit around Communist China as the territorial waters of the Chinese Communist regime. This limit would include all of the Offshore Islands.* The Chinese Communist statement announcing the twelve-mile limit was issued as a formal declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China. It read as follows:

The Government of the People's Republic of China declares:

1. The breadth of the territorial sea of the People's Republic of China shall be twelve nautical miles. This provision applies to all territories of the People's Republic of China, including the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, the Tungsha Islands, the Hsisha Islands, the Chungsha Islands, the Nansha Islands, and all other islands belonging to China which are separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas.

* The Chinese Communist intention to proclaim this limit had been foreshadowed the day before when the People's Daily of September 3 had given strong support to Iceland in its attempts to proclaim a twelve-mile limit in its fishing dispute with Great Britain.

2. China's territorial sea along the mainland and its coastal islands takes as its baseline the line composed of the straight lines connecting basepoints on the mainland coast and on the outermost of the coastal islands; the water area extending twelve nautical miles outward from this baseline is China's territorial sea. The water areas inside the baseline, including Pohai Bay and the Chiungchow Straits, are Chinese inland waters. The islands inside the baseline, including Tungyin Island, Kaoteng Island, the Matsu Islands, the Paichuan Islands, Wuchiu Island, the Greater and Lesser Quemoy Islands, Tatan Island, Erhtan Island and Tungting Island, are islands of the Chinese inland waters.

3. No foreign vessels for military use and no foreign aircraft may enter China's territorial sea and the air space above it without the permission of the Government of the People's Republic of China.

While navigating Chinese territorial sea, every foreign vessel must observe the relevant laws and regulations laid down by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

4. The principles provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 likewise apply to Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, the Tungsha Islands, the Hsisha Islands, the Chungsha Islands, the Nansha Islands, and all other islands belonging to China.

The Taiwan and Penghu areas are still occupied by the United States by armed force. This is an unlawful encroachment on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China. Taiwan, Penghu and such other areas are yet to be recovered, and the Government of the People's Republic of China has the right to recover these areas by all suitable means at a suitable time. This is China's internal affair, in which no foreign interference is tolerated.⁹

The Chinese announcement of a twelve-mile limit may have been meant as a last warning to the United States to get its ships out of the vicinity of Quemoy. It also served the purpose of increasing the political cost to the United States of operating close to the Chinese coast.

In the first of a series of moves designed to present a different image of what was taking place and what the demands of the two sides were, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister informed the Indian Ambassador that the shelling was in retaliation for GRC heavy bombardment while it was attempting to reinforce the islands with more troops.^{10*}

The People's Daily on September 6 reported that the Supreme State Conference of the Chinese Communist Party was meeting and noted that Mao had called into session the 15th session of the Conference and that he had spoken first on both the domestic and foreign situation. His subject for the day focused on agriculture, the commune

* Apparently most of the Peking diplomatic colony, including specifically the Indian Ambassador, believed that the artillery attack on Quemoy was planned to divert U.S. and world attention from the Middle East, making it less likely that the United States would intervene in the Iraqi revolution.¹¹

systems and the militia. It was reported in the People's Daily that the Conference would continue on the following day with a report on the second five-year plan, a report on finance and commerce, a report on education, and finally a report by Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai on foreign policy.¹²

The story gave the impression that no major crisis in foreign policy was currently facing China since the meeting was devoted largely to domestic affairs.

On September 5, Pravda in an Observer article made the strongest statement that it had made so far during the crisis saying that the Soviet Union could not "stand idly by" if things happened "at the frontier or on the territory of its great ally." The Pravda statement declared that the Chinese Communist intention to liberate the Offshore Islands was lawful and just, but made a sharp distinction between operations involving the Offshore Islands and those against the mainland.* It declared that an attack on the mainland would cause the Soviet

Union to help the Chinese Communists. The article asserted that:

the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to events on the border or territory of its great ally. The Soviet Union will not sit by quietly while U.S. military preparations unfold in the Pacific, whose waters also wash Soviet shores. Bound to the Chinese People's Republic by ties of fraternal friendship and mutual aid, the Soviet people will give their brothers the Chinese people all possible aid to curb the adventurous warmongers, who have lost all sense of decency and reason.

The instigators and organizers of this latest military venture in the Far East should not calculate that a retaliatory blow will be confined to the Taiwan Strait and no less the offshore island. They will receive a crushing rebuff, which will put an end to U.S. military aggression in the Far East.¹⁴

On September 6, another Soviet newspaper, Krasnaga Zvezda, warned the United States to keep hands off Communist China. "A retaliatory blow against the aggressors will not be limited to the area of their provocation."¹⁵ On the same day, the People's Daily repeated Pravda's warning statement of September 5. The story was displayed prominently on page 1 and the document reprinted in its entirety on page 4.

According to a report in the People's Daily of September 7, a telegram from the Fukien front on September 6 had indicated that the Chinese Communist Army on the front,

in order to give the Chinese Nationalist troops on Quemoy a chance to repent, took the initiative on September 4 to stop the bombardment against Quemoy, and, in fact, the People's Daily report stated that no shells had been fired on September 4 or 5. It noted, however, that rather than repenting, Chiang Kai-shek's armies had used this opportunity to try to transport material by plane and ship to the Islands and that against this "unconscionable action of Chiang's army the frontline soldiers were angry and could not tolerate this." ¹⁶ Despite the hint in the story that shelling had been resumed, the cease-fire remained in effect, as noted, until September 8.

During the first week of September the coverage of the crisis in Peking increased. There continued, however, to be little direct comment or reporting of the military activities and most the reports were from the foreign press. The campaign was, however, still small in comparison to the communes and the increasing steel output campaigns, and that there was no mention of an early liberation of Taiwan. There were no public demonstrations in connection with the crisis. ¹⁷

On the 6th, Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai issued a statement offering to resume the Sino-American

talks. It will be recalled that the United States had been pressing for some time prior to, and since, the opening of the crisis for resumption of the talks and that the Chinese Communists had received several letters from American officials in Europe requesting an opening of the Sino-American talks.* The United States had stated that it was prepared to resume the talks at the ambassadorial level, which had been the only condition established by the Chinese Communists when they had broken off the talks.

The Chou statement declared that the Dulles Newport statement** seriously jeopardized "the peace of the Far East and the world." It went on to declare that Taiwan was a part of China and the U.S. presence on Taiwan was illegal. Turning to the Offshore Islands, Chou declared that they were being used "as advance bases for conducting all sorts of harassing and disruptive activities." He asserted that China had "every right to . . . take necessary military action against . . . troops entrenched on the coastal islands" and that the United States had no right to intervene. The statement asserted that U.S. intervention was

* See above, pp. 60-61.

** See below, pp. 230-232.

provocative. Separating the Offshore Islands from Taiwan, the Chinese Communist leader stated that:

The Chinese people's determination to liberate their own territory of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands is unshakable. In particular the Chinese people cannot tolerate the presence in their inland waters along the mainland of an immediate threat posed by such coastal islands as Quemoy and Matsü.

Chou then turned to the proposal to resume the ambassadorial talks:

. . . . After the Chinese Government demanded in July this year that the [Sino-American] talks be resumed within a set time limit, the U.S. Government did not make a timely reply, but it has ultimately designated a representative of ambassadorial rank. Now, the U.S. Government again indicates its desire to settle the Sino-American dispute in China's Taiwan area through peaceful negotiation. To make a further effort to safeguard peace, the Chinese Government is prepared to resume the ambassadorial talks between the two countries. But the danger of war created by the United States in China's Taiwan area has not been reduced thereby. In view of the fact that the U.S. Government often acts differently from what it says and often uses peaceful negotiation as a smokescreen to cover up its actual deed of continuously expanding aggression, the entire Chinese people and the peace-loving people all over the world must not relax in the least their struggle against U.S. interference in China's internal affairs and against U.S. threat to the peace of the Far East and the world.¹⁸

The People's Daily, which printed the Chou statement under a banner headline and devoted three-quarters of its September 7th issue to Taiwan, also reported that a

"Liberate Taiwan and the Offshore Islands Campaign" had begun in public meetings everywhere throughout China.

The Chou statement represented part of the Chinese Communist effort to disengage and to take a new course from their original strategy, which had failed, but it was clear that it did not reflect a definitive decision as to which way to move. (The Chinese Communist statements at the Warsaw talks indicated that they never intended to use these for serious negotiation.)* In addition, while Chou made a public statement on September 6, the Chinese Communists, for a number of days before, were making the contacts in Warsaw necessary to get the talks going. The Chou statement seemed to be a stop-gap movement designed to reduce the likelihood that the United States would over-react. While it was clear to the Chinese Communists that the United States was not going to be militarily inactive, the extent of U.S. involvement was not clear, and particularly they did not know how far in the United States would escort Chinese Nationalist ships. Accordingly, they did not know whether it would be possible to resume artillery fire. The Chinese Communists, however,

* See below, pp. 441-446.

did know that they could no longer use PT boats to attack Nationalist supply ships, and hence their original strategy for interdiction of Quemoy, by a combination of naval and artillery action had to be given up. They did not know, however, if they could resume artillery fire without hitting U.S. ships and were probably uncertain as to the effectiveness of a pure artillery campaign.

CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY

It would appear that by September 2, the Chinese Communists had come to the reluctant conclusion that the United States was neither going to force the Chinese Nationalists to abandon the Offshore Islands nor stand aside and allow the Chinese Communists to impose a successful blockade against GRC forces. Certainly by the time of Dulles' Newport statement, but probably before that, the Chinese Communists had sufficient evidence that the United States was going to be involved in the defense of the Offshore Islands.

During the first week in August, there was a very substantial increase in American military efforts in the Far East in general and in the Taiwan Straits in particular which were clearly visible to and closely followed by the

Chinese Communists.* By the end of August the American Taiwan Fleet had been substantially increased in size, ships were sailing up and down the Straits, and planes flying up and down closely followed on Chinese Communist radar. In addition, diplomatically the United States had on August 24 finally complied with the Chinese Nationalist request for a public statement expressing its interest in the Offshore Islands. Following the resumption of fire, there had been a series of other statements by Eisenhower, Smoot, McElroy, Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker, and others climaxing with Dulles' Newport statement.** In addition there was nothing to suggest plans for an American pullback or any evidence that the United States was urging the Chinese Nationalists to withdraw from the Offshore Islands. Though the Chinese Communists obviously could not be certain that the United States was not pressuring the Chinese Nationalists to withdraw from Quemoy, the extensive American build-up, coupled with the fact that there were no reports out of either Taiwan or Washington of such moves, and the fact that U.S.-GRC relations seemed

* Cf. Table 9, p. 65 with Table 13, pp. 134-136.

** These public moves by the United States are discussed in Chapter VI, pp. 228-236.

to be functioning very smoothly would add up to a strong possibility that there was no American pressure of this kind, as in fact there was not.

Thus by early September the American failure to comply with the Chinese Communists' expectations must have been clear. The Chinese in their actions showed that their strategy was about to change. Militarily the amount of artillery fire went down and then came to a complete halt. Other military action was substantially reduced. Diplomatically they continued to play down the importance of the events in the Taiwan Straits. During this period the Chinese were clearly waiting to see to what extent the United States would intervene and were probably searching for a way to disguise their anticipated withdrawal. They were not sure whether the United States would escort all the way in, although they could tell by preparations going on in the Straits that escort operations were about to start.

The Chou statement marked a turning point in the crisis for the Chinese Communists and was part of the effort to disengage but at the same time to adopt a new strategy. Their later actions in Warsaw suggest that the Chinese Communists never expected the talks themselves to

to play a serious role. Rather the Chou statement seemed to be a stop-gap move designed to reduce the likelihood that the United States would over-react and authorize bombing of the mainland. Without being certain of the extent of U.S. escort and military involvement, the Chinese did know that their original strategy of using PT boats and perhaps planes as well as artillery fire could not be implemented. But they could not know whether they would be able to resume artillery fire and, if so, whether it would be successful. Their calculations probably led them to believe that artillery fire alone would not be successful and even if it were, would probably lead to greater U.S. involvement. Thus, at this point in early September, Peking probably did not anticipate the imposition of a successful blockade, although this obviously could not be completely ruled out. The Chinese Communists may have hoped that the pressure from Khrushchev's forthcoming letter to Eisenhower and the increasing international and domestic opposition to American policy would lead to American pressure on the Nationalists to evacuate Quemoy.

CHAPTER VI: U.S. DECISION TO DEFEND QUEMOY

During the early days of September, while awaiting the results of U.S. convoying and planning for the defense of Quemoy against invasion, American officials made a number of public statements. It was hoped that these statements along with U.S. military moves would deter any expansion of the conflict by the Chinese Communists and also would boost Chinese Nationalist morale. Secretary of the Army Brucker visiting Taiwan on September 1 warned the Chinese Communists not to underestimate the force of the warnings by Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles.¹

On September 2 Presidential Press Secretary Haggerty in Washington refused to discuss press reports that Eisenhower had decided to commit U.S. naval and ground forces to defend Quemoy and Matsu. Haggerty was questioned about a statement by Eisenhower at his press conference that he was uncertain as to the discretion of commanders in the field to use nuclear weapons and stated that Eisenhower had not yet checked on this.²

On September 3 Smoot indicated that the United States was sending more help. He was quoted in the press as stating that the Chinese Communists could not successfully

invade or blockade Quemoy.³ In Washington, Secretary of Defense McElroy said the Chinese Communists would be wise not to start a major war.⁴

On the next day the U.S. aircraft carrier Midway arrived in the Taiwan Straits area.⁵ As another part of the American military show of strength General Curtis LeMay left Washington on September 4 for a tour of the Far East including Taiwan. Officials announced that they had arranged for faster deliveries of military equipment to the GRC, for example torpedo boats and airplane parts. The Air Force was reported by The New York Times to be building up perhaps the largest concentration of U.S. air power in the Western Pacific since the Korean War.⁶

On September 4, the United States announced that it rejected the Chinese Communist extension of its territorial waters to twelve miles and would continue to send military convoys to Taiwan and to Quemoy and Matsu up to the three-mile limit. It stated that it was confident that the Chinese Communists had neither the military power nor the legal right to enforce the new limit. It was made clear that despite Eisenhower's comments at his press conference, specific permission of the President was required by any area commander before using nuclear

weapons anywhere in the world. On the same day a Pentagon briefing officer pointed out to newsmen that "substantial logistical support to the GRC" was being given and that the United States was helping to convoy supply craft up to the three-mile limit. He expressed confidence that the GRC could do the job of resupply alone. He also stated that U.S. determination to prevent the invasion of Quemoy and Matsu constituted no "extension" of the policy announced in 1954 to help defend Taiwan and the Penghus.⁷

The U.S. public effort reached a crescendo on the 4th when Dulles saw Eisenhower at Newport, issued a formal statement, and then held a background press conference. This action constituted the most important effort thus far to make clear to the Chinese Communists the American determination to defend Quemoy. In the formal statement the American Government stated that the security of Taiwan had become increasingly related to the security of Quemoy and that the "naked use of force" against Quemoy would threaten the security of the United States.

The statement issued by Dulles after his meeting with the President read in part as follows:

I have reviewed in detail with the President the serious situation which has resulted from aggressive Chinese Communist military actions in the Taiwan (Formosa) Straits area. The President has

authorized me to make the following statement.

1. Neither Taiwan (Formosa) nor the islands of Quemoy and Matsu have ever been under the authority of the Chinese Communists.
2. The United States is bound by treaty to help to defend Taiwan (Formosa) from armed attack and the President is authorized by Joint Resolution of the Congress to employ the armed forces of the United States for the securing and protecting of related positions such as Quemoy and Matsu.
3. Any attempt on the part of the Chinese Communists now to seize these positions or any of them would be a crude violation of the principles upon which world order is based, namely, that no country should use armed force to seize new territory.
4. The Joint Resolution of Congress, above referred to, includes a finding to the effect that "the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in and bordering upon the Pacific Ocean." It further authorizes the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for the protection not only of Formosa but for "the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa." In view of the situation outlined in the preceding paragraph, the President has not yet made any finding under that [Formosa] Resolution that the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States is required or appropriate in insuring the defense of Formosa. The President would not, however, hesitate to make such a finding if he judged that the circumstances made this necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Joint Resolution. In this

connection, we have recognized that the securing and protecting of Quemoy and Matsu have increasingly become related to the defense of Taiwan (Formosa). This is indeed also recognized by the Chinese Communists. Military dispositions have been made by the United States so that a Presidential determination, if made, would be followed by action both timely and effective.⁸

In his background briefing with the press in Newport, Dulles went somewhat further in making clear American determination to defend Quemoy. The press conference began with Presidential Press Secretary James Haggerty informing the press that Secretary Dulles would read the statement quoted above and that from then on he would answer questions, but that the answers to the questions were not to be attributed directly to the Secretary. There then followed this exchange between Haggerty and the press:

Question: Attributed to a United States official?

Mr. Haggerty: Sure.

Question: High United States official?

Mr. Haggerty: Sure, there are only two in Newport (laughter).

At this point Haggerty brought in Dulles, who had not been in the room during this exchange, and Dulles proceeded to read the formal statement. He then answered a number of questions from the press, the most pertinent

of which are as follows:

Question (after the Secretary read the statement):
Mr. Secretary, at point five you say in effect that the Chinese Nationalists might very well be able to defend Quemoy without any help from the United States. Does that mean, as has been suggested in the dispatches from Washington, that the United States would wait and see if Chiang Kai-shek's forces could defend Quemoy before the United States might make a decision as to whether or not to use American armed forces to help defend Quemoy?

Secretary Dulles: Well, let me point out, it does not say without any help from the United States, because we are giving, as indicated here, very substantial logistical support.

Question: I meant to say use of fighting forces.

Secretary Dulles: That's right. We are also helping to convoy Chinese supply craft through the high seas up to the three mile limit, so we are giving quite a bit of help. Now, to answer this question--(to Mr. Haggerty) I understand this is all background?

Mr. Haggerty: Yes.

Secretary Dulles: We would not, probably, wait until the situation was in extremis. We would judge in the light of all the circumstances as to whether or not the situation was out of hand as far as the Chinese Nationalists alone were concerned. The Chinese Nationalists would themselves prefer to do this job themselves, and it would greatly redound to their prestige if they are able to do so, and there is no point to our getting in prematurely. It is primarily their task. They want to make it their task primarily, and we would not, however, wait until the situation was desperate before we acted. We would judge in the light of the developments.

Question: Are you saying, Sir, that if we judge the situation to be out of hand; that is to say, if we judge the Chinese Nationalists could not hold those islands, that we would then go in with American fighting men?

Secretary Dulles: That is the indication of this thing--no, I don't want to qualify or add to or subtract from the precise language which the President has approved in that respect.

Question: I didn't hear--it's the purport of this statement?

Secretary Dulles: I said that that is in general the significance of this statement, but I did not want by any paraphrasing to subtract from or add to the precise language which the President himself has authorized.

* * * *

Question: Do these eight points [contained in the statement] represent any change or extension of U.S. policy?

Secretary Dulles: I think they reflect the application of United States policy to the situation as it stands today.

Question: Would the word "extension" be warranted there, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Dulles: I would not say that it is an extension of policy. The basic policy was laid down by our treaty with the Republic of China [sic] by the findings in the Joint Congressional Resolution. Now policy requires implementation from time to time, and this indicates the circumstances under which it would probably be given a new implementation.

* * * *

Question: Mr. Secretary, do our area commanders around Formosa have discretionary authority to

use atomic weapons.

Secretary Dulles: No they do not. The use of atomic weapons is under the control of the President and no one has discretionary power to use them in any theatre.

Question: Mr. Secretary, this statement does not mention Tan [sic] and some of the little islands. Would we defend them too, or does this just apply to the major islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

Secretary Dulles: Well, that is a difficult question to answer. You know, there are a lot of little pieces of rock that jut up around there and the gradation between what are the principal Quemoy Islands obviously are very minor--a piece of land that was perhaps awash part of the time, that would not be serious, but I can't today take a map and indicate in detail just what would be serious or what would not be. There are, I suppose a score--50 or more--little bits of land there--the principal one is [sic] big Quemoy and little Quemoy.

Question: Mr. Secretary, would the bombing of concentrations on the mainland be part of the defense of Formosa?

Secretary Dulles: It might become so, if Formosa was attacked or imminently threatened from these airfields.

Question: Or Quemoy?

Secretary Dulles: Yes.

Question: What about the ships which are conveying supplies? If they are struck by communist air power, do we strike back against their bases?

Secretary Dulles: That would depend a great deal upon the facts. If it were accidental, I think that would be one thing, but if it was a deliberate effort to drive us by force from what we considered to be the international waters, we would

perhaps react much as we do in case of air attacks. You may recall that in the past there have been attacks made on American aircraft over what we consider to be international air, and our aircraft have authority, under those conditions to fight back and engage in hot pursuit and I would think that if we thought that was deliberate, we might act accordingly.

* * * *

Question: Is it fair to interpret this [statement] as a stiff warning to Peiping not to try to make an attack against Quemoy?

Secretary Dulles: If I were on the Chinese Communist side I would certainly think very hard before I went ahead on the fact of this statement.⁹

In the formal statement and in his answers to questions, Dulles was concerned with answering his American and foreign critics as well as deterring Peking.

PUBLIC OPPOSITION

The events in the Taiwan Straits had come increasingly to capture world headlines and to produce widespread criticism of the American willingness to risk war to defend the Offshore Islands. On September 2 the French commentator, Raymond Aron, writing in Figaro, supported U.S. policy. He wrote that if the Chinese Communists should try to take Quemoy, the United States should aid the GRC with conventional arms. He said that this decision would be best since the use of tactical nuclear weapons would be

deplorable. Not to fight would destroy the Taiwan regime and confirm the belief in the Far East that the United States was a paper tiger.¹⁰ But more common were attacks on the administration's position, including, for example, one by Norman Thomas, which charged that the Chiang Kai-shek regime was corrupt and the United States should get out of Taiwan.¹¹ A letter from James P. Warburg in The New York Times of September 3 expressed opposition to going to war to defend the Offshore Islands.¹²

Joseph Alsop launched a much more bitter attack at the policy of the administration. In a column headed "We Did It Ourselves," Alsop wrote that the threat to Quemoy and Matsu was much more serious than Eisenhower pretended it to be. He stated that the importance of Quemoy and Matsu had been made in Washington, beginning with the policy of unleashing Chiang Kai-shek and then pressuring the Nationalists to occupy the Offshore Islands. He claimed that Chiang had resisted this pressure, saying that the Offshore Islands were vulnerable but that we had forced him to put his troops there after he evacuated the Tachens. Alsop further claimed* that during the Tachens crisis

* Apparently correctly.¹³

Dulles had promised the former GRC Foreign Minister George Yeh that if the Tachens were evacuated the United States would promise to defend Quemoy and Matsu under the Formosa Resolution. However Eisenhower had over-ridden Dulles's promise. Dulles had wanted to draw a clear line, but Eisenhower had refused. Following feeble efforts then to make Chiang abandon Quemoy and Matsu, U.S. military aid was sent to strengthen his position on the Offshore Islands.¹⁴

On September 4 James Reston pointed out that the U.S. people and the Congress apparently were now willing to entrust the Executive with war-making powers and observed that the President had the power to defend Quemoy and Matsu and to use atomic weapons there if he wanted to. He was upset not only at the lack of public debate over the possibility of war but also about the fact that Eisenhower was on vacation in Newport at a time when such critical decisions had to be made.¹⁵

On the same day, the Philippines Security Council announced its support of U.S. policy regarding the defense of Taiwan but avoided any direct commitment concerning the Offshore Islands.¹⁶ The New York Times on the same day reported a series of critical comments on U.S. policy in the Taiwan Straits from a number of British sources,

including the Liberal Party, Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, and the British Trade Union Congress.¹⁷

Despite Dulles' effort to answer his critics, public opposition to American policy actually intensified after the Dulles Newport statement on September 4. On September 5 Adlai Stevenson in Paris called for negotiations and declared that the Offshore Islands could not be considered a part of Taiwan.¹⁸ On the same day, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a speech bitterly attacked the Administration's policy of risking war with China over issues not worth American lives. He identified Secretary Dulles as the U.S. spokesman quoted in the background Newport press conference and declared that the Offshore Islands had traditionally been a part of the mainland and that the United States would lose the support of its friends if it tried to defend them. Acheson asserted that the Offshore Islands could be defended only by a "general war with China."¹⁹

On September 7 and September 10, James Reston published articles in The New York Times criticizing the Administration's foreign policy. He declared that there was a lack of direction of U.S. policy and indicated that there was "drifting and dreaming" on the Potomac. Reston

objected to what he called the sweeping doctrine of asserting that the United States would oppose any use of force anywhere and declared that it was not applicable to the current Quemoy problem.

On September 10, Democratic leaders met to hear three potential Presidential candidates assail American Far Eastern policy.* Former Secretary of State Governor Averell Harriman of New York declared that the crisis stemmed from Eisenhower's irresponsible political act in "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek in 1953. He declared that the United States should defend Taiwan but not the Offshore Islands. On September 11 Walter Lippmann wrote that it was only a question of time when Quemoy would have to be surrendered or evacuated.²¹

REACTION ON TAIWAN

Once they were informed on August 30 of the American decision to escort convoys, the GRC began to mark time in

* In order to reduce congressional criticism of American policy, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Macomber on September 10 telephoned a number of congressional leaders, including the floor leaders and the senior members of the Foreign and Armed Services Appropriations Committee, to explain the Dulles Newport statement to them. He had also mailed the statement and an explanatory memorandum to a number of Congressmen.²⁰

their resupply efforts while keeping up the pretense of trying to land supplies. The U.S. escorting would improve morale on Quemoy but far more important for the GRC, it might well lead to a military clash between American forces and the Chinese Communists. American officials on Taiwan, except for Ambassador Drumright, were to become increasingly suspicious of GRC motives. At the same time, GRC officials continued to press for permission to bomb the mainland and for greater U.S. involvement.*

On August 30, Drumright reported his belief that the Chinese Communists clearly intended, unless stopped by American action, to take the Offshore Islands unless they could force a withdrawal. Although he believed that the GRC could hold out for some time, Drumright felt that the United States would ultimately have to step in to save Quemoy and that therefore he urged that it act then. He suggested that the United States should first warn the Communists and then take out the gun positions. Drumright

* In an analysis made after the crisis, the Taiwan Defense Command concluded that during this period the GRC military activity was ineffective and marked by a continuous effort to determine and influence the extent of American involvement in defense of the Offshore Islands.²²

did not indicate whether this should be done with conventional or nuclear weapons but expressed his belief that American action would lead the Chinese Communists to withdraw.²³

In a report on the same meeting sent through military channels Smoot reported that Chiang had again reassured him that he would consult American officials before acting

but that he wanted authority vested in U.S. officials on Taiwan to concur in air attacks on the mainland. Chiang stated that if there were no response within three days it would be difficult to control morale. The critical question, according to Smoot (but not Drumright), was Quemoy supplies since the Quemoy commander was holding up his counterfire until he was sure of resupply. Resupply still might fail and then Quemoy would fall.²⁵

In a later message on September 1, Drumright expressed his belief that Chiang really felt that his position was being undermined by his failure to take offensive action. Chiang was reported to be extremely sensitive to the "puppet" charge, but the American Ambassador indicated that the situation was nowhere near as serious as Chiang suggested. Morale on Quemoy was excellent and the Island could hold out for one to two months under existing interdiction, Drumright noted, adding that combined U.S.-GRC measures should ease the situation even further. Chiang was not worried about the military situation and said little about it, the American Ambassador continued. He was satisfied with U.S. military assistance and would not in the near future attack the mainland without U.S. concurrence -- only the

most desperate situation would cause him to do so.

Despite this relatively optimistic assessment, Drumright concluded that if harassment continued and grew, the United States would have to intervene and therefore the time to do so was then.²⁶

Smoot, in a private conversation with Chiang Kai-shek on September 2 "gave him the full facts of the situation" and reported that he had left behind an enthusiastic and spirited man. Smoot told Chiang that if bullets could be gotten through to Quemoy, Quemoy Defense Commander, General Hu Lin, would stop husbanding his supplies and would begin firing. He told Chiang that to date the GRC navy "has made no effort to even try" to break the blockade and that all he had gotten from the GRC navy were reasons why they could not do so, with which he did not agree.²⁷

Smoot reported that the GRC had lost only two small boats to artillery and two boats to Chinese Communist PT action, and that there were no critical shortages on Quemoy. The garrison was reported to have thirty days of ammunition for firing at the rate of 2,000 rounds per day and adequate stock of all other supplies.³⁰

Drumright reported on the same day that the Taiwan Defense Command was now pressing for stepped up activity but that the GRC had "not taken steps to translate its sense of urgency into action" to break the blockade. In part, he stated, this was a desire to conserve forces.³¹ But clearly Drumright was implying it was also in part a desire to draw the United States further into the military encounter. He noted that Chiang was isolated and heard only what the military thought he wanted to hear. He was very desperate and anxious for U.S. advice and had agreed that Smoot should see him every day or two. Drumright noted that stocks on Quemoy were anticipated to be adequate for forty-five days at a minimum and he then agreed that concurrence on plans for GRC bombing of the mainland should be withheld at least for a few days.³²

On September 5 CINCPAC concurred in the judgment of officials on Taiwan that an all-out effort was not being made. Felt reported that the failure in the rate of supply was not due primarily to the Chinese Communist artillery fire. "Inability or unwillingness of the CHINAT Navy to utilize resources they have is major cause for failure to get necessary ammo and other supplies to Islands." He provided the JCS with a summary of the

logistics situation on the Offshore Islands, indicating that they had supplies and ammunition for thirty days, including 2,000 rounds for the heavy guns per day, and that all supplies were adequate except sandbags. Resupply required was estimated at from 15 to 18 thousand tons per month.³³

On September 4 Chiang Kai-shek had sent yet another letter to Eisenhower in which he reported that for thirteen days the garrison on Quemoy had been subjected to the enemy's artillery fire and harassment from naval units, yet the GRC had refrained from fully exercising its inherent right of self-defense. He stated his belief that the United States would render timely assistance and reported that Drumright and Smoot were maintaining the closest consultation.³⁴ At the same time, preparations for U.S. escorted convoys were nearing completion.

On September 3 the Taiwan Defense Command had reported that he had completed plans to convoy to Quemoy. The GRC plans were to escort two LSMs with 150 tons of heavy ammunition and cargo to Quemoy every other day commencing within two or three days. The convoys were to have American and GRC surface and air cover.³⁵ U.S. ships, Smoot noted, were already giving protection to GRC ships

in international waters. Earlier in the day he had reported that Typhoon Grace had brought all operations to a halt.³⁶

On September 5, final plans for the first U.S. escorted convoy were made during a conference in Taipei attended by U.S. naval officers and officials from the GRC Ministry of National Defense. It was agreed that the first convoy would be on September 7 and that the first two convoys would be in daylight to assure success. Following this there would be a concentrated day and night effort. The Taiwan Defense Commander reported that the first convoy would be based on the following principles: (a) minimum losses, (b) important resupply items in quantity, (c) subsequent convoy soon after, and (d) coordination of all elements. He indicated that part of the delay had come from the need to clear the Quemoy beach of mines but that there had also been "unbelievable confusion" in the MND. An order by Chiang Kai-shek to the Ministry that nothing was to take place without Smoot's concurrence was necessary to enable planning to proceed.³⁷

Washington was informed early on the 6th, Taiwan time, which was the 5th in Washington, that plans were set for the first combined convoy to hit Quemoy at 7:30 a.m.

on the 7th (6:30 p.m. on the 6th EST). It was informed that it would be a daylight landing with U.S. ships participating and that there would be an air alert for the possibility of a Chinese Communist attack.³⁸

PLANNING FOR DECISION

While awaiting word of the first convoy, American officials were seeking consensus for a contingency plan in case of an invasion of Quemoy. They sought also for more information on GRC and Chinese motivations. State Department officials also began to explore possible diplomatic solutions.

On August 30 Herter held a meeting of members of the State Department at which it was considered asking the Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi to issue a call for a cease-fire. To this end it was decided to sound out the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, MacArthur, and Ambassador Drumright. The fact that telegrams seeking this information were being sent was not to be made known to anyone not present at the meeting. The responses to the telegrams were that Kishi would be glad to take such an initiative but that Drumright felt that the GRC would strenuously object.³⁹

On August 31 Washington requested from Drumright a detailed assessment of Chiang Kai-shek's motivation and the sincerity of his emotional plea at the meeting on the 31st in Taipei. They asked whether Chiang was really fully persuaded that the military situation was as desperate as he represented it and whether Drumright believed that he intended to take military action against the mainland. The question of what the Chinese Communist reaction to such a move would be was also raised.⁴⁰

On September 1 the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) asked CINCPAC for information that he said was desperately needed in Washington in order to make the correct decisions. He stated that it was not known how many supplies, if any, were getting through and, if none, whether it was because of lack of landing craft or artillery fire. He also asked if U.S. forces had begun escorting and, if not, why not, and asked how many supplies were on hand.⁴¹ These messages were part of a larger number which were sent out both through military and civilian channels desperately requesting information as to what was going on in the field. The failure to receive information resulted not only from problems which American

commanders were having in Taiwan in getting the necessary information from the GRC but also from the fact that it sometimes took several days for classified messages to reach Washington from Taipei or vice versa. This communication lag was significantly to hamper policymaking throughout the crisis and to make it difficult to integrate the views of field commanders and diplomatic representatives abroad in decisionmaking in Washington, since their views were frequently to arrive after they were already outdated by Washington decisions.*

While seeking more information from the field, the working levels of the State Department were determined that Secretary of State Dulles understood the situation as it was developing and would not make a show of weakness which might precipitate more extensive Chinese Communist military action. By August 29 a memorandum was ready for the Secretary in response to the questions which had been raised by Christian Herter in a meeting of August 25 to discuss the Dulles memorandum of August 23. In this memorandum it was pointed out that the Offshore

* No attempt is made in this study to deal with the technical difficulties of communication which plagued the Government during the crisis. These included lack of facilities which had been pointed out a number of times by military officials before the crisis.

Islands were not used extensively for operations against the mainland. It was also noted in the memorandum, in response to the suggested possibility of using intermediaries, that a direct U.S.-Chinese Communist contact had been maintained for possible use in a crisis. The memorandum warned, however, that if talks resumed, the Chinese Communists would likely press for a Foreign Ministers meeting or a summit talk.⁴² On the 31st, a State Department memorandum summed up the situation for the Secretary and the President. It noted that within the past twenty-four hours there had been a drop in the level of Chinese Communist artillery, naval, and air activity. However, some of this, it said, might be due to the weather. The U.S. military build-up was reported to be continuing. The Secretary was warned that Japan was concerned about being drawn in by unilateral GRC action. Japan was against American defense of the Offshore Islands and would probably cancel the use of U.S. facilities on Japan. The Secretary was also advised of the information that had been obtained from Ambassador MacArthur that Prime Minister Kishi would be willing to call for a ceasefire at American request. Opposition from other allies was noted, including the United Kingdom,

who found it difficult to support U.S. involvement but offered to approach the Soviets.

The Pravda August 31 article pledging "the necessary moral and material help in the just struggle" was described in the State Department memorandum as a departure from their previous low-key comment on the crisis and hinting at possible Soviet involvement. It was noted that Chinese Communist propaganda, like that of the Soviet statements, underplayed the intensity of the crisis except for broadcasts aimed at Taiwan and the Offshore Islands, which stressed determination and ability to liberate Taiwan. It was predicted that the Chinese Communists would try to invade one or more of the minor Offshore Islands and follow this with a campaign to liberate the major Offshore Islands.⁴³ In another memorandum to the Secretary on the same day from the Far East Bureau, it was reported that the following actions were required:

- (1) A response to the Drumright request for an Eisenhower message of reassurance to Chiang.
- (2) Steps to increase public awareness (both in the United States and abroad) of the issues involved.

- (3) Measures to forestall and anticipate a Soviet initiative for a summit meeting by
- (a) a U.S. approach to the Soviet Union,
 - (b) a U.K. approach to the Soviet Union,
 - (c) Japanese initiative,
 - (d) resort to the U.N. by the U.S., and
 - (e) a friendly mission in Peking to remind them of U.S. offer to reopen Ambassadorial talks.

The memorandum warned, however, that there was a need to guard against an impression of weakness in making any of these moves, and it reminded the Secretary that, although the use of nuclear weapons might be the only possible decisive U.S. military action, resort to nuclear weapons would have "disastrous" repercussions. It was also noted that the President would need to make a formal determination on the Formosa Resolution if an all-out assault should commence.⁴⁴

On September 1 Eisenhower wrote Chiang Kai-shek in further reply to Chiang's letter that the United States was giving unwavering support to the GRC and would continue to do so.⁴⁵ In his letter Eisenhower continued to refuse to be drawn into any discussion of substance or

into any specific commitments. On September 2 the JCS denied the request by CINCPACAF, which had been made on August 31, that one SAC B-36 squadron be alerted for HE operations.³⁶

On September 1 Dulles returned from his vacation and was met at the airport by Herter. Herter drove with the Secretary to a meeting with Loy Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, J. Graham Parsons, and Green to discuss the crisis.⁴⁷ On September 2 Parsons, in a memorandum to the Secretary, stated that the United States should not make a firm commitment to defend the Islands unless it was prepared to do so, indicating quite clearly that he at least was not sure what the United States was prepared to do. He noted that trying to use a third country to convey a warning might give the impression of being on the defensive. He felt that the warning to the Chinese Communists should be as explicit as possible as to what the United States intended to defend and that the message should include an offer to resume the Ambassadorial talks. The United Kingdom might be the best country to convey a message. India, Parsons noted, supported the Chinese

Communist claims to Taiwan and hence would not be an appropriate intermediary. The Swiss and the Swedes were both possibilities, the Swiss probably being the better. If the United States was prepared to defend the Offshore Islands, the message should so state, Parsons urged. The text suggested by Parsons for the message was: "It [the United States] wishes to make it unmistakably clear that it would regard all attacks against any of these territories [Taiwan and the Offshore Islands] to be a breach of peace and it will take whatever action it deems necessary to repel such an attack." If the United States were not prepared to make such a sweeping statement, Parsons proposed that it simply confine its message to a proposal to reopen the Ambassadorial talks.⁴⁸

Parsons here was skirting all the difficult issues involved in making such a commitment, including the question of the smaller coastal islands, and Dulles' concern with the legal issues and the opposition of Congress, and concentrating simply on the question that he was not sure the United States was going to defend the Offshore Islands and that it should not say so if it were not going to.

On both September 2 and 3, with Eisenhower vacationing in Newport, top officials in Washington met to consider what should be done if the Chinese Communists launched an invasion against the Offshore Islands. The meeting on the 2d, which lasted from 12:15 to 1:47, included Dulles and the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff,⁴⁹ and was to reveal some differences among the Chiefs as well as with Dulles.

* No specific study of the possible value of the 8-inch howitzers has been located and none was alluded to in any of the reports of conversations which I have seen.

** Burke was explaining a reference to the relative inactivity of the GRC Navy in a Navy paper which was being discussed at the meeting.

assemble junks rapidly. Dulles asked if the GRC Air Force had the capability to hit junks. He told the group that Eisenhower had indicated to him that the GRC should have the authority to hit concentrations of junks which might be presaging an invasion, but that the GRC had not struck at junks observed at Amoy Harbor or elsewhere. He noted it was difficult to destroy junks without using napalm, which made them very expensive to attack. Twining observed, however, that the GRC did have a good supply of napalm.

Burke believed that the principal threat was not the junks, which the Island guns could handle, but rather the shore batteries. He concurred in Dulles's supposition that the Chinese Communists would not attempt to invade Quemoy until the artillery batteries had been silenced unless they were prepared to take heavy losses. Dulles noted that the Chinese Communists conceivably could stage a major assault at any time. Taylor however countered that this would take 300,000 to 400,000 troops and that the Chinese Communists would probably not want to commit this many. Burke noted that the waters around Quemoy were well mined and otherwise well defended and that the Quemoy garrison would put up determined resistance.

The meeting touched briefly on the problem of getting adequate information as to what was going on in the Taiwan Straits area. Burke replied that there was an Army Advisory Group on Quemoy as well as a CIA representative. General Clovis E. Byers, Military Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, reported that the Advisory Group communication facilities had been knocked out in the first bombardment and that they were using the CIA facility. Burke reported that he had sent a rough message asking for more adequate reporting.

* Cf. his comments at the meeting on August 15, see pp. 73-80.

* See below, pp. 374-387.

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*Some of the substance of the meeting leaked to the press, including Taylor's objections. The Army later denied that Taylor had raised any objections. Roberts in the Washington Post on September 3 reported that while the official line was to keep them guessing it appeared that a decision had been made to defend Big and Little Quemoy and the Matsu Islands but not the lesser islands, including the Tans. He reported the Pentagon belief that it would be necessary to hit the mainland to hold the Offshore Islands.⁵¹

On September 3 Dulles met again with military leaders. The meeting was held in the office of the Secretary of State at 4:30 p.m. following a meeting of Dulles and his chief State Department advisers.⁵³ In addition to Dulles, those present were McElroy, Quarles, Twining, representing the Joint Chiefs, and Goodpaster, the President's military representative. Dulles stated that he did not anticipate any decision in the meeting with Eisenhower the next day in relation to what kind of instructions should be sent to the U.S. forces in the field in the event of a military attack, nor any definite decision on when and if the United States would use nuclear weapons.

He asked again how much warning there would be of a Chinese Communist attack on the Offshore Islands. Twining stated that it could be less than twenty-four hours, and Quarles's opinion was that an assault was possible within three to four days. Twining stated that the present type of artillery fire could not break up the Island defense. He felt that the GRC Navy was not doing all that it could.

Quarles agreed, noting that it had not been established that the Chinese Communists could by present means maintain the interdiction indefinitely. Dulles emphasized the importance of getting reports on the daily supply situation. He stressed that the basis for U.S. intervention and foreign support would be far less if this were done in response only to an interdiction campaign. Quarles supported a remark by Eisenhower in a previous meeting that if the Offshore Islands held out for some weeks, the United States should give non-combatant support to the GRC. However, he felt that a massive assault would justify the United States joining in the battle.

Dulles stated that it was essential that the Chinese Communists not be led to believe that the United States would not intervene. This would also be bad for GRC morale. He stated that the American objective was to deter attack and the great danger in this respect lay in our position not being made sufficiently clear. Quarles felt that the United States could not clarify its position publicly without helping the Chinese Communists by revealing U.S. intentions. Dulles observed, however,

that the major Chinese Communist objective was internal development and that this action was essentially a probing one agreed to at the Khrushchev-Mao meeting.*

He felt that a personal message to the Chinese Communists might be taken as a sign of weakness unless it were an ultimatum, which would require the strong support of U.S. allies and world opinion. He raised the possibility again of using intermediaries. The meeting concluded by considering and approving a position paper on the crisis and a communique for the Dulles-Eisenhower meeting.⁵⁴

The meeting had earlier considered a draft statement to be issued by the President after the meeting. The participants agreed that the draft was unsatisfactory and Dulles asked Green to produce a new draft. This text was approved just before the meeting broke up. The statement which was then intended to be issued in the name of the President began by noting that the Chinese Communists were linking Taiwan with the Offshore Islands and continued:

* The evidence available to me does not indicate when and on what basis Dulles arrived at this conclusion, nor how firmly he held it, nor how it related to his belief that the Nationalists had provoked the attack.

I feel compelled to say with all candor that if the Communist dictatorship in Peking persists in its present course of action no other conclusion can be drawn than that it has reverted to the type of tactics that we saw in Korea and elsewhere. Such naked use of force poses an issue far transcending the Offshore Islands and even the security of Taiwan. The real issue is whether the civilized world community can then condone violence as a legitimate instrument of policy. We are mindful of the occasions in this century when tacit acquiescence to increased military annexations merely whetted the appetites of power-hungry dictatorships and led to further military expansionism.

It seems to me that the peace we all seek will be greatly in danger if once again we allow a militant dictatorship to use violence successfully in prosecuting its ambitions. I have not, however, abandoned hope that Peking will stop short of defying the will of mankind for peace.⁵⁵

Sometime after this meeting, Dulles himself drafted the actual statement which was later released.*

The position paper was formally approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs prior to the September 3 meeting. It was approved by Eisenhower on the next day and the text, as published verbatim by Eisenhower in his Memoirs, read as follows:

Events in the Taiwan Straits indicate that the Chicoms, with Soviet backing, have begun tentatively to put into operation a program, which has been prepared for over the past 3

* See pp. 230-232.

years, designed initially to liquidate the Chinat positions in Taiwan and the offshore islands, and with, probably even more far-reaching purposes.

The program has been begun by intense pressure on the weakest and most vulnerable of such positions, namely, the Chinat-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. It seems that the operation is designed to produce a cumulating rollback effect, first on the offshore islands, and then on Taiwan, the "liberation" of which is the announced purpose of the present phase. The "liberation," if it occurred, would have serious repercussions on the Philippines, Japan, and other friendly countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia.

The first phase of the operation--that involving Quemoy and/or Matsu--would be primarily military; for these initial obstacles cannot be overcome otherwise. The follow-up against Taiwan might be primarily subversive, taking advantage of the blow to the Republic of China involved in the loss of the offshore islands where it has virtually staked its future. However, armed Chicom attack against Taiwan is not to be excluded. This is, indeed, forecast by the current Chinese Communist broadcasts.

The taking over of Taiwan by the Communists would greatly enhance Communist influence and prestige throughout the free Asian world and depreciate that of the US.

The foregoing summary is based upon the following more specific estimates:

- 1) In the absence of US intervention, the Chicoms, by accepting heavy casualties, could take Quemoy by an amphibious assault supported by artillery and aerial bombardment. Such an assault could be staged with little advance notice. The operation once initiated might take from one to several days depending on the quality of the resistance.

2) If the Chicoms believe the US will not intervene, they can be expected to mount such an assault whenever they believe the defenders have been sufficiently "softened up."

3) If the Chicoms believe the US would actively intervene to throw back an assault, perhaps using nuclear weapons, it is probable there would be no attempt to take Quemoy by assault and the situation might quiet down, as in 1955.

4) It is, however, also possible that if the Chicoms felt that the US would intervene only if there were a major assault, they might keep that assault an overhanging menace but never an actuality, and meanwhile continue the type of pressures now being exerted, including bombardment and attempted blockade, on the theory that if this were prolonged, the defense would collapse due to deterioration of morale and lack of supply.

5) Under these conditions, and if interdiction were not broken, the morale and defense capability of the defenders would, in fact, deteriorate and might eventually collapse, particularly since the US would find it difficult to maintain in the area its present show of strength for any considerable period of time.

6) If Quemoy were lost either through assault or surrender, this would have a serious impact upon the authority and military capability of the anti-Communist, pro-US, government on Formosa. It would be exposed to subversive and/or military action which would probably bring about a government which would eventually advocate union with Communist China and the elimination of US positions on the island.

7) If the foregoing occurred, it would seriously jeopardize the anti-Communist barrier consisting of the insular and peninsular positions in the Western Pacific, i.e., Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of China, Republic of the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. Other governments in Southeast Asia

such as those of Indonesia, Malaya, Cambodia, Laos and Burma would probably come fully under Communist influence. US positions in this area, perhaps even Okinawa, would probably become untenable, or unusable, and Japan with its great industrial potential would probably fall within the Sino-Soviet orbit. These events would not happen all at once but would probably occur over a period of a few years. The consequences in the Far East would be even more far-reaching and catastrophic than those which followed when the United States allowed the Chinese mainland to be taken over by the Chinese Communists, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union.

8) The impact of these adverse developments in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia would undoubtedly have serious, world-wide effects.

9) If the Communists, acting on the supposition that we will not actively intervene, seek to take Quemoy by assault and become increasingly committed, and if we then do intervene, there might be a period between the beginning of assault and irrevocable commitment when prompt and substantial US intervention with conventional weapons might lead the Chicoms to withhold or reverse their assault effort. Otherwise, our intervention would probably not be effective if it were limited to the use of conventional weapons.

10) US destroyers are cooperating with the Chinat sea supply operation within the limits of international waters, i.e., up to within three miles of Quemoy. There is thus a possibility of a deliberate or accidental hit by the Chicoms, which would have potential and unplanned reactions which might involve at least limited retaliation.

11) Once we intervened to save the offshore islands, we could not abandon that result without unacceptable damage to the safety of the free world and our influence in it.

If accomplishment of this result required the use of nuclear weapons, there would be a strong popular revulsion against the US in most of the world. It would be particularly intense in Asia and particularly harmful to us in Japan.

If relatively small detonations were used with only air bursts, so that there would be no appreciable fallout or large civilian casualties, and if the matter were quickly closed, the revulsion might not be long-lived or entail consequences as far-reaching and permanent as though there had occurred the series of political reversals indicated in Point 7 above. It is not certain, however, that the operation could be thus limited in scope or time, and the risk of a more extensive use of nuclear weapons, and even a risk of general war, would have to be accepted.

(References are here made to Quemoy as the most likely Communist target. If Matsu became the initial target, the situation would be substantially the same.)⁵⁶

The paper, in both tone and content, implying drastic consequences if Quemoy were lost, was apparently approved at the working levels as well as the top levels in both State^{*} and Defense, and represented a view of the

* This extreme view of the consequences of the loss of the Offshore Islands was not shared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) in the Department of State. On September 4, it produced a paper on possible Far Eastern reaction to the loss of the Offshore Islands, the official abstract of which reads as follows:

Reaction in the non-Communist countries of the Far East to the loss of the Offshore Islands to the Chinese Communists would vary widely, depending on the conditions under which the

crisis considerably different from the view held by the American public and America's allies. The paper could be summarized as saying in effect that the loss of the Offshore Islands could well mean within a few years the collapse of the entire American position in the Far East. It said further that unless the Chinese Communists could be deterred either by U.S. statements in the pre-assault period or very quickly in the post-assault period with the use of some conventional bombing, nuclear weapons would have to be used; and, it emphasized that the use of these nuclear weapons might lead to general war.

loss occurred. Irrespective of the circumstances, however, it is apparent that there would be some loss of U.S. prestige throughout the Far East. Communist control of the islands would be accepted as evidence of increasing Chinese Communist strength, and U.S. intention to continue to support the anti-Communist positions of the several Asian countries would be brought into question, with concomitant demands for evidence of such support. There might also be a further shift toward a more neutralist position on the part of some Southeast Asian nations. These reactions would be minimized, however, if any change in the status of the Offshore Islands were to come about as the result of negotiations.⁵⁷

The lack of decisiveness in the INR predictions, though it probably accurately reflected the uncertainties involved, was probably at least partly responsible for the almost total lack of influence which INR had during the crisis.

The paper thus provided Eisenhower, as he preferred, not with alternative policies but with the unanimous advice of his principal intelligence and policy advisors. The policy proposals made, however, were influenced by previous presidential decisions and by Eisenhower's views as he had expressed them in meetings and conversations with Dulles. The papers carried by Dulles to Newport were designed to lay the background for meetings the following week back in Washington at which it was expected that firm decisions on the issues raised would be taken.

In his conversation with Dulles, which lasted from 10:30 to 12:15 at Newport,⁵⁸ Eisenhower stated that the use of nuclear weapons was the heart of the matter. Dulles stated that the United States had in fact acknowledged and accepted the political and psychological dangers of using nuclear weapons when it decided to include them in its artillery. He reviewed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the September 2 meeting which they had had with Dulles, and which has been discussed above, with particular reference to the way in which air burst nuclear weapons would be used.

Eisenhower noted that retaliation by the Communists with nuclear weapons might well be against Taiwan and beyond rather than against Quemoy. The Secretary of State then discussed with Eisenhower the draft statement to the press. The statement had been prepared by Dulles on the way to Newport in substitution for the draft, discussed above, prepared by Green and approved by State and Defense officials. It was decided by the two men that Dulles, not Eisenhower, would make the statement.⁵⁹ Dulles checked by telephone with Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Robertson, who suggested one change which was approved by Eisenhower.* Dulles then met with the press for a background press conference to answer questions relating to the statement.**

On Friday, September 5, following a meeting with Robertson and Parsons, Dulles discussed the Taiwan Straits crisis with Goodpaster, McElroy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

* The change apparently involved deleting a paragraph which would have appeared after paragraph four of the statement as issued and which stated that any attack by Communist China which had the conquest of Taiwan as its objective would specifically require the United States to consider its treaty obligations.⁶⁰

** See above, pp. 230-235.

Mansfield D. Sprague, and Twining for fifty minutes.⁶¹ McElroy suggested that the meeting with Eisenhower on the next day be directed at giving him an understanding of the types of questions that might have to be faced at a moment's notice. Dulles noted that the GRC should be encouraged to use the supplies that they had. There was discussion of the scope of retaliation which would be given the commanders in the field. On this there was general agreement that they be given permission to bomb mainland bases in the general area of Taiwan in the event of an attack on Taiwan. Dulles indicated, and it was agreed by all, that there was still not adequate information on the resupply situation. Twining stated that the GRC was not supplying the information, but that supply seemed to be adequate and that damage on Quemoy had been slight despite exaggerated GRC claims. The meeting ended with Dulles again stressing the need for intelligence on Chinese Communist intentions and on the situation of resupply.⁶²

The memorandum to the Secretary of Defense approved by the Joint Chiefs began by noting that American forces were spread dangerously thin in the Far East and that this condition of weakness was aggravated by the uncertainty over the use of atomic weapons. It noted that a crisis in Southeast Asia or in Korea might occur simultaneously with the crisis in the Taiwan Straits and that this would require mobilization of reserve forces.

TABLE 16

PROPOSED ARMY CHANGE IN JOINT STAFF DRAFT ON USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS. IN DEFENSE OF QUEMOY

The JCS paper expressed concern that the American public and the free world were uninformed about and unprepared for such eventualities. The paper indicated that at any time in the immediate future without further warning, events in the Taiwan Straits might occur which would result in the involvement of American forces in direct clashes with the Chinese Communists. In addition to the actions for contingency planning in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, the Joint Chiefs proposed that the following actions be considered:

- (1) A statement to the GRC, the Chinese Communists, and the Soviet Union that no doubt exists as to U.S. intentions concerning the Offshore Islands.
- (2) Congressional leaders be notified of the seriousness of the situation.
- (3) Allies be notified of the seriousness of the situation.
- (4) The United Nations be informed of the critical nature of the situation and consideration be given to calling a special meeting of the UN Security Council.
- (5) Military assistance funds to the GRC for fiscal year 1955 be released immediately.

- (6) Ways be found to marshal public opinion to support American policy.
- (7) Consideration be given to a radio and TV address by President Eisenhower.⁶⁶

At this same meeting the Joint Chiefs approved a discussion paper on "Authority for Emergency Action in Defense of Taiwan and the Off-shore⁶⁸ Islands" for a meeting later in the day with the President.

WHITE HOUSE MEETING (September 6)

Following the Joint Chiefs meeting, Twining went to the White House for a meeting with the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The meeting, as will be indicated below, was partly devoted to discussing the Chou En-lai statement on opening the Warsaw talks and agreeing that the United States would resume the talks.* Following this discussion they turned to the paper proposed by the Joint Chiefs which read as follows:

Discussion Paper, 6 September 1958.

Subject: Authority for Emergency Action in Defense of Taiwan and the Offshore Islands.

1. Authority is required to replace losses of supplies and materiel and expenditure of ammunition and supplies by CHINAT forces.
2. In the event of a major emergency arising from an attack on Taiwan and the offshore islands moving so rapidly that it would not permit consultation with the President, JCS would take the following actions on behalf of the Secretary of Defense: a) CINCPAC would be authorized to augment U.S. forces engaged in the defense of Taiwan from the resources of his own command; b) all U.S. forces worldwide would be alerted; c) oppose any major attack on Taiwan and attack mainland bases with all CINCPAC forces that can be brought to bear. (See attached map.) [Map not on copy seen.]

* See pp. 441-442.

3. In the event of a major landing attack on off-shore islands, authority for the following actions not now authorized would be desirable:
a) approve CHINAT Air Force's striking enemy forces and mainland targets; b) authority for U.S. forces to strike with conventional weapons any CHICOM assault of major proportions moving against Offshore Islands.*
4. Use of atomic weapons and U.S. air attack in support of CHINAT Air Force in 3(a) [i.e., in case of attack only on Quemoy] above, as necessary, only as approved by the President.

(initialled by the President)⁶⁹

Though the memorandum was signed by the President as it was presented to him, a memorandum from Twining to the other members of the Joint Chiefs, concurred in by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, indicated that though paragraph one had been improved for immediate implementation, the emergency actions listed in paragraphs two and three had been approved only "under those circumstances when time does not permit securing the President's specific approval in each case." With this understanding it was also agreed that the items in paragraph three

* The paper as originally drafted and approved by the Joint Chiefs had contained an item 3(c): "approve U.S. air support of CHINAT forces." Apparently sometime before the meeting with the President, as a result of conversations between Twining and Dulles, this item was moved to Section 4 so that it could be carried out only with the explicit approval of the President.

indicated as being "desirable" had the President's approval.⁷⁰ The Joint Chiefs looked upon the authority given to them as not subject to delegation to commanders in the field and hence did not pass on the authority to defend Quemoy, Nor, as we shall see, was the reasoning on the role of atomic weapons, as made clear in the Joint Chiefs' discussion on the proposed Army change in the Joint Staff memorandum, reflected in information passed to CINCPAC for his subordinate commanders.

Within two weeks of the outbreak of large-scale military action in the Taiwan Straits, the Administration, in a series of meetings presided over by the President, had thus approved basic American policy for the crisis. The precise islands which the United States would assume some responsibility for had been established, American escort to within three miles of the Offshore Islands had been authorized, and contingency plans for the defense of Quemoy against a major invasion had been drafted and approved by the President. There remained the critical question of what would be done if resupply could not be successfully accomplished with escort simply to within three miles. However, at this point word had just reached Washington that the first U.S. escorted convoy was to sail

on the next day for the Offshore Islands and American officials were at this time prone to await the results of the convoy operations before making any additional plans. While implicit in the decisions of the Government was the fact that further actions would be taken to prevent a successful blockade of the Offshore Islands, as September was to progress, American officials were to consider the possibility of negotiated settlement as well as the moves which might be necessary to break the blockade. By early September and increasingly through the month, American officials came to the conclusion that the Chinese Nationalists were not making an all-out effort to break the blockade and could land adequate supplies on Quemoy at any time they chose.

As indicated in the Joint Chiefs background paper, the American unwillingness to permit the Chinese Nationalists to draw the United States into a major conflict with the Chinese Communists was a major motivation for the limits adopted on American policy. Thus the United States had not informed the GRC of its contingency plans and had not made any public

commitment to the defense of Quemoy.* The President and the Secretary of State also felt that the domestic, political, and legal situation did not permit any statement clearer than that issued at Newport, indicating American interest in the defense of Quemoy. It was felt that only after the beginning of invasion could the President find that the situation envisioned by the Congressional Formosa Resolution had come to pass and that therefore the United States would defend the Offshore Islands. It was also recognized that a firm public statement would invite extensive public criticism of the policy not only in the United States but elsewhere throughout the world, as well as more intense private diplomatic pressure which was in any case to build up during September.

In terms of communications with the Chinese Communists, the United States, contrary to many impressions, did not see any virtue in ambiguity. The United States was sure that it would defend Quemoy against a Chinese Communist invasion and wanted to do

* In addition to the other pressures to be indicated below, American communications with the GRC were also complicated by the fact that the United States was not prepared to defend the smaller island in the Quemoy chain, which the GRC was determined to hold.

everything it could to deter such an attack by making clear that the United States would be involved. Thus if the other audiences could have been disregarded, the United States would have made a public statement that it would defend Quemoy. A private approach to the Chinese Communists had been discussed prior to the September 6 White House meeting and was to be discussed again. It was always to be ruled out on grounds that it would not be credible unless it were to take the form of an ultimatum, which, given the fact that the United States was not prepared to force the crisis to a head, could not be issued. An approach through a third source would, it was thought, appear to be a sign of weakness rather than a sign of strength. Thus the United States sought by its military action, including the activities of American forces in the Taiwan Straits, the build-up of American forces in Taiwan and the Pacific in general, and by increased aid to the ROC military as well as American involvement in the convoy operations, to convey to the Chinese Communists American commitment to the defense of Quemoy.

The question of what Chinese Communist intentions were continued to be grappled with by Washington officials,

but with no firm answer. There was agreement that whatever the tactical objectives in relation to Quemoy, the main Chinese Communist interest was in Taiwan and hence their policy vis-à-vis the Offshore Islands would be shaped by the Chinese perception of its effect on the Taiwan political and military situation. The pause in Chinese Communist military actions noted above^{*} had not been fully observed in Washington and there was no notion that the Chinese Communist strategy might be in a period of uncertainty, awaiting the American convoy operations. Rather, Washington saw Peking as continuing to apply military pressure on the Offshore Islands, perhaps hoping for a successful blockade, perhaps planning for an invasion. It was felt that increased military operations leading to a successful blockade or invasion could be deterred if the United States made clear that it was to be involved.

While deciding to accept the Chinese Communist proposal to reopen the Sino-American talks, Administration officials did not expect these talks to lead to any solution of the crisis. Rather they expected that this

^{*} See pp. 212-214.

was probably a tactical move on the part of the Chinese and did not necessarily rule out a later invasion of Quemoy. Thus, for Administration officials the crisis was far from over.

The Administration was also confident that it could defeat an attempt to invade the Offshore Islands, but only if it were willing to use atomic weapons. The question of what role atomic weapons should play had quickly come to the fore as the key question in American contingency planning for the crisis. While, as is seen below, military officers in the field were encouraged to be ready for extended conventional operations, the Joint Chiefs and major civilian leaders had become convinced that only very limited conventional operations would be possible before the resort to atomic weapons. What the President would do in the moment of decision could not, of course, be known in advance, probably even to the President himself. Nevertheless, Eisenhower had done everything to give the impression to the military that the authority to use nuclear weapons would be forthcoming if the Chinese Communists launched a major invasion of Quemoy and

failed to stop very quickly with the first signs of American conventional involvement.*

Washington officials continued to hope that the choice could be avoided by deterring an invasion, and attention focused back on the Taiwan Straits where the operations of convoy and blockade were about to begin.

* The Administration would use conventional weapons for a very short period in an effort to convince the Chinese Communists that they had miscalculated and that the United States would in fact defend Quemoy against a determined Chinese Communist attack. The pause would also provide time for the appropriate decision to be made by the President to authorize the use of atomic weapons. At the same time it was clear to officials in Washington that this could only be a pause, and in fact one measured in hours and not days, and that there was no point in planning for prolonged conventional operations since they could not succeed. Eisenhower confirms this view, indicating that he was prepared to use nuclear weapons against military installations on the mainland. (Waging Peace, p. 295.)

CHAPTER VII: THE PROLONGED BLOCKADE: COMMUNIST MOVES

(September 7 to October 6)

MILITARY ACTION

On the early morning of September 7 (Taiwan time), the first U.S. escorted Chinese Nationalist resupply ships set out for Quemoy. Convoy No. 1 consisted of one U.S. cruiser and three U.S. destroyers, escorting two Chinese Nationalist LSMs carrying 300 tons of supplies.* There was no Communist interference with the resupply effort. No shells were fired. Communist PT boats were in the area but did not interfere with the operation, and Communist MIGs circled twenty miles away making no threatening moves. The ships landed on the beach in Lialo Bay without interference, but there was a slight delay in withdrawing the LSMs due to the failure of the GRC beach crews to unload the vessels on schedule. The unloading operation, as described by an American on the scene, was

*U.S. Vice Admiral Beakely, Commander of the Seventh Fleet, announced on Taiwan that there had been previous night escorting of Nationalist convoys by U.S. ships since September 3,¹ but there is nothing in the classified records I have seen to substantiate this.

The first reported successful resupply of Quemoy had taken place on September 5 with the first aerial dropping of sandbags with U.S. air cover.²

so inept that the Taiwan Defense Command advised against a second try on the 8th. The Taiwan Defense Command reported to CINCPAC that the "ineffectiveness [of the] Chinese [Nationalist] Navy and inadequate Kinmen [Quemoy] beach preparation [were] so obvious as to virtually guarantee GRC corrective action."³

On September 8 a second Chinese Nationalist convoy of two LSMs with U.S. support set out from the Penghus to Quemoy. Despite the Taiwan Defense Command's advice against sending the convoy, Chiang Kai-shek, who had maintained clear personal authority over the resupply operation, ordered the convoy to proceed to the same beach as on the previous day. Chinese Communist artillery, long zeroed in on the beach, opened fire two hours after the convoy reached the beach. One of the two LSMs which was in the process of unloading came under the artillery fire and withdrew without damage. The second LSM was ordered to withdraw without unloading its cargo. The main difficulty was reported to be lack of coordination on the landing beach.⁴ Though the landing beach did come under attack, fire was directed mainly against the airfield, the dock, and the headquarters area, totaling approximately 53,000 rounds during the day.

Apparently the Chinese Communists had withheld their fire to be sure that American ships were not following the Chinese Nationalist ships onto the beach. Even then, they held their fire, apparently until they had reported their findings to higher officials. The estimate made at the time by the CIA representative on Quemoy was that the attack on the September 8 convoy was probably a high-level decision. The Nationalists had set up a military target that the Chinese Communists could hardly pass up. Nevertheless they waited two hours to fire, suggesting extreme caution against the possibility of hitting American ships.⁵

On the morning of September 8, prior to the second convoy, the first air battle of the crisis since August 25 took place near Swatow. Approximately a dozen GRC F-86s opposed fifteen Chinese Communist MIGs. The GRC destroyed at least four and possibly more of the enemy aircraft and one GRC F-86 was damaged. The GRC fighters were flying protective cover for a reconnaissance flight unrelated to the convoy. Acting under orders to avoid provocative actions during the period of Communist cease-fire,* Smoot had strongly advised against the flight and

* i.e., the lack of fire on September 7.

was not told that it was taking off. The TDC strongly protested the action.⁶

On September 9 and 10 the Chinese Nationalists, because of adverse weather conditions, did not attempt any resupply operations to Quemoy.⁷ Nevertheless, on the 9th the Chinese Communists fired approximately 8,000 rounds against Quemoy.⁸ This pattern was to continue through September. The Chinese Communists fired whether a convoy attempted to land or not. They directed some of their fire at the ships attempting to resupply but never at the same rate as in August. The pattern of convoy operations and artillery fire is indicated in Table 17.

On September 11 the third U.S. escorted convoy left Taiwan with four LSMs. The Chinese Communists fired approximately 60,000 shells in the heaviest and most concentrated bombardment since August 23 and succeeded in preventing the landing of more than a negligible amount of supplies. The firing began within forty minutes of the boats beaching and forced the unloading crews to take cover. One of the two ships which carried ammunition was blown up by Chinese Communist artillery. The second ship, after the blow-up of the first vessel, returned to

Table 17

ARTILLERY FIRE AND RESUPPLY

September 7 - October 6, 1958

Date	Convoy Number	Composition ^a	Cargo Unloaded	Artillery Fire Directed Against Convoy	CC Total Artillery Fire	Chinese Nationalist Artillery Fire	Remarks
Sept. 7	1	2 LSM	272 Tons ^c	None	0	0	No Damage
8	2	2 LSM	72 Tons	Artillery Fire (Heavy)	53,000	10,104	1 LSM Hit
9					8,470	0	Rough Seas prevent conveying
10					1,050	30	Convoy Postponed to improve landing techniques
11	3	4 LSM	8 Tons	Artillery Fire (Heavy)	60,890	5,650	No Damage
12					0	0	

Table 17--continued

Date	Convoy Number	Composition	Cargo Unloaded	Artillery Fire Directed Against Convoy	CC Total Artillery Fire	Chinese Nationalist Artillery Fire	Remarks
Sept. 13	4	3 LSM	5 LVT 20 Tons	Artillery Fire	DNA ^b	DNA ^b	1 LSM Hit
14	5	1 LST 2 LSIL	17 LVT 166 Tons	Artillery Fire (Moderate)	6,830	1,333	1 LST Hit
15					2,208	428	
16	6	1 LST	17 LVT 221 Tons	Artillery Fire (Moderate)	8,169	384	1 LST Hit
17	7	2 LST	31 LVT 108 Tons	Artillery Fire	9,588	1,163	1 LVT Sunk 1 LST Hit
18	8	2 LST	34 LVT 141 Tons	Artillery Fire	4,409	645	No Damage

Table 17--continued

Date	Convoy Number	Composition	Cargo Unloaded	Artillery Fire Directed Against Convoy	CC Total Artillery Fire	Chinese Nationalist Artillery Fire	Remarks
Sept. 19	LSD 1	1 LSD 1 LCU 1 LCM	3 8-inch howitzers	None	10,585	625	LSD Unloaded 10 Miles Out
	9	3 LST	47 LVT 118 Tons	Artillery Fire (Heavy)			No Damage
20	10	2 LST	102 Tons 250 Troops	Artillery Fire (Heavy)	8,220	1,557	No Damage
21	LSD 2	1 LSD 3 LCU 1 LCI	3 8-inch howitzers	Artillery Fire (Heavy)	10,413	1,035	2 Howitzers Immobilized
	11	1 LST	None	Artillery Fire (Moderate)			Did not beach due to fire
22	LSD 3	1 LSD	None	None	DNA ^b	DNA ^b	Returned due to rough sea
	12	2 LST	29 LVT 105 Tons	Artillery Fire (Heavy)			1 LST Capsized

Table 17--continued

Date	Convoy Number	Composition	Cargo Unloaded	Artillery Fire Directed Against Convoy	CC Total Artillery Fire	Chinese Nationalist Artillery Fire	Remarks
Sept. 23	LSD 4	1 LSD	None	None	8,622	402	Returned due to rough seas
	13	3 LST	None	None			Returned due to rough seas
24					6,269	1,470	Rough seas prevent conveying
25					6,857	0	Rough seas prevent conveying
26	14	3 LST	140 Tons	DNA ^b	12,694	DNA ^b	
27	LSD 5	1 LST	1 M-51 Tank Re-triever 110 Tons	DNA ^b	8,282	21 Rounds ^d	
	15	3 LST	270 Tons				
28	16		102 Tons	DNA ^b	4,420	547	In addition junks land 99 tons
29					9,625	5,541	Rough seas prevent conveying

Table 17--continued

Date	Convoy Number	Composition	Cargo Unloaded	Artillery Fire Directed Against Convoy	CC Total Artillery Fire	Chinese Nationalist Artillery Fire	Remarks
Sept. 30	17		110 Tons	DNA ^b	13,061	263	In addition junks land 81 tons
Oct. 1	18		Bulk Cargo	DNA ^b	17,403	0	
2					DNA ^b	DNA ^b	Rough seas prevent conveying
3					5,345	232	Rough seas prevent conveying
4					DNA ^b	DNA ^b	Rough seas prevent conveying
5	19	1 LST	None	Artillery Fire	2,448	0	Did not unload due to fire
6	20		500	None	0	DNA ^b	Chinese Communist cease fire put into effect before convoy reaches Quemoy

Table 17--continued

SOURCE: Convoy Summary SA-261, September 26, 1958 [No originating office indicated] (Secret); CINCPAC Historical Division, "CINCPAC Taiwan Diary," August, 1958-December, 1959 (formerly Top Secret, downgraded to Secret); TDC Daily SITREPS [Situation Reports], TDC file #3482 consisting of a daily telegram to CINCPAC, September 3, 1958 to October 17, 1958 (Secret). The three sources give somewhat different figures; where there were differences the TDC data was used.

- ^aLSM - Landing ship, mechanized
- LST - Landing ship, tank
- LSIL - Landing ship, infantry (large)
- LVT - Landing vehicle tracked
- LSD - Landing ship, dock
- LCU - Landing craft, utility
- LCM - Landing craft, mechanized
- LCI - Landing craft, infantry

^bData Not Available.

^cSupplies unless otherwise indicated.

^d8-inch howitzer.

the protection of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, which was not fired upon. Earlier in the day two tugs had towed four LCMs to Quemoy for use in inter-island resupply. These boats were not fired upon, leading U.S. officials on Taiwan to conclude that Chinese Communist intelligence was very effective.⁹

Nationalist convoys numbers four and five left on the 13th and 14th. The convoy on the 13th contained three LSMs and the one on the 14th contained an LST and an LSM. Both convoys were met with heavy artillery fire and managed to unload only a small fraction of their cargo--a total of forty-eight tons of supplies and twenty-two LVTs (landing vehicle tracked). In both cases one ship was hit by Chinese Communist fire.

The first successful air drop took place on October 13 when thirteen tons were dropped.¹⁰ On the 15th there was a second air drop on Quemoy. Air drops during this period are summarized in Table 18. At the same time American planes joined with the GRC in a protective patrol over Quemoy. Though remaining three miles off Quemoy, their pilots were able to see Chinese Communist movements on the mainland and reported them to the GRC.¹¹

Table 18

AERIAL RESUPPLY: September 7 - October 7

	Date	Tons
Sept.	9	84
	12	5.6
	13	13
	14	10
	15	15.8
	17	12.8
	18	12.7
	19	15
	20	12
	22	54
	24	50
	25	50
	26	64
	27	65.6 ^a
	28	68
	29	76
	30	60
Oct.	1	93
	2	275
	3	158
	4	268
	5	285
	6	283
	7	102

SOURCE: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis, Intelligence Report No. 7805, "Chronology of Taiwan Straits Developments, June 30-September 26, 1958" (Prepared by Division of Research and Analysis for Far East), September 29, 1958 (Secret); Ibid., Intelligence Information Brief No. 48, "Chronology of Taiwan Straits Developments, September 26-November 30, 1958" December 12, 1958 (Secret); CINCPAC Historical Division, "CINCPAC Taiwan Diary," August, 1958-December, 1959 (formerly Top Secret, downgraded to Secret).

^aErh-tan and Ta-tan.

On September 16 a GRC photo reconnaissance mission over Amoy, the first Chinese Nationalist attempted intrusion over the mainland since the beginning of the crisis, was not molested. Air activity over the Taiwan Straits increased rapidly after this. Clashes took place frequently at the instigation of the Chinese Nationalists, who were to receive Sidewinder missiles during this period and who were anxious to demonstrate their superiority over the Chinese Communist Air Force.¹² Air battles are summarized in Table 19.

During the same period convoy operations continued. On the 18th, four Communist torpedo boats for the first time since the start of the U.S. escort operations tried to intercept the LSTs engaged in the resupply operations. GRC Sabre Jets attacked and destroyed three of the four torpedo boats. When MIGs appeared to protect them, five of them were destroyed or damaged.¹³

On September 19 convoy No. 9 sailed as well as the first of a new convoy operation using dock landing ships, labeled LSD convoy No. 1. The LSD convoy involved one LSD with one LCV (landing craft vehicle), and one LCM, carrying three 8-inch howitzers on board. The LSD unloaded its cargo ten miles offshore. There was no

Table 19

AIR BATTLES: September 7-October 6

Date	Planes	Damage
Sept. 8	12 F-86 v. 15 MIGs	4 MIGs Destroyed 1 F-86 Damaged
18 (3 engagements)	4 F-86 v. 20 MIGs	2 MIGs Destroyed 1 Damaged
	4 F-86 v. 25 MIGs	None
	4 F-86 v. 8 MIGs	3 MIGs Destroyed
20 (4 engagements)	Each Involved 4 F-86 v. a larger number of MIGs	None
24 ^a (numerous)	20 F-96s equipped with Sidewinder v. larger number of MIGs	10 MIGs Destroyed
29	20 C-46s engaged in resupply	1 C-46 downed during resupply attempt by enemy Flak
Oct. 3	C-46s engaged in resupply v. unknown number of MIGs	1 GRC plane downed during resupply attempt by MIGs

SOURCE: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis, Intelligence Report No. 7805, "Chronology of Taiwan Straits Developments, June 30-September 26, 1958" (Prepared by Division of Research and Analysis for Far East), September 29, 1958 (Secret); Ibid., Intelligence Information Brief No. 48, "Chronology of Taiwan Straits Developments, September 26-November 30, 1958," December 12, 1958 (Secret); TDC Daily SITREPS [Situation Reports], TDC file #3482 consisting of a daily telegram to CINCPAC (Secret).

fire against the LSD landing, and the three 8-inch howitzers were successfully landed.¹⁴

On September 20 a sea engagement took place near Matsu. The GRC claimed that it had sunk one PT boat and damaged a second.¹⁵ Because of the rough seas, there were no convoys between September 23 and 26,¹⁶ though air drops continued. These are summarized in Table 18. Artillery fire also continued to be exchanged, the Chinese Communists firing 6,000, 9,000 and 12,000 shells on the 24th, 25th and 26th respectively, and the Chinese Nationalists answering with 1,500 shells on the 24th and 25th and 6,000 shells on the 26th.¹⁷

On October 4 there was no convoy activity and for the first time for at least several weeks, no artillery fire by either side. The Chinese Nationalist Air Force dropped 268 tons of supplies on Quemoy.¹⁸

On October 5 the last convoy prior to the ceasefire sailed with 126 tons, but did not unload because of enemy fire. However, the Chinese Nationalist Air Force dropped 285 tons. The Chinese Communists fired 7,000 rounds and in return received 282 rounds from the GRC.¹⁹ The last Chinese Communist fire occurred at 11 p.m. (10 a.m. Eastern Standard Time) on October 6.

During the period from August 23 to October 6, the Chinese Communists fired 474,910 rounds at the Quemoy Islands, as is indicated in Table 20. The shelling resulted in 2,596 military casualties, including 489 killed. This constituted approximately 3 percent of the troops, and approximately 29 artillery pieces were damaged. During the same period the GRC fired 68,223 rounds, killing an undetermined number of Chinese Communist troops and neutralizing 150 enemy artillery pieces.²⁰ The GRC fired approximately 50 percent more per artillery piece than the Chinese Communists.

At the time of the cease fire, supplies for at least thirty-three days and up to sixty days were available on Quemoy in each of the supply categories.²¹

SINO-SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND DIPLOMACY

On September 7, following the unopposed convoy operation by the Chinese Nationalists, the Chinese Communists issued what was to be the first of a series of "serious warnings" about U.S. intrusions into Chinese Communist territory. The warning was released by the NCNA and was against the sending of U.S. ships into the vicinity of Quemoy. The Chinese Communists have

Table 20

CHINESE COMMUNIST ARTILLERY FIRE: August 23-October 6

	Rounds	Rounds/Square Kilometer
Quemoy	237,838	1.46
Little Quemoy	117,149	7.55
Ta-Tan	92,469	117.00
Erh-tan	27,454	98.00

SOURCE: Report of Taiwan USARPAC Advisory Team on the Artillery Situations on the Offshore Islands, October 30, 1958, To: CINCUSARPAC, TDC #3480 (Secret).

continued to issue "serious warnings" until the present. All of the warnings during the crisis after the first one were to concern alleged American intrusions in the vicinity of Matsu. The Peking radio also reported that China was the scene of anti-American demonstrations.²² The mayor of Peking, Peng Chen, was reported by the People's Daily as saying that the United States was massing forces to prevent the liberation of Quemoy and Matsu and even threatening atomic bombardment. He called for mobilization for production. It was also reported in the People's Daily that mass rallies of unprecedented size were being held in Peking on the liberation of Taiwan theme.²³ This was to be the start of a major internal propaganda campaign.

Soviet Premier Khrushchev addressed a letter to President Eisenhower on September 8. The letter was written before Khrushchev could have known what happened with the second convoy on September 8 in the Taiwan Straits: whether U.S. ships had gone all the way in or whether the Chinese Communists had fired against U.S. ships if they had gone all the way in. In fact, he could have had little time to digest the

events of September 7--when the U.S. escorted convoy landed without opposition. The Khrushchev letter stated in part:

As a result of the policy being carried on by the USA in regard to China, and especially of the actions being undertaken at the present time by American Government in the area of the Chinese island of Taiwan and of the Taiwan Straits, a dangerous situation has arisen in the Far East. Humanity has again been put before the direct threat of the beginning of a military conflagration.

In this responsible moment, the Government of the Soviet Union has decided to turn to the Government of the USA with an appeal to show sense, not to permit steps which could entail irreparable consequences.

You well know, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union stands firmly on the position of the peaceful coexistence of all states, regardless of their social or state structure and is in favor of not allowing the beginning of military conflicts, in order to assure conditions for a peaceful life for peoples on the whole globe. I think no one will dispute that the principles of peaceful coexistence have already received broad international recognition, and it can be said that for the overwhelming majority of states, they are the bases of their relations with other countries.

Nevertheless, in the postwar years, as a result of the policy of the USA, a deeply abnormal situation has been continuously maintained in the Far East, the cause of which is the aggressive policy of the Government of the USA, a policy of war. The main reason for the tense and, it must be directly said, very very dangerous situation which has arisen is that the USA has seized age-old Chinese territory--the island of Taiwan with the Pescadores Islands--by force, is continuing to occupy

these territories, cloaking this occupation with references to its support of the traitor of the Chinese people, Chiang Kai-shek, and is also trying to extend its aggression to the offshore Chinese islands.

As the Soviet Government has already stated many times in the organization of the United Nations, as well as in correspondence with the Government of the USA and governments of other powers, the situation is also inadmissible that a great state--The Chinese People's Republic--as a result of the position taken by the Government of the USA, is deprived of the opportunity to participate in the work of the organization of the United Nations, and is not represented in that organization, although it has a legitimate right to this.

You also know as well as I do that the Chinese state is one of the founders of the UN and that by force of that circumstance alone the existing situation is absolutely abnormal and deeply unjust in regard to the Chinese people.

The situation which has now arisen as a result of the actions of the USA in the area of the island of Taiwan and of the Taiwan Straits seriously disturbs the Soviet Government and the people. . . .

Nearly every day political and military leaders of the USA come out with threats addressed to People's China. Such and only such a meaning have the repeated statements of USA Secretary of State Dulles about the activities of the USA in the region of the Taiwan Straits and in particular the statement which he made in your and his name of 4 September. This statement cannot but evoke the most decisive condemnation. . . .

The inciting statement of Minister of Defense McElroy draws special attention to itself in which are contained frank threats addressed to the

Chinese People's Republic, and in which attempts are made to justify the aggressive activities of American armed forces in the Far East and in which the Chiang Kai-shek clique is taken under protection. And the commander of American armed forces on Taiwan Vice-Admiral Smoot has let himself go entirely and states the intention of the USA together with the Chiang Kai-shekists to inflict a defeat on Communist China.

Military leaders in the USA try even, with the tacit agreement of the American Government, to resort to atomic blackmail in relation to China, acting evidently still on inertia under the impression of the moods governing in Washington in that short period in the course of which the USA had at its disposal a monopoly of the atomic weapons. As is known, even at that time the policy of atomic blackmail did not have and could not have any success. Is it necessary to say that in present conditions when the USA has long not been the possessor of a monopoly in the field of atomic armaments, attempts to intimidate other states by atomic weapons are a completely hopeless business.

I speak about this because, as it seems to me, in the USA there are still people who do not want to part with the policy of threats and atomic blackmail although, it would seem, each day gives no little evidence that such a policy henceforth is doomed to failure.

One can with full confidence say that threats and blackmail cannot intimidate the Chinese people. This clearly follows also from the statement of the CPR Chou En-Lai of 6 September.

The Chinese people wants peace and defends peace but it does not fear war. If war will be thrust on China, whose people are full of determination to defend its rightful cause, then we have not the slightest doubt that the Chinese people will give a worthy rebuff to the aggressor.

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It is possible you will find what I have said above as harsh. But I do not permit myself to agree with this. In this letter to you, as also on other occasions, I simply wish to express myself frankly and to emphasize the whole danger of the situation developing in the region of Taiwan and the Chinese offshore islands as result of actions of the USA. If we were to hide our thoughts behind outwardly polite diplomatic formulations, then, I think it would be more difficult to understand each other. Moreover, we desire, that you, the Government of the USA and the whole American people with whom we wish only good relations and friendship should have a correct idea about those consequences which the present actions of the USA in the Far East might have. It would be a serious miscalculation if in the United States the conclusion were drawn that it was possible to deal with China in accordance with the example as it was done by certain powers in the past. Such kind of miscalculation might have serious consequences for the cause of peace in the whole world. Therefore let us introduce into the questions full clarity because reservations and misunderstandings in such affairs are most dangerous.

An attack on the Chinese People's Republic, which is a great friend, ally and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union. True to its duty, our country will do everything in order together with People's China to defend the security of both states, the interests of peace in the Far East, the interest of peace in the whole world.

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If the Government of the USA will take the road of respect for the legitimate sovereign rights of the great Chinese people then this doubtless will be regarded with satisfaction by all peoples as a serious contribution of the

people of the United States of America to the cause of strengthening of universal peace.

Sincerely,

N. Khrushchev²⁴

The Khrushchev letter gave strong support to the Chinese Communist position in the Far East. It stated that the Chinese Communist Government had every right to take measures against Chiang Kai-shek to liberate its territory, including the Offshore Islands and Taiwan, and stated that the United States has no right to interfere in internal Chinese affairs. It also warned that an attack on China would be considered an attack on the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union would do everything to "defend the security of both states." The Khrushchev letter thus made two points. On the one hand it stated that the Chinese Communist operations against the Offshore Islands was a purely internal affair of the Chinese Communist Government against a rebel band with which the Soviet Union would not interfere. At the same time it warned the United States not to involve itself in the situation by attacking the Chinese mainland and stressed that an attack on China was the equivalent of an attack on the Soviet Union.

This Khrushchev statement has often been interpreted as coming too late to be of value to the Chinese Communists and at a time when it was no longer dangerous to make such commitments. However, as will be indicated below, it is the author's contention that the Khrushchev statement was, in fact, in line with Chinese Communist strategy and that Peking should not have wanted and did not want an earlier statement.*

While demonstrations spread through China, the Chinese Communists expanded their propaganda and political maneuvering. On September 8, NCNA issued a statement accusing the United States of provocation by entering the twelve-mile limit of Chinese territorial waters. The statement warned that the United States was playing with fire.²⁵ On the 9th, Chou En-lai charged that it was the United States and not the Chinese Communists who were using armed force to try to achieve territorial ambitions in the Far East.** Also on the 9th, a Soviet official warned the United States

* See p. 254.

** Cambodian Premier Prince Norodom Sihanouk reported that Chinese Communist leaders had told him a month earlier that they were planning to take Quemoy but not Taiwan "at this time."²⁶

that Chinese Communist and Soviet security interests were inseparable and at the same time the Soviets announced their recognition of the Chinese Communist twelve-mile limit.²⁷

On September 10 the Chinese Communists charged that two U.S. planes had flown over the mainland and that one had penetrated as far in as 200 miles. They termed this "deliberate war provocation." The NCNA stated that U-2 reconnaissance planes had flown over Fukien and other nearby Chinese provinces and that two hours earlier, one naval type patrol plane had flown over the Fukien area. A Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry spokesman issued the third serious warning on the Seventh Fleet's violation of the proclaimed twelve-mile limit.²⁸

At the same time Pravda indicated that the Soviet Union would lead the drive to seat Communist China in the UN General Assembly Session opening on September 16. It noted British Labour Party support of the Chinese Communist bid for recognition, and Izvestia noted the Acheson and Finletter criticisms of American action in the Taiwan Straits crisis, echoing the frequent citation in the People's Daily of domestic American criticism of

American policy.²⁹ On the 10th, the People's Daily featured prominently on page one a summary of the Khrushchev letter to Eisenhower and printed the text in full on page three.³⁰ Also on September 10, although it was not to be announced until nineteen days later, Mao left Peking for a tour of the Yangtze river area, suggesting that lines of action for the Chinese Communist withdrawal had been laid out and that it was not felt that any high-level decisions would have to be made quickly in the ensuing period.³¹

On September 11, mass rallies were held throughout the Soviet Union to enlist popular support for the Chinese Communists and to condemn U.S. actions in the Far East.³² TASS reported on September 12 that Eisenhower's speech of the previous day (discussed below) had been an attempt to justify a policy of blackmail and the threat of force.³³

During the period from September 15 to the October 6 cease fire, the Chinese Communists engaged in an intensive propaganda campaign increasingly aimed at minimizing or disguising their failure to take Quemoy and at the same time exacerbating U.S.-GRC relations and attempting to paint the GRC and the United States as warmongers

threatening the peace of the world. They also continued their warnings about U.S. intrusion beyond the twelve-mile limit in the Matsu area, issuing warning No. 7 on September 17. At the same time the NCNA reported a wave of indignation at U.S. actions which was being channeled into the establishment of the communes.³⁴ The Peking radio reported that 302 million people in Communist China had demonstrated on the 18th against the United States over the Taiwan issue.³⁵ Also on the 18th, the People's Daily reported that the Chinese Communist Government had rejected the notion of a cease fire in the Taiwan Straits.³⁶ The Peking radio further declared that the United States must renounce force lest the crisis explode into war.³⁷

In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly during the general debate on September 18, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko charged that the Seventh Fleet was engaged in provocative action, and that the United States was then threatening to extend its aggression to the Offshore Islands. He warned the United States that China was a powerful nation with powerful allies who would not hesitate to come to her aid. He echoed the Chinese Communist line at Warsaw

in declaring that the situation could be stabilized only by a complete American withdrawal from the area.³⁸ On September 19 Khrushchev, in a second letter to the American President, warned Eisenhower that U.S. troops and ships faced expulsion by Communist China from Taiwan and the surrounding seas unless they withdrew "now." He warned that a world war was possible and said that the Soviet Union would honor its commitments to Communist China.* The Soviet Premier restated Russian willingness to come to China's aid if she were attacked. The Khrushchev message to Eisenhower came in response to Eisenhower's answer to Khrushchev's first letter, to be discussed below, and read in part as follows:

On receiving your letter of September 12, and on studying it, I was sorry to note that, as I see it, you have failed to appreciate the essential meaning of my message to you. My message was meant to show the full extent of the danger that will face mankind unless the United States of America abandons its aggressive policy, which is creating centres of grave conflict, now in one area of the world, now in another, and has brought about the present particularly tense situation in the Far East.

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* The U.S. Embassy in Moscow interpreted the letter at the time as the clearest warning by Moscow in the postwar period of the circumstances under which it would go to war. However, it declared that Moscow did not want

If the existing situation is viewed soberly and on the basis of the actual facts, one is bound to admit that the only real source of the tension in that part of the world consists in the fact that the United States has seized inalienable Chinese territory--Taiwan and a number of other islands--and is maintaining under its armed protection the Chiang Kai-shek clique thrown out by the Chinese people, and encouraging its attacks and provocations against People's China.

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I addressed my message on the Taiwan events to the President of the United States and not to the Government of the Chinese People's Republic for the simple reason that it is not China that is interfering in the internal affairs of the United States of America, but the United States which, trampling underfoot all the standards of behavior of civilized nations, has grossly interfered in China's affairs and is trying by force of arms to have things all its own way in someone else's house, in this way creating a grave threat to peace in the Far East.

Moreover, Mr. President, to urge us, as you do, to exert some influence on the government of the Chinese People's Republic in connection with the Taiwan events, means trying to induce the Soviet Union to interfere in the internal affairs of China. The Soviet Union would never be a party to such a shameful affair, as that would be fundamentally contrary to its peaceful foreign policy and would be incompatible with the relationship of unbreakable friendship and fraternal cooperation between the Soviet and the Chinese peoples.

As you found it fit to mention in your letter, I have been to Peking lately and had a chance to exchange views with the leaders of the

or expect a war and that there was no domestic preparation for war, as there had been during the earlier Middle East crisis. It reported that the Soviet press had reprinted in full the Eisenhower statement of September 12 and concluded with the observation that the Khrushchev letter was aimed largely at world opinion. 39

government of the Chinese People's Republic on all matters of interest to the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. I can tell you frankly and straightforwardly that the full unanimity of views of the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese People's Republic on the main thing, that is, on the necessity of continuing to struggle resolutely against all forces of aggression and of supporting the forces working for peace all over the world, was reaffirmed during our discussions in Peking.

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It appears from your statement that the United States government does not, unfortunately, intend to desist from interference in the internal affairs of China and from an aggressive policy towards the Chinese People's Republic, and this is a very dangerous policy, fraught with the threat of an armed conflict in the Far East and in other areas. Indeed, if Britain, for instance, were to build her policy on such a concept, she might, if she could, start a war against the United States for the simple reason that what is now the territory of the United States was once a colony of the British Empire.

Nor can one fail to note that in opposing Taiwan and the offshore islands to the whole of China, as you do in your letter, an undisguised attempt is being made to create a situation of 'two Chinas.' Such attempts, which are aimed at the dismemberment of China, are resolutely rejected by the people and government of the Chinese People's Republic, just as by all those who respect the sovereign rights of the peoples and the territorial integrity of states.

You seem, Mr. President, to be still proceeding from the assumption that Chiang Kai-shek represents something in China. In reality, however, he is no more than a hated shadow to disappear once and for all as soon as possible. There is only one government of China. That is the government of the Chinese People's Republic. To fail to see this means to base one's actions on illusions, which certainly cannot serve as a basis for any country's foreign policy.

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As for blackmail and threats with regard to People's China, one must say that they have not achieved and cannot achieve their purpose. As I noted in my previous message, certain American military leaders are even trying to threaten China with atomic weapons. Press reports say that units of the American air force, equipped with nuclear weapons, have been rushed to Taiwan, together with various rockets and guided missiles of the "Nike-Hercules" type, and that missile-launching ramps are being built and so on.

Such actions by the United States government cannot, naturally, reduce tension in that area, cannot improve the general climate or create the conditions for greater confidence. On the contrary, these actions tend to aggravate the situation and increase the danger of an outbreak of war involving the use of the most devastating modern weapons.

I must tell you outright, Mr. President, that atomic blackmail with regard to the Chinese People's Republic will intimidate neither us nor the Chinese People's Republic. Those who harbor plans for an atomic attack on the Chinese People's Republic should not forget that the other side too has atomic and hydrogen weapons and the appropriate means to deliver them, and if the Chinese People's Republic falls victim to such an attack, the aggressor will at once suffer a rebuff by the same means.

A war against China on the pretext of defending the security interests of the United States, or on any other equally artificial pretext, will gain nothing for the United States. To touch off a war against People's China means to doom sons of the American people to certain death and to spark off the conflagration of a world war. It means to assume a grave responsibility before mankind, before history. The responsibility for this will also rest with you personally, Mr. President.

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I told you earlier, and feel it necessary to stress once more, that an attack on the Chinese

People's Republic is an attack on the Soviet Union.' We have a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with this great friend, ally and neighbor of our country, a treaty meeting the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples, the interests of peace, and let no one doubt that we shall fully honor our commitments.

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An end must be put once and for all to intervention in China's internal affairs. The American fleet must be recalled from the Taiwan Strait and American troops must leave Taiwan and go home. Without these steps there can be no lasting peace in the Far East. If the United States does not do that now, People's China will have no other recourse but to expel the hostile armed force from its own territory which is being converted into a bridgehead for attacking the Chinese People's Republic.

We fully support the Chinese government and the Chinese people. We have supported and will continue to support their policy. However, if the United States government adopts the course of respecting the sovereign rights of the great Chinese people and will be guided in its policy towards China by the principles of peaceful co-existence, we do not doubt that this will not only enable the present tension in the Taiwan area to be removed, but will also create the necessary conditions for reliably strengthening peace in the Far East and throughout the world.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV⁴⁰

On September 20 the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, in a tough statement in response to Dulles' UN speech, to be discussed below, declared that Communist China would take Quemoy and Matsu. He ruled out hope for a cease fire and said that the United States and Communist China were not at war with each other. This statement was featured prominently in the People's Daily of September 21, 1958. In it the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister declared:

The Chinese people are determined to recover Quemoy and Matsu, and no force on earth can stop them. The Chiang Kai-shek clique, repudiated by the Chinese people, has been using Quemoy and Matsu all along to carry out all sorts of harassing military activities against our mainland and coastal areas with the support of U.S. imperialism. In the last two months, these military activities have become even more unbridled. The facts show that so long as Quemoy and Matsu are not recovered, the immediate threat to our mainland and coastal areas will not be removed. The punitive military operations conducted by the Chinese people against Chiang

Kai-shek's troops entrenched on Quemoy and Matsu are therefore entirely proper and necessary. But the U.S. imperialists have described as "aggression" this action of the Chinese people in exercising their sovereign right and used this as a pretext to intervene, in an attempt to bring Quemoy, Matsu, and other islands in our inland waters under their direct armed control and turn them into springboards for further aggression against the Chinese mainland. The Chinese people have not forgotten the historical lesson that the Japanese militarists first invaded and occupied Taiwan and northeast China and converted them into springboards for aggression against the whole of China. They will never allow the U.S. imperialists to repeat the old tricks of the Japanese militarists.

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The Chinese people ardently love peace, but they will never succumb to the war threat of the imperialists. No amount of war threats by the U.S. imperialists can cow the Chinese people. The mighty demonstrations against U.S. aggression held by 300 million Chinese people in the cities and the countryside testify to the Chinese people's firm will. Should the U.S. aggressors, despite the repeated warnings of the Chinese people and the firm opposition of the people of the world, dare to impose war on us, our 600 million people, united as one, will certainly spare no sacrifice and will, under the sacred banner of defending our great motherland, fight against aggression, fight for the preservation of our sovereignty and territorial integrity, and fight for the safeguarding of peace in the Far East and the world! Ours is a just struggle. With the help of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and with the sympathy and support of all the peace-loving countries and people of Asia, Africa, and the rest of the world, we will certainly win complete victory.

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On September 21, Moscow assailed the rejection by the American Government of Khrushchev's note* and declared that the United States shunned a solution of the Taiwan problem.⁴³ On the 22nd, the People's Daily warned that if the United States used atomic weapons against China, it would immediately be subjected to counterblows with similar weapons. Rallies were reported by NCNA as being held throughout China on the 24th with the theme, "Taiwan and the Offshore Islands are inseparable parts of China's territory and must be liberated."⁴⁴

By late September, the Chinese Communists were apparently becoming worried about the possibility that the current discussion of the Taiwan Straits crisis in the General Assembly would lead to an attempt by some neutral nations to introduce a two-China solution which would involve Chinese Nationalist evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu in return for some international guarantee of the status of Taiwan. They began a move to forestall this possibility. On September 26 the Chinese Communists delivered a note to all of the embassies in Peking

* See below, p. 402.

declaring that the ceasefire proposals which it was understood the United States was presenting in Warsaw were unacceptable and declared that the United States must withdraw or hasten a hopeless war.⁴⁵

On October 1 at the United Nations, the Indian representative, Arthur Lall, suggested to the United States that India desired to be helpful in the Warsaw talks by providing informal interpretations for each side of the other's position. He suggested a need for foreshadowing what would occur if shooting stopped, and felt it would not be useful to bring the situation to the United Nations. Lall reported that Chou En-lai, in a letter to Krishna Menon, had said that the United States exaggerated the degree of bombardment of the Islands. He indicated that Menon or Nehru would be glad to get in touch with Chou with a message from the United States. Menon had reported that the Chinese Communists had indicated that they would not harass a GRC withdrawal from the Offshore Islands. They would, of course, openly take the Islands, but would agree to renounce the use of force to take Taiwan.^{46*}

*This was not the position which the Chinese took at Warsaw. See below, pp. 441-457.

On October 3 the People's Daily, commenting on a speech by John Foster Dulles on September 30, declared that the speech supported Chiang's return to the mainland and stated that the United States was using the trick of proposing a ceasefire in an attempt to bind the Chinese Communists and prevent them from eliminating the Nationalist regime.⁴⁷ On October 5, with neutralists' efforts to develop a compromise solution reaching a peak in the discussion by the Bandung Powers of a resolution on the issue, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, sent for the heads of all the Afro-Asian missions in Peking and stated that though the Chinese Communist Government appreciated the efforts of the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations, the Chinese people could not accept any resolution of the crisis which did not embody four principles on which Communist China's Taiwan policy was based:

1. Taiwan and the Penghu Islands were Chinese territory.
2. Only the Chinese People's Government could claim to be the Government of China.
3. All U.S. forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan and the Straits area.

4. The Chinese and the U.S. Governments should settle in peaceful discussions the disputes existing between them.

Referring specifically to the Resolution being drafted in the General Assembly by the missions of the Afro-Asian countries, Chen said that any resolution not embodying these four principles would represent an imperialist victory. He proceeded to detail the diplomatic support given by Communist China to the Afro-Asian nations, during the Suez crisis, the Syrian crisis of 1957, the Lebanon and Jordan crisis of the previous summer, the Indonesian civil war, and in the dispute between Cambodia and South Vietnam. He declared that in the cases of Suez and Indonesia, the People's Republic of China had not asked for a ceasefire and that in the case of Syria had not asked for mediation. In the Cambodian situation, Communist China had not suggested UN action. The Chinese Communist Foreign Minister declared that any such action then by China would have fallen short of unconditional moral support to the cause of justice. In return, the PRC expected diplomatic support, but was not interested in material

support. He went on to state that China was in no hurry for a solution to the Offshore Islands problem and was not interested in mediation. He declared that China would not attack U.S. forces first, but was not frightened of and could handle the United States single-handedly if necessary. He declared that Communist China was anxious to make peace, but not by compromising the principles stated. He declared that in the meantime, the bombardment would continue, and that mediation by the Secretary General was unacceptable.*

This strong statement by the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister had the effect of leading the Bandung Powers to drop their projected General Assembly Resolution even before the Chinese Communists announced their ceasefire.⁴⁸

On the 29th, NCNA reacted sharply to the use by the GRC of the Sidewinder missile. The People's Daily of September 30 had published a big story on the missile, including a statement by the Ministry of National Defense

* A memorandum from the Foreign Office to Washington indicated that the information had been received by the British from the Pakistan Chargé d'Affaires in Peking. It is interesting to note that this meeting took place less than 24 hours before the Chinese Communist ceasefire statement (to be discussed below). This suggests that the Chinese Communists were seriously interested in stopping the mediation.

attacking its use. The story declared correctly that Chiang had used the Sidewinder for the first time on September 24 and had downed one plane, and that the Chinese Communists had captured an unexploded warhead. The issue of People's Daily contained a picture of the captured missile.⁴⁹ The People's Daily article played up as "abnormal" the Sidewinder missile. It charged that the first use of the missile was "military provocation of utmost gravity" and that the United States had now confronted mankind with the danger of guided missile and nuclear warfare.⁵⁰ The Chinese were to continue in the early days of October to play up the Nationalist use of Sidewinders.

On October 4, Peking issued serious warning No. 22. It announced the observance of the anniversary of Sputnik, and linked this and the resumption of Soviet nuclear tests to the Taiwan crisis.⁵¹ On October 5, Peking called for a U.S. withdrawal from the area. A TASS statement declared that the Soviet Union would be involved in the fighting only if the United States attacked the Chinese Communist mainland. On October 6 the Chinese were to announce a ceasefire in the Taiwan Straits.

CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY

It seems clear that the Chinese Communists had not planned in advance for a prolonged artillery blockade against GRC convoys. In the period prior to active U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Straits, they had engaged not only in artillery fire but in extensive PT boat activity. There is no reason to suppose that they intended to stop the PT boat activity if the United States had remained out of the effort to resupply the Islands. The bombardment began just prior to the typhoon season, which makes it unlikely that the Chinese Communists were planning to invade Quemoy, but likely that they were hoping for a successful blockade. In fact, bad weather was to make resupply very difficult during much of the crisis period. However, rough seas would not have precluded the use of PT boats against supply boats on the days when both were capable of operating in the waters surrounding the Offshore Islands. Thus, if the United States had stayed out, the Chinese Communists would have used PT boats as well as artillery fire and possibly air power in what would have probably been a successful interdiction of the Offshore Islands.

If the United States came in, the Chinese Communists could not know what strategy they would be capable of following, since they could not anticipate the precise nature of the U.S. intervention. The Communists gave every evidence during the crisis that they were determined not to fire on American ships. Thus, as has been noted, on the first day of convoy they did not fire, and on the second day, they waited until it was very clear that U.S. ships were going to remain out of range before they opened fire. In addition, they engaged in almost no PT boat activity after the first few days of September, apparently because this would have run a very high risk of involvement with U.S. military ships. (In fact, American ships had authority to attack any Chinese Communist military vessels which tried to interfere with the GRC ships in international waters.) Thus during the period from September 2 to September 8 the Chinese Communists were, as indicated above, groping for a new strategy, one that would enable them to cover their retreat while securing the objectives that they now had.

When the United States made it clear that its intervention would consist of escorting up to three miles, the

Chinese Communists simultaneously discovered that their strategy of artillery and PT interdiction would be too dangerous, but that it was safe to carry out artillery firing against the Offshore Islands. It appears that the Chinese Communists were not very hopeful that artillery fire alone would lead to a successful blockade of Quemoy.*

The Chinese Communists did not engage in an all-out effort and never fired shells at Quemoy during this period at anything like the rate that they fired prior to September 2. The Chinese Communists probably recognized that they could not hope to effect a blockade of the Offshore Islands simply with artillery fire and therefore it was not worth the military effort. They

* However, it cannot be excluded that after September 7 the crisis in the Chinese Communist view switched from being a test of U.S. resolution, which it had been up to September 2 or 3, to a test of capabilities. Given the military ground rules and the limitations which had been established, the question was whether the blockade could be broken without expansion. The Chinese Communists may have hoped to stabilize the ground rules by various diplomatic and deterrent moves, including the Khrushchev statement. If, in the test of capabilities, the Chinese Communists were successful, they might have hoped that the United States would seek to deal with the problem diplomatically and politically rather than by stepping up the level of violence which might be difficult and politically costly.

may also have felt that if they did step up the artillery fire to the point where the GRC could not resupply on its own, in the long run the United States would begin to escort all the way in. If it were the case that the Chinese Communists would not have fired against American ships escorting all the way in, then the Chinese Communists had an interest in not raising their military action to the point that forced this action on the United States and hence exposed Chinese Communist lack of will.

The possibility of engaging in sporadic artillery fire against the Offshore Islands was probably seen by the Chinese Communists as an unexpected and unplanned opportunity to cover their disengagement from the attempt to capture the Islands. The period in which the Chinese Communists were able to prevent resupply by artillery fire probably went on for much longer than they expected when they implemented it on September 8. It was very difficult for American officials on Quemoy and Taiwan to estimate how long it would take for the blockade to be broken, if in fact it could be broken, and it was certainly difficult for the Communists to make this estimate. In order to do so they would have had to judge with what seriousness and determination the Chinese

Nationalists would go about the effort to break the blockade, how vigorously the United States would press the Nationalists to resupply, what kind of American training and aid would be given and what kind of techniques the United States and the GRC would use in their resupply operations.

As the period of effective blockade continued through September, there may have been a point at which some Chinese Communist officials began to feel that perhaps the artillery fire would be successful in blockading the islands and thus lead the United States to try to force the Chinese Nationalists off Quemoy rather than expand their own military operations. There is no sign that the Chinese Communist Government as a whole ever took this position seriously and ever tried to implement it by directing intensive artillery fire against the U.S. escorted convoys in any concentrated period of days during the latter part of September. Nevertheless, this question may have aroused some dispute in Peking as well as some apprehension in Moscow that perhaps the Chinese Communists would press ahead and force greater American activity, which might ultimately

call into play the Soviet guarantees. If such a discussion was taking place in Peking and the Soviets were aware of it, this might account for their backing off somewhat from the statements made by Khrushchev in early September, designed to cover a Chinese retreat and not a Chinese Communist effort to impose a successful blockade in the face of the U.S. action. The Soviets, however, may have become nervous because of indications that the United States did not believe the crisis was over. However, if there was any expectation on the part of some Communist Chinese leaders that the blockade would succeed or that the interdiction would succeed, this was clearly broken by early October and the Chinese Communists must have recognized that it was time to back away further and to implement a new strategy. However, during September their continuing military pressure had produced a major crisis in the United States and in the Western Alliance.

CHAPTER VIII: THE PROLONGED BLOCKADE:
REACTION ON TAIWAN AND IN THE FIELD

GRC PRESSURE ON WASHINGTON

In contrast to public pressures to reduce American involvement, which continued to mount during September, the United States was confronted with appeals from the GRC for more American action. During the period of September 7 to October 6, the GRC, with U.S. military assistance and convoy support, gradually improved its capability to land supplies on Quemoy. While expressing gratification for the stepped-up U.S. military support, Chinese Nationalist officials continued to press for greater U.S. involvement and for permission to bomb the mainland under current conditions. The pressure increased as the success of the convoy operations grew. GRC officials were uncertain about the U.S. response to an invasion of Quemoy and sought a firm private assurance and a public statement that the United States would defend the Offshore Islands. They pressed Smoot on the need for him to have the authority to authorize bombing the mainland by GRC or U.S. forces in the event

of an invasion attempt or bombing of Quemoy. They accepted as inevitable the resumption of the Sino-American Ambassadorial talks but put pressure on the United States not to make any agreements at the meetings. In particular they made clear, both publicly and privately, their opposition to a ceasefire arrangement which the United States was to seek to negotiate at Warsaw. GRC officials continued to hope that U.S. military action against Chinese Communist forces would become necessary. They sought to increase the intensity of the crisis by misleading information on the supply situation on Quemoy, by threatening to bomb the mainland, and by provoking air battles.

In public statements GRC officials expressed their impatience and their feeling that the war would have to be carried to the mainland. On September 7 the GRC Chief of Staff, General Wang Shu-ming, in a radio broadcast told the people in Fukien Province on the mainland to evacuate areas near Chinese Communist military bases to escape GRC retaliatory actions should the Chinese Communists try to invade the Offshore Islands. Smoot had told General Wang in a meeting on September 6 that

the basic American position on action against the mainland had been conveyed orally by Ambassador Drumright to Chiang at meetings held on August 24 and 31.* He summarized United States views as being that in the event the Chinese Communists launched air attacks on Quemoy and Matsu and such attacks were met by GRC aircraft, the Government of the United States would consider that the GRC's inherent right of self-defense would include GRC air attacks on aircraft conducting such attacks and the right to pursue the Chinese Communist aircraft to their bases and attack these bases. Smoot, in reporting on this conversation, expressed his view that the GRC had shown admirable restraint under the most dire circumstances.¹

On September 12, with only 441.6 tons having been landed, Drumright reported that if the Chinese Communist interdiction continued to be successful, GRC pressure on the United States to supply all the way to the beach and knock out the Chinese artillery would mount rapidly.² Smoot conferred with GRC Defense Minister Wang and Chiang Kai-shek. It was agreed that because of the Chinese

* See pp. 147-148, and 209-210.

Communist ability to zero in on all of the beaches, it would be necessary to use mobile landing techniques.

Chiang was reported to have been assured by the new plan, but he told Smoot that if the situation did not improve within a week, "quite drastic steps would have to be taken."³ On the same day, in a statement in Washington,

the new GRC Ambassador to the United States, Dr. George K. C. Yeh, in reaction to what might take place at Warsaw, said his government would not agree under any circumstances to a ceasefire in the Taiwan Straits. He said that his government would not agree to a political settlement involving the withdrawal of GRC troops from Quemoy or Matsu or their neutralization or demilitarization. He criticized as inadequate the Seventh Fleet convoy system and asserted that Chinese Communist attacks on Quemoy freed the GRC from the need to get United

States consent to take offensive measures against the mainland.⁴ In a conversation with Dulles on September 13, Ambassador Yeh stated that Chiang Kai-shek was "annoyed" by the United States observance of the three-mile limit. Yeh stated that Quemoy was GRC territory and that the GRC had invited the United States in. He emphasized

that the GRC was embarrassed by public references to an exchange of notes restricting GRC actions. He stated that the GRC was not satisfied with the convoys and wanted 8-inch howitzers included. Dulles, in reply, pointed out that many of America's allies and many neutrals were pressing for "appeasement." He stressed that the United States was isolated in world opinion on this issue and must take this into account. He assured Yeh, however, that there would be no appeasement or surrender.* Dulles asserted that it was foolish to put so many troops on the Offshore Islands and told Yeh that Eisenhower was unhappy about this and felt that it was an extremely foolish and in fact an "utterly mad policy." He noted that Eisenhower was preoccupied by this aspect of the situation. Dulles asserted his personal belief that the GRC was not holding back on attempting to resupply Quemoy and that it was a question of experience. He made this statement in response to an inquiry by Yeh into the charge that the GRC Navy was shirking and Yeh's

*Dulles was asserting his genuine feelings here in saying that allied and neutral opinion had to be taken into account and that his assessment was that it was pressing for appeasement.

comment that the Army Commander on Quemoy had in fact wanted ships to turn back if attacked.

In closing, Yeh noted that Chiang would always consult the United States but preferred not to have this stressed. Chiang had asked Yeh to tell Eisenhower and Dulles that he would do nothing foolish militarily. Dulles concluded by emphasizing that the United States could not act without the support of U.S. public opinion and to some extent, world opinion.⁶

Smoot reported on the 13th that while each convoy showed signs of improvement, the GRC had not yet demonstrated an ability to overcome the blockade. He noted that the current daily requirement estimate of 696 tons could be drastically reduced.⁷ On the 15th, Smoot was able to report that he was optimistic because of the GRC success in landing supplies on the 14th.⁸

On September 14 the GRC Foreign Minister told Drumright on Taiwan that he was not worried about supplying Quemoy, but about the public criticism on Taiwan of continued failure of the convoy operation and GRC inaction in face of Chinese Communist artillery fire. Drumright, in reporting this conversation, noted that he

shared this concern.⁹ Press reports from Taipei on September 14 indicated that pressure was being applied against the United States to escort all the way to Quemoy, but a U.S. spokesman on Taipei said that the shoal water around Quemoy would keep escorting destroyers three miles off shore even if the limit were removed.¹⁰ The same press report quoted the GRC Defense Minister as stating that 900-ton gunboats resembling the Soviet RIGA type might have reached the Matsu area,¹¹ this move apparently being part of the campaign of the GRC to create the impression that a new crisis might be brewing in the Matsu area.

On September 15, Chiang, in an interview with Stewart Alsop, stated that the convoy system was no solution. He declared that if the blockade continued, the GRC would be forced to order its Air Force to attack Chinese Communist artillery. He reported that the United States had begged Chiang to wait and see and that Chiang had agreed, but that he might lose patience. Chiang was reported by Alsop to be disturbed by the slight hint in the Eisenhower statement of September 6 that some sort of deal with the Chinese Communists concerning the Offshore Islands might be made and in

particular by press interpretations of the Eisenhower comment. Chiang said that anyone who thought that Eisenhower wanted neutralization or demilitarization of Quemoy and Matsu was guilty of a misinterpretation, and he implied that he would oppose any such arrangement.¹²

On the next day, Premier Chen Cheng declared that if the Chinese Communists kept up the blockade, this would "mean extending the war" to the mainland.¹³ Cheng was addressing the GRC National Assembly, which, in a resolution, called for "immediate and effective" air attack by the United States and the GRC to stop the Chinese Communist gun bombardment of Quemoy.¹⁴

On the 16th, a CIA telegram from Taipei warned that the GRC was threatening to bomb the mainland if the United States did not take over resupply operations. From the Chinese Nationalist point of view, the telegram indicated, U.S. resupply would at worst save the Islands and at best bring on a U.S.-Chinese Communist war, which the GRC wanted. The estimate of this report was that Chiang would not carry out his bluff to bomb the mainland, but that relations with the United States would be badly strained if the blockade continued.¹⁵

On September 17 the GRC press was reported by an American correspondent to be reflecting anti-American themes clearly with official government sanction. These themes were:

1. U. S. willingness to discuss the Taiwan situation at Warsaw.
2. U. S. refusal to send escort destroyers within range of Chinese Communist artillery.
3. U. S. refusal to let GRC warplanes take out Chinese Communist artillery positions.¹⁶

On the same day, however, at Smoot's urging, the GRC appointed a single commander for all aspects of the re-supply operations. Smoot, who had been experiencing great difficulties because of the diffuse GRC chain of command, reported that the effectiveness of the convoy operations should improve in the near future.¹⁷

Also on the 17th in Washington, GRC Ambassador Yeh, in another public statement, said that the GRC was opposed to the U. S. effort to secure the "neutralization" of Quemoy and Matsu by getting the Chinese Communists and the GRC to renounce the use of force.¹⁸ On September 19 in yet another public statement, Ambassador Yeh said that the GRC should order air strikes against the Chinese

Communist guns opposite Quemoy as soon as it had enough planes for effective operations. For the first time he brought out in the open what was beginning to be discussed privately among U.S. officials, i.e., the possibility that GRC troops on Quemoy and Matsu should be thinned out if the crisis came to a halt and Yeh declared that the GRC would not think of thinning out its troops whatever the U.S. pressure.* Yeh also declared that the United States was not telling the GRC about the Warsaw talks.**19

On September 19 a GRC spokesman in Taipei announced that the GRC would support discussion of the Taiwan Straits crisis in the UN only in connection with the charge versus the Soviet Union of aggression through aid to the Chinese Communists. A foreign ministry spokesman declared that the GRC was not prepared to make any concessions to the Chinese Communists to get a ceasefire. He declared that the GRC was opposed to demilitarization or trusteeship for Taiwan.²⁰

* As will be seen, the GRC later agreed to reduce its garrison on Quemoy. See pp. 539-543.

** As will be indicated below, in fact the GRC was fully informed both about the U.S. and the Chinese Communist positions at the Warsaw talks. What Yeh must have meant was simply that the GRC was not given a veto over U.S. actions at the Warsaw talks. See p. 444.

At the same time Premier Chen Cheng in a conversation with Admiral Smoot reported that the GRC could not exercise restraint in the face of an indefinite bombardment because of the morale problem. Drumright, in reporting the conversation, noted that Chen is a strong advocate of restraint and therefore that his statement should be taken very seriously.²¹

At the same time in Washington, Yeh was conferring with Deputy Undersecretary of State Murphy. Discussion was described in the State Department memorandum of conversation as being conducted in a "friendly fashion," and Yeh was reported to be quite honest about the situation on Quemoy, including the existence there of good morale and three or four months of supplies. He reported that civilian casualties had been very heavy--300 to date. He stated that while the GRC did not shoot at Amoy except for a few test shots, control of the Islands made possible the blockade of Amoy and had great psychological value. He declared that the crisis had been created by Khrushchev and Mao in order to get Communist China into international meetings.²²

On September 20 Chen Cheng met with Drumright in a conversation similar to the one the previous day with

Admiral Smoqt. He reported that the problem of Quemoy was not supplies, which were adequate until the end of October, but the morale of the Quemoy defenders. He declared that the time had come to attack. He noted, however, that attacks on Chinese artillery emplacements were of doubtful value, and that the best tactic was to destroy Chinese communications and airfields. He stated that the GRC wanted full U.S. logistical support for the operation and that the GRC would not withdraw from the Offshore Islands or accept a formal ceasefire or demilitarization. Under Drumright's questioning, Chen Cheng said that he was not then asking for formal U.S. concurrence in an attack on the mainland and stated that the United States had one week to ten days to concur.²³

Drumright on September 19 reported the GRC's fear that the United States would buy peace at their expense. He stated that the GRC would oppose any formal agreements freezing the situation, and that they would not abandon the Offshore Islands. He stated his estimate that the Chinese Nationalist regime would collapse if the United States managed to force a withdrawal.²⁴

Drumright's assessment was that the GRC would take retaliatory action in two or three weeks if the situation

did not change. He expressed a strong belief that the United States should defend its ally and make no deal with the Chinese Communists. Drumright made the following recommendations:

1. Abandon Warsaw talks after feeling out the Chinese Communists.
2. Condemn the Chinese Communists in the UN.
3. Build up U. S. military forces in Taiwan.
4. Release restraints on GRC and provide them with the necessary equipment and let it do the job of attempting to reduce interdiction. The U.S. should stay out if possible.²⁵

On September 22, Washington received mixed reports on the GRC situation. On the one hand, Drumright reported that the GRC was experimenting with mobile landing craft and with new methods for resupplying Quemoy,²⁶ and Admiral Felt, after a meeting with the officials in the GRC Ministry of Defense, was able to report that they seemed calm and reassured.²⁷ However, in an earlier message, he declared that he did not believe that the GRC would tolerate artillery fire much longer. He felt that the tinderbox was public opinion on Taiwan and that the GRC would attack the mainland by artillery bombardment or

commando raid when the critical point was reached in regard to public attitudes. He urged the United States to escort all the way in, believing that the Chinese Communists would not fire on U.S. ships, and that if they did, they would be branded the aggressor.²⁸

On September 22, Felt and General Kuter held a meeting with Chinese Nationalist Foreign Minister Yu to discuss the crisis. Kuter, in a later report of the conversation, said that for three and one-half years Yu had held the view that Communist action in Quemoy would bring GRC bombing of the mainland followed by a Chinese Communist bombardment of Taiwan and then U.S. involvement. However, on the 22d, Yu argued that the Chinese Communists would not retaliate because of the recent high-kill rate established by the GRC Air Force, and the Chinese Communist anxiety not to involve U.S. forces in open fighting. Yu concluded that the GRC should attack the mainland and that the Chinese Communist response would only be air-to-air combat. The Communists would lose the air war by attrition and give up. However, Kuter expressed his doubts whether a few hundred GRC and U.S. aircraft could defeat 3,000 Chinese aircraft. He later wrote, "I attributed Yu's change of tone as a devious step toward securing U.S.

endorsement of the offensive employment of the CHINA AIR FORCE and the early involvement of the United States in actual fighting." Kuter reported that this was the first time in three and one-half years he had interpreted Yu's behavior as being devious.²⁹

As the U.S. Government was moving, as we shall see, toward the firm belief in the ability of the combined current operations to break the blockade, the Chinese Nationalists continued to press for stronger action and in particular emphasized the critical situation on the smaller islands.^{*30} On September 23, Chiang met with Smoot and Drumright and stressed the need to solve the resupply problem within two weeks. He particularly pointed to the difficult situation on Erh-tan and Ta-tan. He stated that he considered these islands part of the Quemoy complex, and that an assault on them would amount to an assault on Quemoy. He said that his interpretation of Eisenhower's speeches was that it would require U.S. defense against assaults against the Tan Islands. He declared that the GRC would defend these satellite islands and requested U.S.

*The critical nature of the situation on the Tans was confirmed by an American officer on Quemoy, who reported that the Tans had been shelled daily since August 23 and had not received any supplies. There was heavy damage to fortification and weapons by artillery fire.³¹

air drops to supply them. Chiang predicted amphibious attacks on the Tans within two weeks and said they would be resisted, both directly and by retaliatory attacks against the mainland. He tried to discover what the United States would do if the Chinese Communist Air Force attacked Quemoy. He again stressed the morale problem. However, even at this time, reporting on this conversation, Drumright indicated that the situation seemed to be somewhat eased.³²

The Chinese Nationalists, perhaps recognizing that the American Government was coming to the conclusion that the resupply operations were going to be successful, continued to press for increased U.S. participation before this become too obvious. Thus, on September 24, the Foreign Ministry requested that the United States participate further in the airlift to Quemoy by flying transport planes to augment resupply and improve Quemoy morale. Drumright replied on the spot that approval was unlikely.³³

On September 25 he was able to report definitely that the American position remained that increased U.S. participation in an airlift was not desirable.³⁴

On September 28 the Taiwan Defense Commander reported that the Chinese Nationalist Ministry of National Defense

was determined to get supplies to Ta-tan and Erh-tan, and if this failed, to bomb the mainland. He declared that the satellite islands would not be abandoned voluntarily, though the Minister of National Defense secretly believed that the small islands were indefensible.

Smoot noted that in terms of the resupply of the major islands, a military analysis did not show a serious situation. Quemoy had supplies for at least twenty days, and the Minister of National Defense has assured him that it would not take action against the mainland without consulting the U.S. However, he noted that, if the GRC believed that the United States would enter the fight immediately to combat air reaction, they would assault the mainland at once. They hoped the United States would enter if the Chinese Communists initiated bombing of Quemoy, but they were not sure, and even if they were sure, they were desperately concerned that the need for approval by Eisenhower would pose a fatal delay. Smoot also noted that General Hu Lin, the Quemoy Defense Commander, could take more effective action in defense of Quemoy if he were assured that the United States would oppose assault and hence did not have to husband his supply of ammunition.

However, Smoot concluded that he believed that he could convince the GRC that resupply was the only solution.³⁵

On September 28, at a meeting in Washington between Robertson and GRC Ambassador Yeh, Robertson stated that the United States could not possibly support defense of the Tans. Yeh agreed and said that he would recommend abandoning and blowing up these islands. Robertson's remark was apparently intended to be an off the record one since at the same time American military officials on Taiwan were operating under strict orders not to inform GRC officials that the United States would not defend the Tans.³⁶

On September 29 at his first press conference since 1955, Chiang assailed the misunderstanding of the crisis by the American people. He stated that the GRC was opposed to any negotiations with the Communists and that the GRC would not at this point bomb the mainland artillery positions.³⁷

In a conversation between Ambassador Drumright and GRC Premier Chen Cheng on September 30, Drumright read to the Premier Washington's response to his proposal to bomb the mainland. Drumright stated that the Joint Chiefs believed that the Offshore Islands could be resupplied by current methods and that it was essential to continue to

exercise restraint. Cheng agreed that the resupply situation was improving.³⁸

On October 1 Drumright reported to Dulles that his press conference remarks of September 30 indicating a U.S. desire to negotiate^{*} were causing uncertainty, uneasiness, unsettlement and fear in Taipei. The American Ambassador noted that the press was misinterpreting Dulles' remarks but that the GRC Government recognized that there was no change in U.S. policy. Nonetheless Drumright emphasized that it was unfortunate that Dulles' remarks were misinterpreted.³⁹

On October 2 Drumright was summoned by Chiang Kai-shek, who stated that he "was highly shocked" by press conference statements by Eisenhower and Dulles,^{**} which will be discussed below, and which were widely interpreted both in Washington and Taipei as representing a softening of the U.S. position. Chiang declared that remarks by Dulles had caused bewilderment on Quemoy, particularly those comments suggesting a gradual withdrawal of forces from the Islands.

^{*} See below pp. 360-362.

^{**} See below pp. 360-363.

Chiang pointed out that he had tried to help U.S. opinion in his press conference by declaring that the Offshore Islands would not be used as a springboard and that he would not ask the U.S. forces to defend the Offshore Islands. He declared to Drumright, however, that the ill-fated Marshall mission of 1946-47 was being resurrected in the minds of the Chinese people, and he asserted that the United States must declare a no-compromise principle. Chiang stated that he could go no further in public support of the U.S. position and declared that a withdrawal of a small number of troops would have the same effect as withdrawing all of them and would be tantamount to giving up Taiwan. He declared that nothing would prevent his troops from remaining on Quemoy and that he expected Matsu soon to come under fire.

Drumright, in his message to Washington, reporting the conversation, urged the avoidance of remarks suggesting the possibility of withdrawal or the infeasibility of defending the islands, as hurting GRC morale.⁴⁰

In the Chinese Nationalist official minutes of the meeting, made available to Drumright and forwarded to Washington, Chiang's unhappiness with Eisenhower's Newport remark about "peaceful means," which he declared suggested

that the Chinese Communists could get Quemoy and Matsu by negotiation, was particularly cited as damaging to GRC morale. It was stated that the Dulles press conference had an even more serious effect on morale. The troops on Quemoy, according to the Nationalist summary, had previously believed that U.S. Army forces would aid them if the Islands were attacked. Now nothing was said about this and the stress was on the reduction of the garrison. The GRC summary noted that Chiang had stated that no external pressure nor any weapons including atomic bombs could ever force the Chinese Government to evacuate a single soldier from the Offshore Islands. The troops there would keep fighting until their last drop of blood was shed. It was reported that Drumright had assured Chiang--as he was instructed to do⁴¹--that there was no change in U.S. policy.^{42*}

* Since the Quemoy Islands were very isolated and it was difficult to get to them with supplies or ammunition, it should have been somewhat surprising to Drumright that the Quemoy garrison was upset by Dulles' press conference statement, and perhaps it was. However, according to both his report and the official GRC record, he did not raise the question of how the Quemoy garrison in its isolated position focusing on artillery attacks on the mainland had learned of the Dulles press conference. How this occurred was made clear to American officials in a CIA report which indicated that the Dulles press conference had been re-broadcast by the GRC to the troops on the Quemoy garrison,

On September 23 a Navy memorandum listed the requests of the GRC to the United States, which had not yet been approved and which were to remain unfilled during the crisis:

1. U. S. statement to the effect that the defense of Quemoy and Matsu was inseparable from the defense of Taiwan, and that an attack on these islands would be regarded by the U.S. as a threat to Taiwan.
2. U. S. assurance that the U.S. would insure communications with the Offshore Islands would be kept open and remain open.
3. The treaty area be extended to the Offshore Islands.
4. The U. S. provide the TDC with concrete instructions on military operations and authorize him to make on-the-spot decisions utilizing U.S. forces.⁴⁴

actually having the effect of causing the lowering of morale.⁴³

This incident provides strong indication that the GRC was trying to manipulate morale on Quemoy in order to get the United States to intervene before it was clear that the blockade could not be broken. Even in early October when it was already believed in Washington that the blockade could be broken, the GRC resorted to the rather clumsy device of rebroadcasting this Dulles speech to Quemoy and then claiming that the speech which they understood had been addressed to other audiences, particularly American public opinion, had caused lowering of morale on Quemoy.

American officials on Taiwan, however, did not at any time during September or early October indicate to officials in Washington their firm conviction that the GRC was not providing accurate reports on the recent supply situation. Thus the GRC evaluations and their threats to extend the war if nothing further was done to end the blockade

continued to be taken very seriously throughout the period of the artillery fire. By late September or very early October, officials in Washington were to become convinced that the blockade could be broken but they were still to fear a GRC attack against the mainland before the crisis could be brought to a halt.

AMERICAN OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD

American officials in the Pacific directed their attention during September and early October along three lines. They tried to develop an accurate picture of the resupply situation on Quemoy, which could be sent on to Washington. At the same time within the limits authorized by civilian officials, they sought to aid the GRC resupply efforts and to demonstrate to the Chinese Communists American involvement in the defense of the Offshore Islands. They tried in this connection to present a picture of restraint mixed with determination. Finally military officers were engaged in crash planning for the contingency of large-scale conventional operations in the Taiwan Straits.

In seeking to develop an accurate picture of the resupply situation on Quemoy, U.S. officials were up against not only the general problems of the necessary time

lag between the landing of supplies on Quemoy and the processing, collecting, sorting, and evaluating data on supplies landed and the general problem of assessing what the supply routes requirements on Quemoy were. Also, as indicated in the Taiwan Defense Command report quoted above, "the biggest problem was the GRC, who found it in their interest to confuse the resupply status."⁴⁶

Recognizing some but not all of the uncertainties involved in their calculations and under intense prodding from Washington for additional information, officials on Taiwan continued to send the supply reports back to Washington. As will be seen, these reports plus independent evaluations of the situation performed by the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations were to play a critical role in U.S. policy during September.

In addition to supplying the details of convoys sailed and supplies landed, which were roughly correct and are summarized in Table 17 on page 298, officials on Taiwan attempted to provide a running evaluation of their estimate of whether or not the resupply operation could ultimately be successful.

On September 9 Drumright indicated his belief that American actions had succeeded in deterring a Chinese

Communist attack against the Offshore Islands. He indicated that while the Chinese Communists would probably continue their artillery fire, this could be overcome by current actions.⁴⁷ However, after the failure of the convoy on September 11 and the combination of rough seas and inefficient technique which prevented any convoys from sailing on the 9th, 10th, or 12th, Drumright more pessimistically indicated to Washington on the 13th that "I am gradually coming to the view that we will have to seek another solution if the Communists persist in intensive shelling of GRC convoys."⁴⁸ Drumright's solution was for the United States to take over the responsibility for landing supplies and send U.S. manned ships all the way in to Quemoy. He indicated his belief that the Chinese Communists would not attack these convoys and felt that this was safer than concurring in GRC air attacks against the mainland.⁴⁹ Smoot concurred in this pessimistic judgment, indicating that the United States had gone as far as it could without actually taking over the convoy operations and that it was not yet clear that the GRC could overcome the Chinese Communist interdiction.⁵⁰ Following the relatively successful convoy operation on the 14th, Smoot reported that he was now optimistic that the GRC could

carry through an effective resupply operation, but Drum-right continued to be somewhat pessimistic.⁵¹

On the 16th, a CIA evaluation reached Washington which indicated that there was now at least a month's supplies at current rates of consumption on Quemoy. Smoot continued to indicate that there was a high danger of the success of the interdiction campaign.⁵² By the 19th Smoot was able to report that the minimum daily requirement for Quemoy had been substantially reduced to 234 tons and that there was now a fifty day supply on Quemoy.⁵³ Using reports from American officials who had returned from Quemoy and the capacity of junks to augment the regular convoy operations, Smoot was able to report more optimistically on the 21st that the Islands could certainly hold out at least until November 15.⁵⁴

To the end of September there continued to be disagreement among officials in the field as to whether or not the resupply problem had been licked.

On September 24, Kuter sent a personal assessment of the situation to Air Force Generals White, LeMay, and Gerhardt following a tour of Taiwan which reflected his belief that the United States had whipped the resupply problem and that the crisis was over. Kuter noted that the

military pressure had eased off a little, thanks chiefly to the quick U.S. response. He reported that though the shelling continued, it was at a reduced rate, and that this coupled with improved landing techniques had increased resupply greatly. He declared that the Chinese Nationalist Air Force was doing very well. He noted that, with increased resupply, the Chinese Communists might resort to the air, but declared that chances of the Chinese Communists achieving air superiority then looked very slim. If the Chinese Communist Air Force bombed Quemoy, they must expect a U.S.-GRC Air Force response and they were not likely to be ready for this. The only alternative to easing off would be an assault, and the Chinese Communists "ruled this out early in the game as too expensive." Therefore, he concluded that the Chinese Communists would take no steps to expand the conflict. The crucial move, then, in solving the crisis in Kuter's view had been the U.S. air build-up.⁵⁵

On September 25 Felt indicated in a personal message to Burke that the situation was still critical and would require a decision on a new American policy within thirty days.⁵⁶ On September 30 Felt reported that the procedures for reporting resupply information to CINCPAC and Washington

were still not satisfactory. He indicated that he was eliminating flash reports, which tended to be inaccurate and to underrate the amount of supplies delivered, and was substituting delayed reports, which would more accurately reflect what had taken place.⁵⁷

Following several successful landings in the latter part of September, estimates in the field changed radically by early October. On October 1 the CIA representative on Taiwan advised Washington that the conflict had passed the turning point. The supply situation was clearly now not critical, he reported, and the convoys were succeeding in moving supplies to Quemoy. Even GRC officials were now proclaiming that the blockade was broken. The crisis was therefore over unless the Chinese Communists resorted to new methods of weapons or tactics, which was, of course, distinctly within their capability, the report noted. The military phase had been stabilized and the GRC could live with the situation indefinitely. The CIA message concluded by warning that withdrawal from the Islands might still prove the downfall of the regime.⁵⁸

On the same day a message in a similar vein was sent personally from Smoot to Admiral Burke in which Smoot stated that there were two recent changes in the political

atmosphere on Taiwan: first, the continued use of restraint and, second, the obvious understanding of the U.S. position. He declared that daily requirements for Quemoy were now admittedly much lower than previously stated and that the Offshore Islands could now hold out with present supplies for six months. He concluded that resupply on a continuing basis could be expected.^{59*}

Efforts to improve the effectiveness of authorized American military operations continued throughout September. On the 9th, the Commander of the Seventh Fleet noted that he considered it essential to deliver 8-inch howitzers to Quemoy at the earliest possible moment. He felt that the best plan was to have the Chinese Nationalists load the guns into GRC-manned LSM-8's and employ U.S. LSDs to debark six miles off the beach. He requested the use of U.S. LSDs for this purpose.⁶⁰

CINCPAC interpreted the existing JCS telegram (947414) as not authorizing the use of U.S. LSDs in this kind of resupply operation.⁶¹ However, on September 27 the Chief

* Although this in fact represented Smoot's real belief, it was clearly also in response to Burke's request for a telegram of this kind if Smoot could send one in order to swing the political balance in Washington. Actually by the time it was sent there had been general agreement on the impossibility of a successful interdiction at the present level of Chinese Communist military activity.

of Naval Operations authorized the use of LSDs with American crews as necessary with the understanding that the LSDs would remain at least three miles from Quemoy.⁶²

On September 10 the Commander of the Seventh Fleet reported to the CNO that he considered the restriction of escort to one destroyer, which had been ordered by Washington because of the lack of fire against the first convoy, had been lifted as a result of the Chinese Communist action against the second convoy. He reported that U.S. surface vessels over the horizon would be of no use against the threat of multiple torpedo boat attack.⁶³

On the same day CINCPAC concurred in this judgment, expressing his belief that the CNO message was general and not specific guidance on future escort and that the principal thing that it stressed was to avoid too great a show of force, which might be construed as provocative.* CINCPAC authorized the Seventh Fleet to have more than one destroyer in sight in convoy operations.⁶⁴

On September 11 CINCPAC published an order creating a unified Taiwan Defense Command directly under CINCPAC.⁶⁵ A TDC telegram on September 16 reported on planning to improve resupply and noted that emphasis was being placed

* The CNO message restricting escort is discussed below. See pp.

on the part which the Chinese Air Force could play in air attack which might neutralize the gun positions preventing convoy activities. The Chinese Communist gun positions were deeply embedded in several spots, all of which could fire on the beaches. Any attempt to solve the problem by air attack, the telegram stated, would be hampered by the fact that the Chinese Communists would move in superior air support easily at any time on short notice.

The Telegram went on to say that on the initial day, by using Chinese Air Force F-84s with napalm against the gun positions and using screening smokes and Chinese Nationalist F-86s for medium and high cover, successful offloading could be accomplished despite Chinese Communist resistance. However, for the second effort, 24 to 48 hours later, Chinese Communist air capability of sufficient quantity could be moved in to make the operation extremely costly and ineffective unless staging airfields had first been destroyed. Also, in this case, Chinese Communist air action against Quemoy should, Smoot warned, be expected. It was therefore concluded that air attacks on Chinese bases within supporting range would be essential for this kind of operation, that otherwise this operation would be uneconomical and impractical. The telegram noted also that

there was no possibility of effective silencing of the Chinese Communist guns by conventional air attack and that the heavy use of air fire would make sense only as a short-time operation designed to demonstrate an intent to defend Quemoy.⁶⁶ Smoot made clear that non-atomic efforts by the U.S. Air Force and the Seventh Fleet Air Force could not materially assist in destroying the artillery positions because of their small numbers and their other responsibilities (i.e., their general war target assignments).

U.S. military officials on Taiwan had been authorized in early September to take over the air defense of Taiwan as soon as they considered it feasible. On September 18, Admiral Smoot in a letter to the Chief of Staff of the GRC Air Force formally offered to assume responsibility for the air defense of Taiwan.⁶⁷ On September 24 the GRC without a public announcement formally released responsibility for air defense to the United States in a letter from the Chief of Staff of the GRC Air Force to Admiral Smoot. However, it was clear that GRC planes were to continue to participate in the air defense operations and that this was to be a combined U.S.-GRC effort with the United States supplying as much of the force as it could in order to relieve the GRC planes for operations over Quemoy and over the mainland.⁶⁸

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The Army draft reflected the kind of

*For a discussion of earlier disagreement on how to react to this telegram, see pp. 138-146. For the view on this question in Washington, see pp. 285-293.

**See above, pp. 279-283, and Table 16.

Table 21

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES IN THE TAIWAN STRAITS

Table 21 -- continued

SOURCE: TDC Operations Order No. 201-1, September 30, 1958, attached to Annex B "Rules of Engagement of Air Task Force Thirteen (P) Reports Tension in the Taiwan Straits, ATF-TS-59-36, no date (Top Secret).

planning that was being carried out in the field. No one could be sure that the President would authorize the use of nuclear weapons and thus there was no inclination to stop planning. The view in Washington, however, was not anything like what it was in the field as expressed, for example, in the following statement in a post-crisis analysis prepared by the Taiwan Defense Command:

The most significant change in planning assumptions was that concerning the possible employment of atomic weapons. Although U.S. participation never reached the shooting stage, this changed assumption radically affected the offensive capabilities of U.S. forces available in the area for contingent employment, and required major revision of operational planning and computation of logistic support requirements, ordnance, and other.

It was considered of urgent importance that all U.S. echelons, military and civilian, be fully appraised of the extent to which U.S. forces (and the U.S. contribution to contingent combined operations) have come to rely on the availability of atomic weapons. It is vital that (1) action be initiated to make the use of efficient atomic weapons acceptable to U.S. allies in particular and to the world in general, (2) aggressive and imaginative actions be taken to maximize, tactically and technically, our non-atomic capabilities. ⁷¹

Officials at all levels in Washington were in fact well aware of the extent to which U.S. action was contingent on the use of nuclear weapons. However, during the crisis, officials in the field continued to be under the impression that Washington was not aware of what they thought to be

the situation and hence thought they might be able to engage in extensive conventional operations. Thus planning for conventional war contingencies was carried on with some urgency.*

* Smoot in fact appears to have disagreed with his subordinates and to have come to the conclusion at least after the crisis that Quemoy could have been held simply with conventional forces.⁷²

On September 26, General Kuter was told by his staff that the situation regarding conventional munitions was serious indeed. It reported that a program of "demilitarization" of conventional weapons had been cancelled but stated that there was still only a limited amount of conventional munitions authorized in support of the EWP (i.e., the general war mission which continued to be the major mission of CINCPACAF). It stated that "if a conventional war is at all likely, the demilitarization program should be canceled and adequate levels established to support operations."⁷⁹

Table 23

PACIFIC NON-NUCLEAR BOMBING CAPABILITY: SEPTEMBER 1958

SOURCE: Navy Message CINCPAC to JCS, 052100Z September, 1958, September 15, 1958, No. 0243 (Secret).

CHAPTER IX: THE PROLONGED BLOCKADE:

PUBLIC DEBATE AND DECISION MAKING

PUBLIC OPPOSITION

During September public opposition to American involvement in the defense of the Offshore Islands continued to mount in the United States and abroad. American officials were well aware of this opposition and continued to be constrained by it. A sampling of reactions is presented below.

On September 7 Prime Minister Nehru of India said that Quemoy and Matsu must sooner or later be surrendered to the Chinese Communists and declared that he sought a peaceful solution to the problem.¹ On September 8 Philippine Ambassador to the United States General Carlos Romulo stated that the Philippines would welcome a third party move through the UN to seek a solution to the crisis.² While the opposition of the British Government was expressed in private, the Labour Party and the British press expressed disapproval of American actions. British public opinion was opposed to war over Quemoy, and London diplomats feared that U.S. involvement would lead to "a Suez in reverse."³

On September 10 Australian Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies declared that the Australian Government had

no commitment to help defend Quemoy and Matsu. He did not think that the ANZUS Pact of 1951 covered military operations in the Taiwan region.⁴ On the next day, there was a further indication of lack of support for the U.S. position even among its allies when Prime Minister Walter Nash of New Zealand suggested that Taiwan be made an independent and neutralized nation.⁵

On September 12 in response to an Eisenhower speech on the Offshore Island situation which will be discussed below,* a number of foreign reactions were reported in The New York Times. Macmillan stated that the United States had neither sought nor received any promise of British military support in the Taiwan Straits. He noted, however, that Britain was obliged to help find a peaceful solution to the Far Eastern crisis by private consultation and public diplomatic action. The French were reported to welcome negotiations but were pessimistic about the possibility of their success. Bonn was silent on the Eisenhower speech, reflecting a deliberate policy of non-involvement.⁶ Japanese Foreign Minister Aichiro Fujiyama expressed agreement with the U.S. position that the Chinese Communist

* See pp. 395-398.

use of force caused tensions in the Far East, which should be abated peacefully. A joint U.S.-Japanese statement indicated that no promises or commitments had been made by either country.⁷

On the 17th, resentment of Dulles' policy among West Berliners was reported in the New York Post. According to one of their columnists, Berliners were saying that the U.S. action had strained the Atlantic Alliance and emphasized that they would not support the United States in a conflict with Communist China over Quemoy. West Berliners were also said to have been disturbed by Dulles suggesting an analogy between Quemoy and Berlin. They felt that losing Berlin was of much greater importance and that the West should be prepared to go into World War III to hold Berlin but should not be and would not be to hold Quemoy.⁸

On September 17 the Japanese Government stated that it could not prevent the United States from using its base in Japan to supply troops on Taiwan. It made this statement in commenting on a Soviet note protesting American use of its bases in Japan and indicated that therefore it was helpless to prevent this measure of support to the U.S. military effort.⁹

On September 29 the British Labour Party at its annual conference voted to oppose British support of the United States in the event of a war over Quemoy.¹⁰

One of the few American allies to support vigorously the U.S. action in Taiwan throughout the crisis was the government of Syngman Rhee in South Korea. On September 13 in reaction to Eisenhower's speech, Rhee hailed the talk as a step toward freedom.¹¹ Support for the U.S. position came on September 18 when the military leaders of SEATO were reported to have agreed unanimously to strengthen the defense of the treaty area in light of the Taiwan Straits crisis,¹² and on September 20 when a South Korean envoy to Taiwan vowed complete aid to "Free China."¹³

Public opposition in the United States to the Administration's apparent determination to defend the Offshore Islands was also heavy. On September 18, for example, Walter Lippman argued in a column that the United States should defend Taiwan but not the Offshore Islands.¹⁴ The same view was expressed editorially by The New York Times on the following day.¹⁵

Congressional criticism, particularly from Democratic Senators, increased in volume. It was reported in the press that congressional mail was heavy and strongly

opposed to Administration policy.¹⁶ Much of the criticism came from members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and from other congressional leaders.*

On September 27 The New York Times reported in a story whose validity was never challenged that eighty percent of the mail to the State Department was critical of the Administration's policy.¹⁹ Vice President Richard Nixon immediately accused an unnamed State Department official of seeking to sabotage American policy by revealing the unfavorable mail response.²⁰ On September 29, Senator John F. Kennedy declared that the United States must find a way to disentangle itself from defense of the Offshore Islands while continuing to defend Taiwan.²¹ The increasing Democratic attack on Administration policy caused fear that the Communists would interpret the debate as an indication that the United States would not act. Speaking for the

*The Administration nevertheless continued its efforts to secure bipartisan support for its policy. On September 25 the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations sent a long letter and memorandum to twenty-four congressional leaders attempting to explain the American position.¹⁷

On the 26th, George C. Denny, a staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, met with Rear Admiral W. S. Post, Jr., Regional Director of the Far East Division in ISA, to discuss current American policy. While Post sought to justify and defend U.S. policy, Denny informed him that there was only lukewarm support for the policy even from Republican members of the Committee. He suggested early recognition of Communist China.¹⁸

Democratic Advisory Committee on October 2, Paul Nitze warned that the current debate should not be taken as a sign of disunity or unwillingness on the part of the United States to defend its interests.²²

On September 29, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senator Theodore Green sent a letter to President Eisenhower expressing his concern about American policy. Though Green did not release the text of his letter until Eisenhower had publicly replied, the press learned immediately of the letter and its general content. Green wrote to express his concern that events "may result in military involvement at the wrong time, in the wrong place, and on issues not of vital concern to our security." The letter continued with Green's assessment that the United States would be fighting without the support of America's allies or of the American people.²³

THE PUBLIC AMERICAN POSITION

Throughout September and early October, Administration officials, basing themselves on the Newport statement, sought in their public statements not only to deter further Chinese Communist military moves but also to answer the criticisms of the policy of the kind discussed above.

On September 7 Eisenhower reaffirmed the U.S. intention to keep Southeast Asia free, and Dulles warned that Communist China had not renounced "the use of force to serve their expansionist aims." He said he did not think that the U.S. vessels sailing inside the twelve mile limit of the China coast would lead to war.²⁴

On September 9 Dulles held a press conference in which he hinted at a fresh approach to negotiations with the Chinese Communists. Dulles stated that the United States might make a new try at Warsaw to obtain from the Chinese Communists an agreement to renounce force in the Taiwan Straits. American efforts, he continued, would be constructive in a situation which might have further consequences and which involved "rights and interests of an ally." He said that the United States could not negotiate the future of the Offshore Islands because they were the property of the Government of the Republic of China. If U.S. ships were hit off Quemoy, the United States would reply in a military way.

During the course of the conference, Dulles acknowledged that he was the "high official" who had been cited as giving the background briefing following the Newport statement.

The Secretary of State indicated that the United States had decided to convoy only to within three miles of Quemoy partly because activities within the three-mile radius might require a decision, or imply that one had been made by the President under the Formosa Resolution to defend Quemoy. He indicated that the decision was also based on the fact that American ships operating beyond the three-mile limit would not risk coming under the fire of the Communist shore batteries. Pressed by reporters to indicate why the American position was remaining ambiguous despite his often stated belief that the most frequent cause of war was miscalculation, Dulles replied that under the terms of the Formosa Resolution and the defense treaty, the President did not have the legal right to assert flatly that the United States would defend Quemoy under all conditions. He concluded by expressing his belief that one could "guess" from the Newport statement whether the United States would defend Quemoy and that he did not want to go beyond that statement.²⁵

Secretary of the Army Brucker on September 10 said that he was convinced the GRC forces were strong enough to withstand a Chinese Communist attack on Quemoy, but, he continued, if the Chinese Communists ignored U.S.

warnings, we were "prepared to show the world what [we] can do."²⁶

On September 11 Eisenhower returned from his vacation at Newport and consulted with Dulles, Haggerty, Goodpaster and Robert Montgomery on a major address on U.S. policy which had been drafted by Dulles.²⁷ In this speech Eisenhower declared that the United States would welcome negotiations which would lead to a settlement acceptable to all parties including the GRC. He noted that the Chinese Communists had said that they were planning to capture Quemoy and had subjected it to a heavy bombardment. He went on to explain why Quemoy could not be allowed to fall:

Let us suppose that the Chinese Communists conquer Quemoy. Would that be the end of the story? We know that it would not be the end of the story. History teaches that, when powerful despots can gain something through aggression, they try, by the same methods, to gain more and more and more.

Also we have more to guide us than the teachings of history. We have the statements, the boastings, of the Chinese Communists themselves. They frankly say that their present military effort is part of a program to conquer Formosa.

It is as certain as can be that the shooting which the Chinese Communists started on August 23d had as its purpose not just the taking of the island of Quemoy. It is part of what is indeed an ambitious plan of armed conquest.

This plan would liquidate all of the free-world positions in the Western Pacific area and

bring them under captive governments which would be hostile to the United States and the free world. Thus the Chinese and Russian Communists would come to dominate at least the western half of the now friendly Pacific Ocean.

So aggression by ruthless despots again imposes a clear danger to the United States and to the free world.

.....

I must say to you very frankly and soberly, my friends, the United States cannot accept the result that the Communists seek. Neither can we show, now, a weakness of purpose--a timidity--which would surely lead them to move more aggressively against us and our friends in the Western Pacific area.

.....

Today, the Chinese Communists announce, repeatedly and officially, that their military operations against Quemoy are preliminary to attack on Formosa. So it is clear that the Formosa Straits resolution of 1955 applies to the present situation.

If the present bombardment and harassment of Quemoy should be converted into a major assault, with which the local defenders could not cope, then we would be compelled to face precisely the situation that Congress visualized in 1955.

Thus Eisenhower made it clear that the United States would defend Quemoy. He went on to explain why an explicit commitment had not been made:

I have repeatedly sought to make clear our position in this matter so that there would not be danger of Communist miscalculation. The Secretary of State on September 4th made a statement to the same end. This statement could not, of course, cover every contingency. Indeed, I interpret the joint resolution as requiring me not to make absolute advance commitments but to use my judgment according to the circumstances of the time.

But the statement did carry a clear meaning to the Chinese Communists and to the Soviet Union. There will be no retreat in the face of armed aggression, which is part and parcel of a continuing program of using armed force to conquer new regions.²⁸

The President's speech concluded with the hope that negotiations would bring the crisis to an end.*

On September 12, Secretary of Defense McElroy at a press conference further amplified U.S. policy. McElroy declared that the Chinese Communist blockade of Quemoy would be broken but did not state how. He stated that the United States had considered bombing the mainland to knock out shore batteries which were harassing Quemoy but had come to the belief that it could supply Quemoy without this. The United States would resist a Chinese Communist assault

* James Reston in an article in the New York Times in commenting on the Eisenhower speech interpreted it as saying that the U.S. would fight if it was necessary to prevent the conquest of Quemoy and Matsu by the Chinese Communists. He noted that the speech had made no reference to the latest reports that the United States would suggest to the Chinese Communists that if they renounced the use of force, we would tell the GRC to leave Quemoy and Matsu and end raids on shipping in the Chinese Communist ports of Amoy and Foochow. Neither did he make any mention of U.S. convoying or planes flying over Chinese Communist territory. In addition, Eisenhower, according to Reston, had ignored the protests of U.S. allies and Democrats. He interpreted Eisenhower's sticking to the original American position to mean that we would not fight for Quemoy and Matsu in the first stages, but would if it were necessary--if the GRC were losing.²⁹

on Quemoy without waiting for the GRC first to try to defend it alone. Quemoy, he said, was regarded as a major part of the Taiwan defense system and that since the Chinese Communists had said that taking Quemoy and Matsu was part of an attack on Taiwan, an attack on Quemoy and Matsu would be regarded as giving the President authority, under Congressional Resolutions, to take whatever steps he considered advisable.³⁰

On September 12 Eisenhower replied publicly to Khrushchev's letter of September 8.* He declared that the Chinese Communists were seeking to capture Taiwan and the Offshore Islands and suggested that the Soviet Union urge the Chinese Communists to seek a peaceful solution. Eisenhower again expressed the willingness of the United States to negotiate.³¹

As another part of the effort to impress upon the Chinese Communists U.S. military strength and determination, Admiral Felt arrived on Taiwan to confer with Chiang Kai-shek and his own subordinates in the newly established Taiwan Defense Command. He expressed confidence in U.S. destructive capability.³² On the 15th, the Department of Defense announced in Washington that it had assigned an anti-aircraft

* See pp. 311-316.

battalion equipped with Nike Hercules missiles, using both conventional and atomic warheads, to the "Pacific area."³³

On September 18, Dulles made a speech at the UN in which he expressed the hope that negotiations would lead to a cease-fire. The prominence given to the Taiwan situation had grown in importance as the speech, originally drafted in the International Organization section in State on September 10, was circulated within the Department and worked over by Dulles.³⁴ In his speech Dulles declared that while the situation was complicated, there were two "undisputed and decisive" facts:

1. The Chinese Communist regime has never during its 9 years of existence exercised any authority over Taiwan, the Penghus, or the Quemoy or Matsu Islands.

2. The Chinese Communist regime is now attempting to extend its authority to these areas by the use of naked force.³⁵

The Secretary of State told the General Assembly that force should not be used to settle disputes and concluded with the hope that a peaceful settlement could be negotiated.³⁶ After his speech Dulles consulted again with Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and with French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville.³⁷

At a background press conference in New York on September 17, Dulles described the situation as extremely

serious and refused to rule out demilitarization as a solution. He told reporters that he believed that the GRC had the right under the self-defense clause in the exchange of letters between Dulles and Yeh in 1955 to take action against the shore batteries if the blockade continued. He added:

Now that does not mean that I favor that action but I think the reasons against the action, perhaps, are more of a practical character than legal. But I do think that it is not unfair for the Chinese Nationalists to interpret the letter as giving them the right to act in defense of Quemoy and Matsu if otherwise they appear to be blockaded out of existence.³⁸

On the 19th in a public statement in New York, Dulles again described the situation as "extremely serious." He expressed the hope that the Warsaw talks would bring positive results, but he observed that Gromyko at the UN had made no reference to the talks. He stated that he is not aware of any concrete diplomatic intervention by other governments.³⁹

On the same day in Washington, a Defense Department spokesman said that U.S. pilots had the right of hot pursuit into China but were not authorized to bomb the mainland.⁴⁰

On September 20, the State Department announced that the United States had rejected the latest Khrushchev

message to Eisenhower quoted above.^{41*}

The White House later issued two statements from Newport explaining that the note had been rejected because it was "couched in language that it abusive and intemperate" and contained "inadmissable threats."⁴³

On September 30 Dulles, in a press conference, made a number of statements reflecting the Administration's belief that the blockade had been broken. Dulles believed that it was now time to seek a diplomatic settlement of the immediate issues.^{**} He now believed that the crisis was over in the sense that the Chinese Communist attempt to change the situation by military force had been defeated and that therefore the problem was to satisfy the "legitimate" demands of the Chinese Communists in relation to provocative action by the Nationalists from the Offshore Islands, and to try to stabilize the situation. Though they were widely interpreted as expressing a change in Dulles' position, the Secretary's answers rather reflected a change in his view as to what stage the crisis was in. With the military phase over, Dulles was prepared to make what he felt to be

* The rejection was decided on and the note drafted at a State Department meeting attended by Dulles, Herter, Robertson, Reinhardt, Murphy, Parsons and Marshall Green.⁴² No information on the substance of the meeting is available.

^{**} See pp. 326-328.

legitimate political concessions, but at any time when the military situation heated up, he would go back to his opposition to any concessions.

In response to questions from reporters, the Secretary of State stated that the United States would be in favor of a reduction in the size of the Quemoy garrison after the establishment of a de facto cease fire in the Taiwan Straits. He proposed a mutual renunciation of force in the Taiwan Straits and indicated that he thought it was "foolish" to keep so many forces on the Island. Dulles denied that the United States was going beyond the Formosa Resolution and stated that:

I would say today, if the United States believed that these islands could be abandoned without its having any adverse impact upon the potential defense of Formosa and the treaty area, we would not be thinking of using forces there. It's because there is that relationship, under present conditions, conditions primarily of the Communists' making, that there is the tie-in there.⁴⁴

He expressed doubts as to the likelihood of a GRC return to the mainland except in the wake of a Hungarian-type revolution and stressed that the United States had no

commitment to help Chiang return to the mainland.^{45*}

American optimism was reflected by Admiral Felt, who told a press conference that resupply was now at an adequate level. He reported that U.S. forces had no limits put on their actions in international waters. On the touchy question of resupply or defense of the smaller islands, Felt asserted that "when we speak of the Quemoy's we normally speak in terms of big and little. The Tans are just little tiny islands."⁴⁷

On October 1, Eisenhower at a press conference indicated that as a military man he did not think that it was a good idea for the Nationalists to station so many troops

*The Dulles press conference was interpreted in Taiwan as well as in the United States as a major change in U.S. policy. In an effort to remove this interpretation, Dulles on October 1 sent a telegram to Drumright in which he stated that there had been no conscious change in his position expressed in his press conference of September 30. He declared that the United States has continually asserted that it would not accept change by force, but if there were a ceasefire it would explore the possibility of preventing the Offshore Islands becoming a source of irritation. He noted that a majority of correspondents in Washington opposed U.S. policy and therefore played up this statement as indicating a change in the U.S. position. He declared that we must remove the feeling that the United States has put its destiny in the hands of Chiang, a feeling shared by much of the press and many members of Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, and most of all by allies who believe Chiang wants war. He concluded by declaring "I do not go one inch further in this matter than seems to be necessary in order to prevent whole Chinese policy from being swept overboard."⁴⁶

on Quemoy, but he stressed that the basic issue "is to avoid retreat in the face of force, not to resort to force to resolve these questions in the international world. And we believe if we are not faithful to that principle, in the long run we are going to suffer."⁴⁸

In response to a critical letter from Senator Green,^{*} Eisenhower in a reply, which was dated October 2 and made public October 4, strongly defended U.S. policy while stressing his desire for peace. The letter, which accurately reflected Eisenhower's thinking, stated that the United States would observe the Congressional Resolution on Formosa but implied that the terms of the Resolution would require him to defend the Offshore Islands if this were necessary for the defense of Taiwan. He went on to say what might happen:

The Chinese and Soviet Communist leaders assert, and have reason to believe, that if they can take Quemoy and Matsu by armed assault that will open the way for them to take Formosa and the Pescadores and, as they put it, "expel" the United States from the West Pacific and cause its fleet to leave international waters and "go home."

I cannot dismiss these boastings as mere bluff. Certainly there is always the possibility that it may in certain contingencies, after taking account of all relevant facts, become necessary or appropriate for the defense of Formosa and the

^{*} See above, p. 393.

Pescadores also to take measures to secure and protect the related positions of Quemoy and Matsu.

The President stated that if military action were necessary, "our friends and allies would support the United States" and in fact would be "appalled" if the United States retreated in the face of military pressure. He expressed the hope finally that the American people would be united if war came.⁴⁹

DECISION MAKING IN WASHINGTON

When word reached American officials on September 7 that the first U.S. escorted resupply operation had been successful and had been carried out without Chinese Communist opposition, there was some hope that the crisis was at an end. The Chinese Communists' failure to fire on the September 7th convoy was interpreted as being a sign that the Chinese Communists might not be prepared to interfere with a U.S.-supported GRC resupply operation.

Dulles accepted a proposal made by Green that leaflet drops and other overflights be suspended during the Chinese cease fire. He indicated in a phone conversation with Green his tentative approval of Green's suggestion that U.S. conveying be halted but indicated that he was inclined to accept JCS advice on this. Dulles asked Green to consult

with Twining or with Burke on the convoy question and to urge on them the need to avoid provocative action.⁵⁰

After consultation with Green, Burke dispatched a message to U.S. forces in the Pacific. The Chief of Naval Operations informed his commanders in the field that, since the Chinese Communists were not then firing against the Offshore Islands, and did not try to interfere with the convoys, it was important to avoid any action which was provocative or might appear to be provocative. He warned that small incidents might have great impact on the negotiations about to be undertaken between the United States and the Chinese Communists in Warsaw. He directed that as long as the Chinese Communists withheld their fire on the Offshore Islands, only one U.S. destroyer could be in sight of the off-loading of the beaches of Quemoy. He suggested that one ship control the situation and call for additional U.S. and GRC support if it were needed as well as "make sure GRC Navy takes proper action." Other U.S. support should remain over the horizon and U.S. aircraft should remain over Taiwan.⁵¹ In addition, attack carrier aircraft day-and-night sweeps of the Taiwan Straits were halted.⁵²

A State Department telegram informed Drumright of the message being sent by the CNO and asked him to cooperate

in seeing that it was implemented without affecting the build-up on Quemoy. He was also asked to encourage the GRC to avoid provocative action.⁵³

In his phone conversation with Green, Dulles indicated for the first time interest in the possibility of an agreement aiming at the demilitarization of the Offshore Islands. He stated that he realized it would be hard but he hoped it could be worked out and succeed in getting GRC forces back to Taiwan. He indicated that he agreed with Green that the Chinese Communists might be planning further military moves. He asked Green to prepare instructions for Beam asking him to consider demilitarization.⁵⁴

Following this conversation on the morning of the 7th, Green prepared the memorandum requested by Dulles analyzing the possibility for demilitarization of the Offshore Islands. He listed the following arguments in favor:

- (a) To remove a powder keg.
- (b) Withdrawal to defensible terrain.
- (c) Responsive to U.S. and world opinion.
- (d) World opinion demands action. We have come dangerously close to atomic war.

The disadvantages as Green saw them were:

- (a) The GRC was bitterly opposed and might refuse.

- (b) A bitter U.S.-GRC controversy at this point would be very dangerous.
- (c) The Chinese Communists might agree but later take the Offshore Islands and the U.S. could do nothing at this point without using nuclear weapons.
- (d) Demilitarization of the Offshore Islands would heighten acceptance of the two-China concept.
- (e) A U.S. proposal for demilitarization would be tacit acceptance that the threat to peace came from the GRC. In order to counteract this the U.S. should simultaneously demand demilitarization of the shore opposite the GRC-held Offshore Islands.
- (f) The proposal would represent a partial surrender to Communist China and therefore would whet their appetite for further gains.

The Green memorandum concluded:

- (1) There is a need to take some steps since we came close to war and there still may be war. "The crisis is far from over."
- (2) Demilitarization is inadvisable.

- (3) The first step should be to get both the GRC and the Chinese Communists to avoid provocative actions.
- (4) The U.S. should approach demilitarization very slowly.
- (5) The U.S. should use the Warsaw talks to identify actions which the Chinese Communists consider provocative.
- (6) It is necessary to maintain close coordination with Taipei.⁵⁵

Green discussed the demilitarized proposal with Burke when he spoke to him later in the day and told him that Dulles wanted the possibility of demilitarizing the Offshore Islands explored. Burke asked his staff to take a quick look at the problem and prepared a memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. In the memorandum he noted that State was now considering a proposal to demilitarize the Offshore Islands. It seemed to the Navy in its initial look that this was not a good idea. The GRC would react violently. The Communists might accept and later seize the Offshore Islands by "peaceful means" and then the United States would have no recourse but "to blast the hell out of China," and could not do that because of public opinion.

It looked to Burke like an attempt to sweep the problem under the rug.⁵⁶

On the following day, in a follow-up memorandum, Burke noted that in connection with the proposed negotiations in Warsaw, the State Department had suggested the demilitarization of the Offshore Islands be considered. Burke recommended that U.S. forces remain deployed in the Pacific and that the United States insist on an immediate halt of Chinese Communist aggression. He felt that the United States should accept a ceasefire if the proposal came from the Chinese Communists. The United States should agree to demilitarization only if it included the coastal areas plus Chinese Communist islands near Quemoy and Matsu. In addition he felt the United States should demand an inspection system and a guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Offshore Islands underwritten by SEATO or a larger coalition and accompanied by a renunciation of force by the Chinese Communists.⁵⁷

A group of State Department officials met with Secretary of State Dulles on the morning of September 8 and explored the possibility of demilitarizing the Offshore Islands. Though Dulles was to continue to express interest in demilitarization, the others present--Robertson, Parsons,

Green and Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, L.R. Lutkins--expressed opposition. Dulles indicated his surprise that the Chinese Communists had not pressed for talks at a higher level. He asserted that he recognized that the Offshore Islands were not used for operations against the mainland but wanted more detailed information.* However small, the "provocative" action from the Islands could not be justified by international law, Dulles said, and the United States should not expect the Chinese Communists to refrain from attacking the Offshore Islands as long as they were used at all as a base for hostile actions. After making these observations, Dulles raised the possibility of demilitarization. Robertson responded that demilitarization was not a practical solution since the Communists could seize the Islands at any time after they were demilitarized. He suggested that the United States might ask the GRC to refrain from any provocative actions from the Offshore Islands.

* On September 11 a detailed statement of Chinese Nationalist actions from the Offshore Islands was sent to Dulles. This memorandum contained the information presented in Chapter I on Nationalist operations from the Islands (see Table 4, pp. 10-12).⁵⁸

Dulles responded that the Chinese Communists would undoubtedly reject demilitarization in return for de facto recognition of GRC control of the Islands and this might be a good reason to make the proposal. He stressed the importance of giving very careful consideration to the American public posture. On the other hand Dulles reaffirmed that the United States should not give an inch on the basic principle of resisting the use of force to pursue territorial ambitions. He declared that the Chinese Communists must not be permitted to use force to gain territory which they had never had under their control. The Communist line that the Offshore Islands were a thorn in their side was nonetheless described by Dulles as having great appeal and for that reason the United States at Warsaw and in its public statements could not ask the Communists simply to renounce the use of force.

Perhaps in an effort to head off the demilitarization proposal to which he objected, Green suggested that the United States might begin the Warsaw talks with the suggestion that the two sides examine means of avoiding provocative action. Dulles indicated that he had been thinking along the same lines and specifically that Beam might ask Wang what actions by the Nationalists the Communists

considered provocative. Robertson responded and expressed the skepticism felt by all of those present except Dulles by asserting that the Communists would reply (as in fact they did) that the provocation was U.S. occupation of Taiwan. Robertson also strongly urged the importance of consulting the GRC before making any moves at Warsaw.⁵⁹

On September 8 the Chinese Communist fire against the second U.S.-escorted convoy brought an end to the hope that the crisis was over. During the ensuing weeks officials in Washington were to continue to explore various diplomatic solutions.* At the same time they sought privately,

* It was at this period that press reports began to most accurately reflect the feelings of the Government at the military level, although there continued to be no hints of Dulles' own efforts to find a peaceful way out of the crisis and the fact that he constantly needed to be pressed by his staff to maintain his tough position. Joseph Alsop, for example, in a column in the New York Herald Tribune on September 10, was able to report that highest Pentagon authorities maintained that the United States would be almost compelled to use tactical nuclear weapons in any fight beyond a mild spat. He reported that U.S. ground and air forces in the Pacific were weaker, except in terms of nuclear weapons, than before Korea. He reported that the planes in the field had been designed and equipped almost exclusively with nuclear weapons in mind and that the B-47 medium bombers of SAC could not deliver anything but atomic weapons. Alsop wrote that Eisenhower had authorized the Joint Chiefs to plan to fight only nuclear wars and he stated that the United States would try to keep the war limited but that it would be up to the Chinese Communist leaders not the Pentagon to keep the war limited.⁶⁰

Marguerite Higgins in the same paper on the following day reported that official sources had labeled premature

as well as publicly, to develop support in the United States and abroad for the American position. Despite disagreements on what to do if the current policy failed, Washington officials were all convinced of the importance of avoiding a war with Communist China and of preventing the Chinese Nationalists from provoking the Communists. They were also convinced that the Nationalists would provoke the Communists, if they could find a way to do so which they were sure would involve the United States in the military operation. At the same time that they sought to prevent the Chinese Nationalists from making any rash move, American officials tried desperately to get precise information on the resupply situation. The question of whether or not the blockade could be broken under current conditions was to become very important. Washington was desperately starved for accurate and up-to-date information on what convoys had gone out, how many supplies had landed, why the convoys had failed to land supplies, and why there were to be

the report circulating in Washington that the Navy was preparing an amphibious landing to put GRC troops and supplies on Quemoy within twenty-four hours, but she reported that U.S. forces in the Far East were prepared for such a move and that the order for U.S. ships to sail to Quemoy beaches could come at any time. More accurately she reported that the modern Seventh Fleet warships could not move in the waters immediately surrounding Quemoy.⁶¹

continued failures to make a massive breakthrough against the artillery fire when prior to the crisis it had been the considered opinion of the American Government that artillery fire alone could not impose a blockade on Quemoy.

In an effort to secure these objectives, two coordinated State-JCS messages were sent out to the Taiwan Defense Command and the U.S. Ambassador on September 8. The military message underlined the fact that the GRC was expected not to provoke incidents or to present the United States with a fait accompli.⁶² The State Department message to Drumright stressed that the GRC must not appear the aggressor. The message cautioned that world opinion was shaped by who appeared to be the aggressor and that therefore the United States and the GRC must act with firmness and resolve but also with calmness and restraint. It emphasized the need for close U.S.-GRC coordination in and in advance of all operations. It noted that there might be temptation on the part of the GRC to provoke incidents which could involve U.S. hostilities but that the United States expected full advance coordination as the right of an ally who would bear the major brunt if war were provoked.⁶³

On September 9 the importance of the Offshore Islands to the GRC had been underlined in a State Department

Intelligence Report which had declared that the loss of the Offshore Islands would affect the GRC assessment of the likelihood of its attaining its fundamental objective of returning to the mainland. The report noted that the severity of the shock to the GRC would depend on the extent of continuing U.S. support, the magnitude of military losses and the changes in attitudes of other countries, but it concluded that it would not lead to the collapse of the GRC. The estimate pointed out that the Offshore Islands, in the eyes of the GRC, was a test of U.S. support of the GRC as the sole legitimate government of China. The report concluded by indicating that the magnitude of the effect of a loss of the Islands would only be slightly affected by whether the Islands fell to a military attack or by a U.S.-forced withdrawal, but that in no case would the GRC launch an attack against the mainland.⁶⁴

In an effort to secure support for its policy in the Taiwan Straits among its NATO allies, the United States provided the American Ambassador to the NATO Council with periodic briefings attempting to explain and justify U.S. policy and to secure support for the U.S. position. The briefing paper which was sent to the U.S. representative on September 9 emphasized Chinese Communist naval strength

in the area and declared that "successful assault without concurrent air strikes will depend on the length and effectiveness of preceding bombardment and interdiction operations. . . .If CHICOM continues to press attack, defenders would eventually be over-run in absence of assistance from the U.S."⁶⁵ The U.S. representative stressed that the United States had exercised deliberate restraint in the Taiwan Straits and stressed the conclusion that the Communists had the ability to take the Islands against only a Nationalist defense, therefore pointing up the need for U.S. intervention should the Communists try to seize the Offshore Islands.⁶⁶

A memorandum prepared in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department with a summary of the resupply situation and noted that continued lack of success of U.S. and GRC resupply was a matter of grave concern. It stated that the situation would become critical in two to three weeks if there was no resupply. An enclosure to the memorandum discussed in more detail the problems of resupply. It noted that the Chinese Communist Navy had posed no threat since the United States escorting had begun and that the failure of resupply was then due to:

- (a) Chinese Communist artillery fire on all beaches,
- (b) horrendous sea conditions at this time of year,
- (c) beach profiles which precluded dry-ramp unloading;
and
- (d) GRC deficiencies.

The memorandum continued that U.S. action to correct Chinese Nationalist deficiencies had not yet become effective but declared that when they did become effective it would require a major increase in the Chinese Communist effort to prevent resupply.⁷³

Washington was not prepared to accept the need for a greater American effort. In addition to the optimism reflected in the Navy memorandum just quoted, the daily report to the President on September 15 informed him that both CINCPAC and the TDC had not concluded that the resupply problem was insurmountable. Eisenhower was told that an all-out effort was being made to get the GRC to do the job.⁷⁴

A more pessimistic note, however, was sounded in an SNIE, which was published on the same day. The estimate predicted that the most likely Chinese Communist course of action was a continuation of the interdiction by which they hoped to make the islands untenable. The Communists were reported to be willing to take action involving considerable

risk of major conflict with the United States, and it was the unanimous view of the United States Intelligence Board that the Communists would probably fire on American ships going all the way in to Quemoy. They estimated that it was highly unlikely that the Chinese would call off the artillery fire or attempt a landing. A landing was seen as unlikely because it would involve action with the United States, diminish the Communist propaganda advantage, and was unnecessary since the Chinese believed that Quemoy would fall to interdiction. The estimate affirmed that the Communists would reject any negotiated settlement restoring the status quo ante or implying a "two-China" situation.

On the subject of Sino-Soviet relations, the estimate began with the premise that the Soviets were informed about and approved of Chinese actions. The Soviets were believed to be interested in discrediting the United States and increasing Communist China's prestige. The Intelligence Board expressed the belief that the Soviets would not intervene if the war were extended by conventional means to the mainland opposite Quemoy and that they might not intervene if tactical nuclear weapons were used in the vicinity of Taiwan. However, the estimate concluded with the observation that at some point in the extension of nuclear

operations into China, the Soviets would probably directly attack American forces and their bases.^{75*}

On the afternoon of September 16, Eisenhower in Newport spoke to Dulles at the UN by phone on the Far East situation.⁷⁷ In the conversation Eisenhower proposed exploring the possibility of developing a program which might appeal to the GRC of making their forces more mobile by giving them some amphibious vessels and reconditioned destroyers. The President suggested that this might be less costly than keeping the reinforced Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits.⁷⁸ Dulles spent the day at the UN consulting with members of his staff as well as with British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd^{**} and UN Secretary General Hammarskjold.⁷⁹ On the same afternoon, Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter phoned Rear Admiral Heyward, Director of the Political-Military Policy Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Herter told Heyward that Dulles earlier in the day had asked for some

* I have no way of assessing what effect if any this estimate had. It was apparently prepared while most of the officials in the CIA Office of National Estimates who normally prepared estimates on China were away and did not express the considered view of these individuals.⁷⁶

** For a discussion of British pressure on Washington, see below, pp. 457-464.

thoughts on what alternative courses there might be to continuing in the present support of the GRC and occupation of the Offshore Islands.

In addition to asking for a response as quickly as possible to the question of what alternative courses there might be to the one the United States was currently pursuing, Herter requested the Pentagon's best judgment by 2:00 p.m. on two questions, both assuming that no cease-fire in the Taiwan Straits took place and that the resupply continued at the present unsatisfactory rate:

- (1) How long can the status quo be maintained before pressure by the GRC would be so great that we would have to take action beyond that now being taken, and
- (2) How long can supplies on the Island hold out?⁸⁰

As will be seen, the JCS answer to Herter's basic question of what alternatives there were was to be approved by the JCS and forwarded to the State Department by a letter from the Secretary of Defense on the 26th--10 days after Herter made his urgent request.* Herter did receive an answer to his second even more urgent question. In a briefing given by the Navy for Herter and other State

* It took 4 days for the Joint Chiefs to prepare an answer but 6 more for OSD to prepare a cover letter.

Department officials it was also stated that the problem of Communist interdiction fire was insoluble on a long-term basis. The best estimate available in the Pentagon was that the overall logistic status in the Quemoy Islands was computed to be six or eight weeks at the present rate of consumption.⁸¹

On September 17, the first reassessment of the resupply situation, which was to lead finally to a more optimistic conclusion being accepted by all, was made in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The memorandum was in the nature of a revision of a document prepared on September 16 and cited just above. The original memorandum had been based on information from the field. The second memorandum was based on a careful evaluation of consumption rates during the period September 3 to September 13. The new memorandum essentially presented the case that both current supplies on the Island and resupply rates had been underestimated by a value of a half. Table 24 indicates graphically the change that was made in the estimates of current supplies on Quemoy. The memorandum also reported that convoys since September 3 had delivered a total of 348 tons.^{82*}

*The optimism reflected in the memorandum was reported by at least one reporter, John Norris of the Washington Post, who indicated that U.S. military experts disagreed

Table 24

NAVY ESTIMATES OF SUPPLIES AVAILABLE ON QUEMOY

ITEM	SEPT. 16 ESTIMATE	SEPT. 17 ESTIMATE
1. Rations	28 days	59 days
2. Equipment	45 days	95 days
3. Fuel	48 days	101 days
4. Ammunition	29 days	62 days

SOURCE: Navy Memorandum for the JCS, Subject: Resupply of the GRC Held Offshore Islands (U) OP-6016/WDW D60, September 17, 1958 (Top Secret).

Meeting in Herter's office on September 18, State Department officials had apparently not yet received or had not accepted the more optimistic Navy report on the resupply situation. The meeting had been called to draft a memorandum to be delivered to the Secretary of State in New York. The memorandum, which was approved and taken by Green to the United Nations, stated that the resupply situation was not bright and that it was not clear the new deliveries would break the blockade. It reported that Communist fire was very effective. The Islands might be able to hold out for several more months by reducing requirements to 300 tons by not firing back, and by increasing resupply to 100-200 tons per day. Sooner or later, the memorandum noted, the United States would have to take new action in the form of more extensive convoy, attacking shore batteries or granting permission to the GRC to attack shore batteries. The Communist artillery could not be knocked out by conventional fire and thus the only effective means would be to use atomic weapons--with grave

with Chiang Kai-shek on the futility of the Quemoy convoy runs. He stated that they knew it was possible to land enough supplies on a bombarded beach, to keep a sizeable force fighting for a long time. This could be done by training in amphibious techniques, by mixing up the landing procedures to keep the enemy guessing, and by determination. He wrote that the Pentagon thought there was no need to bomb the mainland until all possibilities for supplying Quemoy under present U.S. convoy orders had been tested.⁸³

political costs. The memorandum suggested that the GRC might be willing to accept demilitarization within a few weeks but that the Communists might stall the negotiations long enough for the Islands to fall. Thus it was necessary to get an immediate ceasefire. The memorandum concluded by suggesting that the United States quietly accept a resolution calling for an end to provocative action and demilitarization of the Islands.^{84*}

On September 19 Dulles returned to Washington from New York⁸⁵ and on the next morning met at his home with Herter, Robinson, Twining, Burke, Sprague and Cabell. Dulles began the meeting by declaring that the situation was grave and that there were three possibilities for interpreting the Chinese Communist action:

- (1) They were preparing an open attack on the OSI, perhaps followed by an attack on Taiwan.
- (2) They were engaged in a Berlin-type blockade operation.
- (3) There would be a gradual tapering off as in 1954 and 1955.

He declared there was insufficient evidence to be confident of a trend toward (3). Burke declared that the

* It is not clear whether State Department officials envisioned putting pressure on the GRC to implement the resolution.

Chinese Communists might let up for a while to get out of caves and gun emplacements. Dulles emphasized that if the Chinese Communists let up, the United States should reciprocate. Twining agreed and, addressing the second possibility, questioned whether a Berlin-type blockade could be broken. Burke, reflecting the optimistic mood which was becoming prevalent within his office, declared that Quemoy had hidden supplies and stated that Quemoy could hold out for two months at the rate of 100 tons a day of resupply, but not indefinitely at that rate. However, he stated that a buildup of 300 tons a day was likely, and this could go on for a long period. The problem was morale since the troops could not be rotated. Dulles stated that the GRC seemed to have failed to appreciate that the United States had a serious problem with public opinion and had to keep its allies together. He asked whether there was any evidence of planned assault. He noted that the Chinese Communists probably realized that this would involve U.S. sea and air action against the shore batteries and assault craft, which would defeat the assault. Twining noted that the White House paper of September 6, initialed by the President, had given the Joint Chiefs of Staff standing authority to oppose assault by using conventional weapons

against artillery positions and naval targets. Cabell reported that the CIA estimated that the Soviet Union would not become involved unless the war extended beyond the Straits area. He noted that the Soviets were not taking overt measures as they took in the Middle East crisis and were not making any unusual preparations.* Burke declared that the Khrushchev letter seemed to be saying that Soviet support would be only logistical unless the United States used atomic weapons, in which case they would retaliate in kind.

Dulles reported that Drumright's assessment of the situation was that it was satisfactory, provided that the United States was prepared to oppose an assault and could keep Quemoy resupplied on an austerity basis. However, the real question was whether the GRC would tolerate this situation, bearing in mind that the GRC might view this as a golden opportunity for recovering the mainland by bringing on a U.S.-Chinese Communist war. Dulles reported that this view was held by many people in Taiwan.

* This reflected the CIA's position more accurately than the SNIE. See above pp. 423-425 and especially the n. on p. 425.

General discussion followed on how to make the GRC aware of the possibility that Taiwan would be destroyed in such a war. Twining noted that a GRC air attack on the shore batteries would not knock them out, and even if retaliation were limited to Quemoy, the situation would be bad. Dulles summarized his opinion at the time by indicating that he felt this was essentially a Berlin-type blockade operation in which the United States must make a maximum supply effort while ready to act against Chinese Communist assaults and restraining the GRC. Burke indicated that the current resupply operations were costing the U.S. Navy three million dollars, and indicated that he proposed considering an all U.S. convoy.*

Dulles stated that the United States should ask the GRC to restrain itself. He noted on the basis of his recent visit to the United Nations that most UN members supported withdrawal and that, in a sense, they were right, but that there was unfortunately no way to withdraw from the Off-shore Islands without engendering the collapse of the GRC and the takeover of Taiwan by insurgents and possibly by

* Though this was not brought out at the meeting, it was the current view of the Air Force as well as American Officials on Taiwan that an extension of Chinese Nationalist activities was preferable to an increase in U.S. action.⁸⁶

attack from the mainland. Cabell noted that this was the CIA estimate as well.

If the issue were raised in the UN, Dulles noted, the United States would press for a resolution asking for a ceasefire, a renunciation of force, and an examination of measures to tranquilize the situation. The Chinese Communists might not accept such a resolution, but it might pass. At this point, Twining read a JCS paper opposing United Nations consideration of the issue. Dulles replied, however, that there was no way of preventing it. In addition, the United States had been committed by Eisenhower in 1955 to go to the United Nations. He noted that a resolution putting Taiwan under a UN trusteeship and admitting Communist China to the UN was the real feeling of 90 per cent of the members of the UN and that only U.S. pressure prevented it.^{87*}

* On September 21, Hanson Baldwin in an analysis of the situation in the New York Times reported that the GRC had revised its tonnage supply estimates for Quemoy from 900 to 400 to 500 tons a day, but that supply ships were still landing one day's supplies during the week and that Quemoy was living on its reserve stock. He reported that the LST's were succeeding in running the blockade by being loaded with 20 amphibious tankers which themselves were loaded with ammunition, food and supplies. In the same article, Baldwin reported that three of six scheduled U.S. 8-inch howitzers recently sent to Taiwan had reached Quemoy safely. He pointed out that they could fire both nuclear and conventional ammunition but that the GRC has no nuclear ammunition. He reported that the Chinese Communists could

On September 22, Dulles in an "off-the-record" talk to the senior officers course of the Foreign Service, noted that American policy had two justifications: American national interest in keeping the Pacific in friendly hands and the principle that open force should not be used for aggressive purposes. He declared that American policy had to be publicly defended on both grounds. Dulles also pointed out that legal considerations prevented the United States from saying unconditionally that it would defend Quemoy. He indicated, however, that the Chinese Communists had tied Taiwan to the Offshore Islands and "that goes pretty far to resolve the problem and make clear what we would do." He denied that the United States stood alone on this issue, noting for example, that "the Government of the United Kingdom is thoroughly sympathetic with our position."⁸⁸

During the latter part of September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff worked on an answer to Secretary Herter's request

continue the artillery blockade and still have a lot of ammunition.

The article was interpreted by some observers as being an attempt by some, whoever had leaked the information about the howitzers to Baldwin, to make an implicit nuclear threat to the Chinese Communists. But as was noted above, the desire to send the howitzers to Quemoy, which was supported by both the Navy and the State Department, was simply to increase very substantially Nationalist conventional military strength.

as to what possible alternatives there were to the current course of action in the Taiwan Straits. By the time the Chiefs could produce an answer which could then be forwarded through ISA and approved by the Secretary of Defense, the supply situation might be drastically improved and the Chief's recommendation that the current policy should be pursued would be accepted by all. On September 20 they met to approve a draft proposal. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force came to the meeting with a brief from his staff, noting that the Eisenhower speech of September 11 had defined U.S. determination to support the Offshore Islands and stating that the real issue was the position of the Free World in the Far East. A memorandum which he presented to the Joint Chiefs prior to the meeting suggested that the United States prepare a Joint U.S.-GRC ultimatum threatening GRC bombing and U.S. escort and/or bombing and a U.S. show of air strength. The memorandum stressed, however, that a limited release of the GRC was preferable to active U.S. participation.⁸⁹

On September 20, the Joint Chiefs approved a memorandum which they proposed be sent to the Secretary of State reaffirming the desirability of continuing the U.S.-GRC supply system. The memorandum noted that as the GRC became

more adept, an increasing amount of supplies could be delivered. It declared that any modification would involve increasing U.S. participation. This latter alternative could not be implemented with any degree of assurance, and the extent of U.S. involvement would necessarily depend on Chinese Communist reaction. It noted that the Radford/Robertson/Chiang conversation of 1955, which produced an agreement to blockade the coast of China in the event of hostilities, was no longer applicable since the completion of the railroad to Amoy had removed Chinese Communist dependence on seaborne supplies.⁹⁰

Following normal Department of Defense channels, the JCS memorandum was sent to the Office of International Security Affairs, which received the memorandum and produced a draft cover letter on September 22.^{91*}

* It should be noted that the role which ISA played at this time was far different from the one it plays in the current Administration. During this crisis ISA's function seems to have been confined to military assistance, with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Irwin, present at meetings and participating only in discussion of items related to supplies to the GRC under the military assistance program and not concerned with the broader political and military aspects of the problem. The focus for these at the time in the Pentagon was the Navy Office of Political-Military Affairs and more generally the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

The final version of the letter was not produced until September 26, when ISA forwarded to the Secretary of State the JCS memorandum quoted above with a cover letter endorsing its conclusions.⁹²

Before Dulles left for New York on September 25, he met with Herter, Robertson, Macomber and Allen Dulles⁹³ and was presented with a new estimate of the resupply situation made in the Navy and the State Department. The results were contained in a memorandum signed by Robertson. In it the Secretary was advised that the Joint Chiefs of Staff now believed that they could keep Quemoy going indefinitely and that the only problem might be morale, though at the present time it was very high. Neither the Chinese Communists nor the GRC were likely to expand the military operations.⁹⁴

Early in the day of September 25, Drumright had been told that Washington did not believe that the resupply situation was sufficiently critical to justify bombing the mainland as proposed by the Nationalists. Drumright was told that the JCS believed that resupply could be further improved and if the GRC expanded operations in any way, this would have a bad effect on U.S. and world opinion.⁹⁵

On September 25 Felt reported personally to Burke that the situation would require a critical decision within thirty days.⁹⁶ On the next day, in a personal message to Felt, Burke stated that the political situation in Washington might become critical in a few days. He noted that it was not just the long-term supply situation that was important, and declared that a demonstration of the ability to resupply the Islands might determine whether the United States would stay in the Far East. Equally important, Burke wrote, was an immediate dispatch stating that Felt could resupply, provided of course that he could live up to it.⁹⁷

On the 27th, in another conversation with Secretary General Hammarskjold in New York, Dulles acknowledged the possible value of an intermediary, and the possibility of Hammarskjold assuming this role was discussed.⁹⁸ Right after the meeting, Dulles left New York and spent the remainder of the day in Boston, among other things addressing the Research Associates and Fellows of the Harvard Center for International Affairs.⁹⁹ Several days later, in a letter to Dulles, the Secretary General indicated that he was reluctant to assume the role of intermediary unless it seemed to have some greater chance of success than then appeared.¹⁰⁰

On September 28 Dulles, back in Washington, conferred with Herter and Robertson, who met him at the airport. Later in the day, he talked with Allen Dulles alone for fifteen minutes and then for two hours with Herter, Robertson, Marshall Green, and others from State. He spent the next day in frequent consultation on the situation and saw the President at 11:00 a.m.^{101*}

The National Security Council met on October 2 and Dulles also conferred privately at the White House with both the President and Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles.* Soon after the White House sessions, Dulles left on another vacation from which he was not to return until October 7.¹⁰²

By very early October, the entire decision-making community in Washington was convinced that the supply problem had been solved. The official SITREP of September 30 informed the White House that Quemoy now had more than thirty days' supply of all classes.¹⁰³ U.S. officials believed that the action of the next two or three weeks would demonstrate that the Chinese Communists could not

* No information on the substance of these conversations is available.

* No information is available on what was discussed.

take Quemoy by interdiction. They felt the Chinese Communists would then have to bomb Quemoy or accept a de facto truce and would probably do the latter. The fact that the Chinese Communists had not used all their capability, notably air power, or attempted amphibious assault, indicated to Washington officials that the Communists were hesitant to take any action which would involve the United States. The United States would probably be drawn in if the Communists used bombs because the Chinese Nationalists would then attack Chinese Communist airfields on the mainland and the Chinese Communists in turn would retaliate against Taiwan airfields. U.S. officials recognized that the Chinese Communists might step up their operations. However, the contingency plans in the event of invasion had been made and there was little that could be done but press ahead with the resupply and watch for a change in Chinese Communist strategy.

WARSAW TALKS

Word reached Washington on September 6 of the Chou En-lai statement offering to reopen the Sino-American ambassadorial talks. Since the United States had been pressing for some time for a reopening of the talks, it was quickly agreed at the White House meeting held on

September 6 that the offer should be accepted.* It was also stipulated that the GRC should be advised that the United States would not permit anything prejudicing GRC rights and that the GRC would be informed in advance of proposed U.S. positions at the talks. Dulles and Eisenhower were apparently hopeful that the Chinese Communists, faced with a demonstration of U.S.-GRC determination to defend the Off-shore Islands, were then seeking to disengage, but they recognized that the Chou statement might be only a tactical move which could be followed by an invasion attempt.¹⁰⁴ After the meeting a statement was issued expressing American willingness to resume the talks.¹⁰⁵

It will be recalled that prior to the crisis (on June 30), the Chinese Communists had issued a public ultimatum stating that if the U.S.-Chinese Communist talks were not resumed within thirty days the Chinese Communists would consider them broken off. After waiting more than thirty days, the United States had indicated that it was prepared to reopen the talks at the ambassadorial level as demanded by the Chinese Communists and suggested that they be reopened in Warsaw between U.S. Ambassador Jacob Beam and Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang.

* For discussion of the other decisions taken at the meeting, see pp. 285-293.

On September 8 the U.S. letter of July 28 which offered to reopen the talks at the ambassadorial level was, as was indicated in the American statement, still unanswered. Beam was instructed to send a letter to Wang calling attention to the public statements of the United States on September 6 that it was ready to reopen the Warsaw talks and stating that the "U.S. Ambassador to Warsaw stands ready promptly to meet with the Chinese Communist Ambassador there who has previously acted in this matter."¹⁰⁶ Later in the day Beam was sent a telegram giving him the proposed U.S. agenda for the meeting which included: (a) preservation of peace and avoidance of provocative action in the Taiwan Straits, and (b) release of the remaining U.S. prisoners held by the Chinese Communists.¹⁰⁷ The American Embassy in Taipei was sent a draft of the instructions which the Department was then preparing to be sent to Beam for the first meeting, providing in greater detail what Beam should discuss under the two proposed agenda items and including a proposal for a ceasefire. Drumright was authorized to show these to the Nationalists and to indicate to them that they were being shown the instructions for comment before they were sent to Beam.^{108*}

*Drumright had noted on September 7 that news reports indicated that the United States was planning a reopening

Prior to the arrival of the telegram, Chiang Kai-shek in a luncheon meeting with General LeMay and U.S. Ambassador Drumright had opposed the reopening of the Warsaw talks but stated that he had understood the U.S. position and the U.S. need to reopen the talks.¹¹⁰

On September 8 a statement by Mao to the meeting of the Supreme State Conference the previous week was broadcast by the Peking Radio which expressed approval of the reopening of the Warsaw talks and stated that he was "hopeful" of results from the talks.¹¹¹

On September 10 Drumright cabled from Taipei that the GRC would reluctantly accept a ceasefire but that it would not accept a formal ceasefire agreement. He reported that the "GRC views resumption of discussions with greatest. . . apprehension and dismay."¹¹² The telegram was in response to the position which the United States had proposed to take at Warsaw. The U.S. position when presented at the Sino-American talks did not call for a formal ceasefire agreement.¹¹³ On September 11 the press reported that Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang had left Communist China

of the talks with the Chinese Communists and stated that if this were true, he hoped that the United States would consult fully with the GRC.¹⁰⁹ This was another instance in which Drumright was to receive his first information about events in Washington through press reports rather than through official channels.

for Warsaw the day before.¹¹⁴ The Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, in the context of making the fourth formal protest in five days on "violation" of Chinese Communist territorial waters by U.S. forces, noted that he expected the talks in Warsaw to resume soon.¹¹⁵ On September 12 Wang arrived in Warsaw, after stopping in Moscow on the way from Peking, and announced that he was "anxious" to negotiate a settlement.¹¹⁶ It was thus some six days after the Chinese Communists had proposed reopening the Warsaw talks that Wang arrived in Warsaw to begin preliminary contacts with Beam, looking toward the reopening of the talks.

On the 12th Beam received his instructions for the first meeting, which had been cleared with the Chinese Nationalists. At this time Dulles expected the Chinese Communists to open the meeting by insisting on recognition of the twelve-mile limit and on U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan. He felt that after Beam had rejected these proposals, serious negotiations might then begin, but he was not very hopeful that this would happen.¹¹⁷ The message to the American representative instructed him to stress the responsibility that rested on both sides to secure an immediate cessation of hostilities. The first order of business, Beam was to propose, should be this cessation of hostilities.

If this were secured, it would then be possible to turn to a discussion of the renunciation of the use of force in the Taiwan Straits, which had been the principal U.S. theme in previous U.S.-Chinese Communist meetings. The telegram emphasized that it was important that the United States show a constructive approach for propaganda reasons and that it was necessary to defend the GRC on the record.¹¹⁸

This telegram and a future one providing Beam with his instructions as to what he should say at the meeting were carefully worked over and personally approved by Dulles as were the instructions to subsequent meetings.¹¹⁹ They were clearly written with the expectation that there was at least some chance that the proceedings of the meetings would be published by one side or the other at some point. Although this expectation proved to be incorrect, at least to this date of writing, substantial leaks of what took place at the meetings occurred both in the American and in the Chinese Communist press.

On September 12 the press reported that the GRC had always been against negotiations, and on the 13th Drumright cabled that the GRC objected to the Warsaw talks and urged the United States to demand that the Chinese Communists "cease any further hostile action in the Taiwan Straits."¹²⁰

On the 13th Warsaw was reported to be gloomy over the prospects of the talks, and diplomats there were said to blame the United States in advance for their expected failure.¹²¹

By September 14, as has been indicated, the United States Government was becoming increasingly concerned with the situation in the Taiwan Straits and State Department officials believed that unless something could be done to break the blockade, either by military action or a ceasefire, the United States would be forced to move in a different direction. The State Department, in a cable drafted by Dulles and Robertson,¹²² therefore urged Beam, "in view of the urgency of obtaining a ceasefire," to press for a meeting as soon as possible.¹²³ On September 14th the United States and Communist China issued a joint statement in Warsaw announcing that they had agreed to meet in the Polish capital.¹²⁴

In discussing the Warsaw talks the Moscow press was reported by an American correspondent to be playing up two issues: that differences between the United States and Communist China should be negotiated, and that the territorial dispute between Communist China and the Chinese Nationalists was not a concern of the United States.¹²⁵ As

will be seen, this was precisely the line taken by the Chinese Communists at Warsaw, suggesting that the Russians were at least informed in advance of the Chinese Communist position.

There was nothing then in what had occurred at the first meeting to suggest any possibility for fruitful negotiation, and this was the pattern that was to continue.

On September 18 the People's Daily provided lengthy comments for its readers on the Warsaw talks. Observing the U.S.-Chinese Communist agreement to keep the talks private, the Communists resorted to the device of quoting American, Japanese and London newspapers and unidentified

sources on what had taken place.* According to the report in the People's Daily, the United States had demanded a ceasefire and stated that this was a pre-condition of the settlement of the Taiwan Straits problem. The paper declared that the United States was trying to confuse the internal issue of liberating Taiwan from Chiang Kai-shek with the international dispute between the United States and the People's Republic of China and thereby induce permanent recognition of the U.S. occupation of Taiwan. It declared that there was no problem of a ceasefire and that the present firing was simply a continuation of the civil war. It declared that the United States sought a ceasefire so that Chiang Kai-shek could resupply Quemoy. The article ended by noting that if both sides were sincere, the talks might have some results.¹³¹

Instructions for the second meeting of the talks were approved personally¹³² by Dulles and sent to Beam on October 16.

* As might be expected, the Chinese Communists were careful to quote accurate leaks on what had taken place, or at least leaks which served their interest, which turned out in this case to be virtually synonymous.

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* A press report on the meeting of the 22d indicated that the meeting had reached no decision on a ceasefire. It declared that both Beam and Wang were getting statements and moves from their governments and were not being given any latitude to negotiate. It was felt in Washington that the Chinese Communists believed that the United States was under pressure from its allies to reach an agreement with Peking. The Chinese were reported to have accused the United States of trying to sabotage the talks.¹⁴²

For the United States, the holding of the talks once the Chinese had publicly proposed them was a political necessity. The Administration, faced with opposition from its allies, neutrals and from domestic public opinion, needed to do everything to make it appear that it desired peace. Dulles felt that Chou's proposal to reopen the talks might well be a sign of the Chinese desire to disengage and that the possibility of an agreement could not be entirely ruled out. In addition, the Secretary of State believed that the Chinese Communists had begun the crisis because they were provoked and therefore Beam was continually urged to draw the Chinese Communists into a discussion of what had provoked them so that the United States could eliminate this provocation and thus end the crisis. At the same time, Dulles, as well as his subordinates, was aware of the detrimental effect on U.S.-GRC relations which the talks produced. There was little hope in Washington that an agreement would be reached at Warsaw.

BRITISH PRESSURE ON WASHINGTON

*The letter is summarized by Eisenhower in Waging Peace, p. 300.

**See pp. 285-293.

While Washington acted to keep London informed and took British opposition as a sign of widespread dissent from American policy, the British position did not, as should be clear, have any specific direct effect on U.S. policy.

CHAPTER X: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST CEASEFIRE (October 6, 1958 -)

MILITARY ACTION

On October 6 at 1:00 a.m. local time, the Peking radio broadcast to Taiwan a statement by Chinese Communist Minister of Defense Peng Te-huai announcing a one-week ceasefire provided that "there be no American escort." The passage stated that the fire had been in retaliation for Nationalist actions against the mainland. Peng called for negotiations to bring the two sides together.¹ The statement was as follows:

All compatriots, military and civilian, in Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu!

We are all Chinese. Of all choices, peace is the best. The fighting round Quemoy is of a punitive character. For quite a long time, your leaders have been far too wild. They have ordered aircraft to carry out wanton raids on the mainland, dropping leaflets and secret agents, bombing Foochow and harassing Kiangsu and Chekiang, reaching as far as Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechuan, the Kangting area and Chinghai. How can this be tolerated? Hence the firing of a few shells, just to call your attention. Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu are Chinese territory. To this you agree, as proved by documents issued by your leaders, which confirm that they are decidedly not territory of the Americans. Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu are part of China, they do not constitute another country. There is only one China, not two, in the world. To this, you also agree, as proved by documents issued by your leaders. The military agreement, signed between your leaders and the Americans is unilateral; we do not recognize it. It should be abrogated. The day will certainly come when the Americans will leave you in the lurch. Do you not believe it? History will bear witness to it. The clue is already there in the statement made by Dulles on September 30. Placed in your circumstances, how can you help but feel dismayed? In the last analysis, the American imperialists are our common enemy. It is hard for the 130,000 troops and civilians in Quemoy to stand for long the lack of supplies and the pestering hunger and cold. Out of humanitarian considerations, I have ordered the

bombardment' to be suspended on the Fukien front for a tentative period of seven days, starting from October 6. Within this period, you will be fully free to ship in supplies on condition that there be no American escort. This guarantee will not stand if there should be American escort. It is not good that fighting between you and us have been in progress for 30 years and have not yet ended. We propose that talks be held to effect a peaceful settlement. You were notified of this by Premier Chou En-lai several years ago. This is China's internal problem involving your side and our side; it is no issue between China and the United States. The issue between China and the United States is U.S. invasion and occupation of Taiwan, Penghu and the Taiwan Straits, and this should be settled through negotiations between the two countries, which are now being held in Warsaw. The Americans will have to pull out. It won't do if they don't. For the United States, the sooner they go the better, because in this way it can have the initiative. Otherwise, it will be to its disadvantage, because it will then be always on the defensive. Why should a country in the East Pacific have come to the West Pacific? The West Pacific belongs to the people in this region, just as the East Pacific belongs to the people over there. This is common sense which the Americans should have understood. There is no war between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America, and so the question of cease-fire does not arise. Is it not a farce to talk about a cease-fire when there is no fire? Friends in Taiwan! There are flames of war between us. They should be stopped and extinguished. To achieve this, talks are needed. Of course, it would not matter so much even if the fighting should continue for another 30 years. It is, however, better to secure an early peaceful settlement. The choice is up to you.²

The statement was rebroadcast frequently over the next several days and was published in a very prominent position in the People's Daily of October 6, 1958. As the statement indicated, the shelling did come to a halt on the 6th.³

On October 7 the Chinese Communist Ambassador in Moscow told the Norwegian Ambassador that the ceasefire could be

prolonged provided U.S. forces did not come within the twelve-mile limit. He said that the Warsaw talks ought to continue and could lead to a satisfactory solution. He declared that the main Chinese Communist objective was to achieve evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu and that China would raise no demands in relation to Taiwan in negotiating immediate problems.⁴ This was similar to what the Indians were reporting^{*} but was clearly at variance with what the Chinese Communists did say and were to say in the future at Warsaw. This was part of the effort of the Chinese Communists in dealing with the neutrals and with U.S. allies to picture the United States as the side desiring war.^{**}

From October 7 on, and for the first time since the beginning of the crisis, the People's Daily began to report a series of U.S.-GRC disagreements and to report that U.S.-GRC relations were in a state of intense exacerbation. This theme and the stress on the opposition to a two-China policy continued to be emphasized by the People's Daily and the Chinese radio in the coming days and weeks.⁵ One of the most prominent statements of the Chinese Communists on U.S.-

* See pp. 515-556.

** This appears to be a frequently used Chinese Communist technique, indicating to neutral nations that they are prepared to accept one set of terms but in fact demanding quite different terms in direct negotiations with their adversary. They appear to have employed the same technique in relation to a possible settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute.

GRC disagreements came on October 10 when the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister commented in the People's Daily on U.S.-GRC difficulties. He reported GRC veiled attacks on U.S. statements in the Chinese Nationalist press.⁶

On the day before, the People's Daily had printed a Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry statement that the ceasefire had taken place for humanitarian reasons. It denied that the ceasefire was the same as the ceasefire that John Foster Dulles had insisted on and declared that this was not a part of a U.S. ceasefire plot and the U.S. demand for a permanent ceasefire. It declared that when the bombardment stopped and started was an internal Chinese problem and that there was no U.S.-Chinese Communist war and hence no possibility of a ceasefire.⁷

On October 12 the Chinese Communists announced that Huang Ko-cheng had replaced Su Yu as Chinese Communist Chief of Staff.⁸ The reasons for this change remain unclear to this date and it is not known if they were connected with the Quemoy crisis rather than some other event occurring at the time, such as the announced decision to enlist everyone in a people's militia.

On the next day, October 13, the Chinese Communists said that they were continuing the suspension of fire for two more weeks. The announcement, which took the form of an order to the PLA forces on the Fukien front, stated that the extension of the ceasefire would be made "so as to see what the other side will do" and it reiterated that "the

Americans must not conduct escort operations in the Quemoy water area." It went on to say that the United States and the United Nations should stay out of the conflict and again called for negotiations between the two sides. As in their October 6 statement, the Chinese described the American escort in general terms, avoiding the question of their claim to a twelve-mile limit. The text of the statement was as follows:

Comrades of the People's Liberation Army at the Fukien front:

Suspend the shelling of Quemoy for another two weeks starting from today, so as to see what the opposite side is going to do and to enable our compatriots on Quemoy, both military and civilian, to get sufficient supplies, including food and military equipment, to strengthen their entrenchment. Nothing is too deceitful in war. But this is no deceit. This is directed against the Americans. This is a noble national cause, and a clear-cut line must be drawn between the Chinese and the Americans. Taken as a whole, this action on our part does ourselves no harm, but benefits others. Whom does it benefit? It benefits the 10 million Chinese in Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu; it benefits the 650 million people of our whole nation; it only hurts the Americans. Some Communists may not yet understand this for the time being. How comes such an idea? We don't understand! We don't understand! Comrades! You will understand after a while. The Americans in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits must go home. They have no reason to hang on there; refusing to go will not do. Among the Chinese in Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu, the majority are patriots, only a few are traitors. Therefore, political work must be done to enable the great majority of the Chinese over there to wake up gradually, and to isolate the handful of traitors. The effect will be felt with the accumulation of hours and days of work. So long as the Kuomintang in Taiwan has not yet entered into peaceful negotiations with us and reasonable solution has not been worked out, the civil war still continues.

The spokesman of Taiwan said that stop-fight-stop-fight ... is but a trick of the Communists. It is quite true that fighting has been going off and on. But this is no trick. If you are not willing to hold peace talks, fighting is unavoidable. So long as you take such a stubborn attitude as you are doing at present, we are free to fight when we want to fight and stop when we want to stop. The Americans want to take a hand in our civil war. They call it cease-fire. This cannot but make one laugh in one's sleeve. What right have the Americans got to raise this question? Whom do they represent, it may be asked. They represent none. Do they represent the Americans? There is no war between China and the United States, and hence no fire to cease. Do they represent the people in Taiwan? The Taiwan authorities have not given them any credentials. The Kuomintang leaders are completely opposed to the Sino-American talks. The American nation is a great nation, and American people are well-meaning. They don't want war. They welcome peace. But among the U.S. government workers, there are some people, like Dulles and his ilk, who are indeed not so smart. Take, for instance, the talk about a cease-fire. Is this not lacking in common sense? To recover Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu as a whole and complete the unification of the motherland is the sacred task of our 650 million people. This is China's internal affair, and no foreigner has any right to meddle with. The United Nations has no right to meddle with, either. The time is not far away when the aggressors and their running dogs in the world will all of them be buried. There can be no escape for them. Where the enemy can go, we also can go, and drag them back anyway. In a word, victory belongs to the people of the world. The Americans must not conduct escort operations in the Quemoy water area. If there should be any escort, shelling shall start, at once. This order is to be strictly observed.

On October 8 an event for which there seems to be no explanation took place. Four MIG's strafed Yin-shan Island, a small island northeast of Matsu. This was the only Chinese Communist military probe during the period of ceasefire.¹⁰

On October 10 an air battle took place over Matsu between eight GRC F-86s and eight Chinese Communist MIGs. Despite the fact that Sidewinders were not used, five MIGs were destroyed and one damaged. One F-86 was lost because of a collision in mid-air.¹¹

On October 18 the Communists took two unoccupied islands, Ta-po and Hsiao-po, 5,000 yards northeast of Quemoy, without meeting any GRC resistance.¹²

The Chinese Communists announced on October 20 that they were resuming artillery fire because of an intrusion of a U.S. warship into Chinese territory and waters. (An American ship apparently had in fact moved to within three miles of the coast.¹³) The firing resumed at 4:00 p.m. local time on the 20th with 13,000 rounds fired at three LSTs unloading on three separate Quemoy beaches. The LSTs were slightly damaged and returned to Taiwan.^{14*} Firing continued until October 24 as indicated in Table 25.

On October 22 an air battle took place between eight F-86s and 6 MIGs which lasted for seven minutes; no damage was reported by either side. The Chinese Communists continued to issue their serious warnings, warnings Nos. 39 and 40, both claiming intrusions in the Matsu area.¹⁶

*GRC naval officials were reported to have greeted the renewed fire with enthusiasm as they were, according to TDC officers, interested in prolonging the hostilities.¹⁵

Table 25

CHINESE COMMUNIST ARTILLERY FIRE: OCTOBER 20-24

Date	Artillery Fire
October 20	11,734 rounds
October 21	9,773 rounds
October 22	8,965 rounds and 35 propaganda rounds
October 23	1,435 rounds
October 24	3,333 rounds

SOURCE: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis, Intelligence Information Brief No. 48. "Chronology of Taiwan Straits Developments, September 27-November 30 1958," prepared by division of Research and Analysis for Far East, (Secret), December 12, 1958.

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On October 25 the Chinese Communists announced that they would suspend firing on the even days against airfields, beaches and wharves "conditional on not introducing American escorts."¹⁷ The message which was issued by the Chinese Communist Defense Minister called for negotiations between the Communists and the Kuomintang. It stressed their common interest in avoiding a two-China situation. The message as broadcast by Peking radio was as follows:

Compatriots, military and civilian, in Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu:

We are fully aware that the overwhelming majority of you are patriots, and only extremely few among you are willing slaves of the Americans. Compatriots! Chinese problems can only be settled by us Chinese. If they are difficult to settle for the time being, things can be talked over at length. The American political broker Dulles likes to poke his nose into other people's business. He wants to take a hand in the matter of the long-standing dispute between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and order Chinese to do this or that, to harm the interests of the Chinese and serve the interests of the Americans. That is to say: step one, to isolate Taiwan; step two, to place Taiwan under trusteeship. If things do not turn out to their liking, they can resort to the most sinister measures. Do you know how General Chang Tso-lin met his death? There is a place called Huangkutun in northeast China, and it was there that he was done to death. No imperialist in the world has any conscience. And the American imperialists are especially vicious, at least no better than the Japanese who did Chang Tso-lin to death. Compatriots! I advise you to be a little more careful. I advise you not to depend too much on other people, lest all your rights and authority be taken away. To arrange things between our two Parties is very easy. I have already ordered our troops at the Fukien front not to shell the airfield in Quemoy and the wharf, beach and ships at Liaoio Bay on even days of the calendar, so that the compatriots, both military and civilian, on the big and small islands of Greater Quemoy, Lesser Quemoy, Tatan, Erhtan and others may all

get sufficient supplies, including food, vegetables, edible oils, fuels and military equipment, to facilitate your entrenchment for a long time to come. If you are short of anything, just say so and we will give it to you. It is time now to turn from foe into friend. Your ships and aircraft should not come on odd days. We will not necessarily conduct shelling on odd days. But you should refrain from coming, to avoid possible losses. In this way, half of each month will be free for transportation, and supplies would not be lacking. Some of you suspect that we want to undermine the unity between your troops and civilians and between your officers and men. No, compatriots! We hope you will strengthen your unity, so as to act in unison in facing up to the foreigners. Fight-fight-stop-stop, Half-fight, Half-stop: this is no trick but a normal thing in the present specific circumstances. Our refraining from shelling the airfield, the wharf, the beach and the ships is still conditional on not introducing American escorts. Exception will be taken if there should be escorts. In the Chiang-Dulles talks, you have suffered a little loss. Now you have only the right of speaking for "free China;" in addition, you are still permitted to represent a small part of the overseas Chinese. The Americans have conferred upon you the title of a small China. On October 23, the U.S. Department of State published an interview Dulles had given to a correspondent of a British broadcasting company which was recorded in advance on October 16. The interview was made public as soon as Dulles took off from Taiwan. Dulles said that he saw a China of the Communists, that, since this country actually exists, he was willing to deal with it, and so on. Thank heaven, our country is seen by an American lord. This is a big China. Under the force of circumstances, the Americans have changed their policy and treated you as a "de facto political unit," that is to say, in fact, not as a country. Such a "de facto political unit" is still needed by the Americans at the initial stage starting from the present time. That means isolating Taiwan. In the second stage, Taiwan is to be placed under trusteeship. Friends of the Kuomintang! Do you not yet sense this danger? Where is the way out? Please think it over. The document issued after the Chiang-Dulles talks this time was only a communique devoid of legal force. It is easy to shake yourselves free, depending on whether you

have the determination or not. There is only one China, not two, in the world. On this we agree. All Chinese people, including you and compatriots abroad, absolutely will not allow the American plot forcibly to create two Chinas to come true. The present age is an age full of hope. All patriots have a future and should not be afraid of the imperialists. Of course, we are not advising you to break with the Americans right away. That would be an unrealistic idea. We only hope that you will not yield to American pressure, submit to their every whim and will, lose your sovereign rights, and so finally be deprived of shelter in the world and thrown into the sea. These words of ours are well-intentioned and bear no ill-will. You will come to understand them by and by.¹⁸

On the 26th the Chinese Communists observed their self-imposed limitation, not firing against airfields, beaches and wharves. They continued from then on, throughout the rest of 1958 and beyond, to observe this pattern.¹⁹ The firing in October continued, but on odd days the designated targets were avoided as is shown in Table 26.

At the beginning of November the on-again, off-again pattern settled down to a regular minuet, with the Chinese Communists firing no shells at all on the even days and firing regularly and in roughly the same amounts on the odd days, and the Chinese Nationalists answering in kind. The pattern is shown in Table 27.

On November 1 the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister declared that the Offshore Islands and Taiwan must be liberated together. He asserted that the United States must get out of the area.²⁰ On the same day an interview

Table 26

CHINESE COMMUNIST ARTILLERY FIRE: OCTOBER 25-31

Date	Artillery Fire
October 25	337 rounds
October 26	286 rounds ^a
October 27	475 rounds
October 28	441 rounds ^a
October 29	596 rounds
October 30	479 rounds ^a
October 31	427 rounds

SOURCE: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis, Intelligence Information Brief No. 48, "Chronology of Taiwan Straits Developments, September 27-November 30, 1958," prepared by division of Research and Analysis for Far East, December 12, 1958; (Secret).

^aNot against beaches, airfields or wharves.

Table 27

ODD-DAY FIRING: NOVEMBER 1958

Date	Chinese Communists Firing	Chinese Nationalists Firing
November 1	360	202
November 3	39,162	5,460 ^a
November 5	5,600	3,844 20 propaganda
November 7	1,678 111 propaganda	0
November 9	451 117 propaganda	12 10 propaganda
November 11	513 180 propaganda	13 56 propaganda
November 13	399 139 propaganda	0
November 15	229 95 propaganda	0
November 17	45 151 propaganda	861
November 19	279 233 propaganda	0
November 21	293 141 propaganda	10 ^b
November 23	1,839 139 propaganda	1,689
November 25	205	0
November 26	0	propaganda shells ^c
November 27	270 188 propaganda	0
November 29	267 127 propaganda	0

SOURCE: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis, Intelligence Information Brief 48.

Table 27 -- continued

7805, "Chronology of Taiwan Straits Developments, September 27- November 30, 1958," prepared by division of Research and Analysis for Far East, December 12, 1958, (Secret).

^aIf not indicated the shells are HE.

^bThis was the first day on which it was reported that the Chinese Nationalists had fired first.

^cThis was the only firing by either side on an even day in November.

with Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi was published by Gerald Clark of NCNA in the Montreal Star.²¹ The U.S. Government received reliable information that the text was carefully prepared by the Chinese Communists, possibly at a very high level. The Chinese Communists had urged Clark to make the main point of his story that the Offshore Islands and Taiwan were inseparably linked and had deleted from his quotes of the interview the statement that the Chinese Communists would retaliate if the United States fired on the mainland.²²

The interview with Gerald Clark printed in the Montreal Star was part of the Chinese Communist campaign to deny that Peking had wanted to capture the Offshore Islands, to exacerbate U.S.-GRC relations, and to prevent a drift toward the two-China policy. In the interview with Clark, the Chinese Foreign Minister declared that China did "not lose anything in the present situation. Time is in our favor." He noted that the Dulles-Chiang talks had consisted of "serious quarrels," and said that if Chiang would cooperate, Peking would make satisfactory arrangements. Chen Yi stressed that the Offshore Islands and Taiwan had to be liberated at the same time.²³

In line with these objectives, on November 4 the Chinese Communists for the first time accused the Nationalists of using poison gas, a charge presumably based on the use of white phosphorous shells, which had been used by both sides.²⁴

On November 5, the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Thompson, reported that the Soviet position was that this was only a civil war and that there was no point in Soviet action at this time.²⁵

On November 6, a leading Soviet official, First Deputy Chairman Anastas I. Mikoyan, delivered an address in which he declared that American atomic threats against China had only served to unite the Chinese people in their determination to liberate the territory still held by the "foreign imperialists and their henchmen." He continued:

The Soviet Union resolutely supported the C.P.R. stating in a letter from N.S. Khrushchev, chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers to President Eisenhower that an attack on the C.P.R. would be regarded as an attack on the Soviet Union ...

Thanks to the peace-loving policy of the C.P.R. an extension of the conflict in Taiwan was prevented, although the American military still continue to brandish the torch of war on the coast of China.²⁶

A week later, on November 12, the Chinese Communists issued the 41st of their serious warnings about intrusion into the mainland coast area opposite the Taiwan Straits area. This was the first serious warning since October 22

and specifically included charges of intrusions in the Quemoy area.^{27*}

On November 17, the fact that peace feelers had been sent out by the Chinese Communists was reported by the GRC Vice President, who said that they had been ignored.²⁹

On December 12, an article by Anna Louise Strong, an American apologist for the Chinese Communist regime, was published in the Soviet journal New Times. An INR memorandum noted that the article confirmed the INR estimate of Chinese Communist intentions, which were that they did not want to take Quemoy alone and were trying to tie it to Taiwan. The article, written from Peking on October 29,³⁰ argued that the Chinese Communists could have taken Quemoy if they had wanted to but preferred to have the Offshore Islands remain in Nationalist hands. As to the reason for this, the article continued:

* On November 6 a State Department memorandum noted that recent Communist propaganda appeared to acknowledge indirectly that the critical phase of the crisis had ended in failure for the Chinese Communists. The memorandum suggested that the Chinese Communist confidence was shaken by the failure to take Quemoy and the unexpectedly strong resistance from Quemoy as well as the ability of the Chinese Air Force and the determination of the U.S. response. It noted that Communist Chinese propaganda indicated that the Chinese were suffering doubts due to their military setbacks, and needed reassuring propaganda.²⁸

As soon as one asks, one sees the reason. To take Tsinmentao (Quemoy) at present, without taking Taiwan, would isolate Taiwan and thus assist Dulles in his policy of building "two Chinas." It would deprive the Chinese in Taiwan of their hopes of "return to the mainland," hopes that Peking will realize for them, but in its own way. It would throw Taiwan on the mercy of Washington. Hence Peking strengthens Tsinmentao (Quemoy) and attaches it firmly to Taiwan, hoping later to take them both in a "package deal."³¹

On December 16, Foreign Minister Chen Yi briefed foreign diplomats in Peking. He declared that "we do not wish to take Quemoy." The Chinese Communists, he said, could have taken Quemoy at Warsaw because the United States (he stated incorrectly) offered it in return for a two-China solution. However, the Chinese Communists wanted to have Chiang on Quemoy and the United States on Taiwan. The United States wanted a two-China policy to legalize its forces on Taiwan. The Chinese Communist policy was now described as desiring to liberate the Offshore Islands, the Penghus and Taiwan together, or to preserve the present situation. The Chinese Communists, Chen Yi pointed out, could control the situation, shoot when they desired, stop when they desired. This was not defeat but victory, he said.³²

CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY

To recapitulate Chinese Communist moves briefly, on October 6, 1958 they announced a one-week suspension of their artillery fire. At the end of the one-week period they announced a further two-week extension in the ceasefire.

During the middle of this second period, on October 20, they announced that they were resuming fire because of an intrusion of an American ship into their coastal areas (which did take place) but also at a time that coincided with Dulles' visit to Taiwan. Shortly thereafter they announced that they would not fire on the piers, the airports or the landing beaches of Quemoy on the even days but would do so on the odd days. In each case, the cease-fire was conditional on American ships not escorting.

Two questions need to be asked about this new Chinese Communist strategy. First, why did the Chinese Communists stop their artillery bombardment of the Offshore Islands, and secondly, why did they stop in the manner that they did?

One factor which apparently did not weigh very heavily in the Chinese decision to call off the artillery fire was the cost of the shells. As was noted above, they undoubtedly did not plan on such a prolonged artillery bombardment and thus may have run out of shells. On the other hand, they probably were prepared for a period of intensive artillery fire such as they implemented during the last week of August in order to bring about the collapse of the Quemoy garrison and probably had sufficient shells for this and therefore probably sufficient shells for a longer period at the lower rates at which they were firing after September 8. In addition, the rail lines to the area opposite Quemoy had been substantially improved

prior to the crisis and could have continued to supply shells to the Quemoy area at a rate sufficient to maintain artillery fire at the then current consumption rates. Nevertheless, it seems that cost and scarcity played some role in the decision to stop.

Probably looming larger in the Chinese decision to stop was their desire to halt their artillery fire before it became clear that the blockade had been broken by the GRC convoys with U.S. escorts to three miles. In fact it was to be clear to American observers by the middle or latter part of September that the blockade could be broken under current circumstances. Had the Chinese Communists continued their artillery fire much longer this would have become clear to other countries. By stopping when they did, the Chinese Communists left it ambiguous as to whether or not they could have successfully imposed an artillery blockade against the Offshore Islands. Thus the public record suggests that the Chinese Communists called off what might have been a successful military operation and thereby exercised restraint and statesmanship rather than making it clear to all the world that their effort had ended in failure.

The immediate date and time of the stopping of the artillery fire may have been related to a large GRC convoy which left the Penghus on the evening of October 5, prior to the Chinese Communist broadcast announcing the ceasefire but which was to arrive at Quemoy after the time the cease-

fire went into effect. This convoy had an American escort despite the fact that the Chinese Communists said that they would resume artillery fire if U.S. ships continued to escort. The Chinese, however; while noting the escort, did not resume their artillery fire. It is possible that the Communists held their fire so that it would appear that this large convoy went through not because it was capable of running the artillery interdiction fire but simply because of the ceasefire. American and GRC officials apparently had no doubt that the convoy would succeed and would go a long way toward making it clear to the world that Quemoy could be resupplied under current military conditions. Thus it may be that the Chinese wanted to embarrass the United States by having it immediately violate the conditions of the ceasefire and at the same time prevent it from being clear that this convoy could have landed even with their military pressure.

A subsidiary motive which probably led the Chinese Communists to halt their artillery fire when they did was the mounting pressure in the non-Communist world for a two-China solution to be imposed both upon the mainland Chinese and on the Taiwan regime. The neutral nations concerned with the possibility that the war in the Taiwan Straits would grow had been maneuvering, particularly in the UN, for a solution to the problem which would see the evacuation of the Offshore Islands, the Matsus as well as

the Quemoy, by the Chinese Nationalists in return for some international guarantee of the status quo on Taiwan. (Although the Chinese Communists probably were not aware of this, the United States was moving toward at least passive acceptance of this solution and might have been willing to put the necessary pressure on the Chinese Nationalists to have them carry it out.) The Chinese Communists did in fact put intensive and successful pressure on the neutrals to get them to drop this effort, but they may have felt that had they prolonged the fire much longer the neutrals would have renewed their search for a two-China solution.

The Chinese Communists may also have feared that if the artillery fire continued for much longer it would ultimately lead to an American, or more likely a GRC, attack on the mainland and perhaps from that a greater expansion of the war. Had the GRC attacked the mainland, the Chinese Communists would have been faced with either accepting the humiliation of a one-sided bombing attack or attacking Taiwan and thus risking U.S. bombing attacks on the Chinese mainland.* The Communists clearly were afraid

* They might have chosen another alternative of simply attacking the Offshore Islands by air, but this would not have the effect of interfering with the air bases from which the Chinese Nationalist planes were taking off and probably would have led to greater bombing attacks by the Chinese Nationalists.

that any such series of bombing exchanges would ultimately lead to American bombing of the mainland which they were desperate to avoid.

Finally, there may have been some Soviet pressure on the Chinese Communists to hold to their original plan of withdrawing once American intervention was clear and of sticking to the commitments that were probably made by the Chinese to the Soviet Union not to press ahead in the face of extensive American opposition. Although the Soviets did demonstrate some uneasiness in this period, there is no direct evidence that they in fact did apply this pressure on the Chinese Communists.

As we have suggested, if the Chinese Communists stopped their artillery bombardment largely out of recognition that it would soon become apparent to the world that it was not going to be successful, it remains to be considered why the Chinese Communists stopped as they did. It will be recalled that they announced first on October 6 that they would cease fire for one week if the United States did not escort. At the end of the week they said they would cease fire for two more weeks, again provided the United States would not escort. Sometime during that period they charged the United States with violating this rule and made known their intention to resume fire. Shortly thereafter they said that they would not fire against the beaches and other resupply areas on even days.

It seems clear that a primary motivation for the manner of stopping was the same as the Chinese Communists' motive for halting the bombardment. That is to say, they tried to conceal their failure to blockade by suggesting that they were stopping for humanitarian reasons. The Chinese were determined at the Sino-American talks in Warsaw to make it clear that the "cease-fire" they were then implementing was not the "cease-fire" that the United States had been demanding in Warsaw. They rejected U.S. thanks for the ceasefire as well as American efforts to turn to a discussion of what the Chinese Communists wanted now that they had complied with the American request for a ceasefire. The Chinese were determined that this ceasefire would not turn into a formal armistice of any kind such as the truce in effect, for example, in Korea.

However, undoubtedly most important to the Chinese Communists in their manner of stopping was the effect that it might have on American-GRC relations. What the Chinese Communists were in effect telling the GRC was that the Chinese Communists would decide when the islands could or could not be resupplied. That is, Mao appeared to be saying to Chiang that the Offshore Islands were Chinese Communist islands whose resupply situation he controlled but that out of humanitarian considerations and Chinese brotherliness, he would permit the Nationalists to resupply the islands when and how he chose.

It would not have been difficult for the Chinese Communists to predict that Chiang Kai-shek would read the messages in this way and that he would ask the United States to continue the escort of Chinese Nationalist vessels despite the fact that the Chinese Communists had made it the single condition of the ceasefire that the United States not escort. Since the United States had continually said publicly that it was escorting "only insofar as militarily necessary," it was probably possible for the Chinese Communists to predict that the United States would bring its escort operations to a halt once the Communists implemented the ceasefire. It was also possible for them to predict that Chiang Kai-shek would react very violently to this and that there would be an intense U.S.-GRC disagreement on whether the United States and the GRC should pay any attention to the ceasefire or continue with the escorted resupply operation. Once the United States stopped escorting during the ceasefire despite intense Chinese Nationalist objections, the Communists could be reasonably sure that the United States would not escort on those even days when the Communists said they would not fire. This was an even more direct slap at Chiang Kai-shek, not only because it stipulated that there was to be no U.S. escort but also because it told him on precisely what days he could resupply. Again, the Chinese Communists could reasonably predict that Chiang would object

to this and would insist upon escorting on the odd days in the face of Chinese Communist fire. Again, it was also safe to predict that the United States would refuse to escort on these days and that this would produce intense disagreement.

Thus by the method that the Chinese Communists used to end the Taiwan Straits crisis they were able to create intense U.S.-GRC discord.* It was clear that if the Chinese Communists had simply called off the artillery fire or substantially reduced its intensity, the crisis might have ended by creating harmonious relations between the GRC and the United States. As it worked out, they succeeded in putting Chiang Kai-shek in the very humiliating position of having to accept Chinese Communist dictation over when and how he could resupply the Offshore Islands under his control.

* As will be indicated just below, the disagreement hoped for by the Chinese Communists did occur.

CHAPTER XI: THE CEASEFIRE PERIOD IN WASHINGTON AND TAIPEI

The Chinese Communist announcement of a ceasefire on October 6 came, as was noted above, at a time when an American-escorted Chinese Nationalist convoy heavily loaded with 500 tons of supplies had already set sail from the Penghus for Quemoy. The convoy was designed to demonstrate Chinese Nationalist ability to break the blockade and had been designated "Special Convoy No. 1." Accompanied by U.S. escort, the convoy did not meet with enemy fire.¹

Upon receiving word of the ceasefire on condition there be no American escort, U.S. officials in Taipei met among themselves and then with Chiang Kai-shek to consider whether or not the United States should suspend convoy operations. Smoot and Drumright conferred and agreed not to recommend any change in the U.S. escort policy. Drumright in his first message reported to Washington that a convoy under U.S. escort was on the way and that the cessation of Chinese Communist fire would aid its operation. He also reported that Chiang had requested Smoot to ignore the Peng statement, and to continue convoy operations, and that he and Smoot had agreed that this should be done.

Drumright warned Washington that any cessation of U.S. convoys would cause an immediate deterioration in U.S.-GRC relations.²

Smoot, who apparently felt very strongly about the matter, sent telegrams to CINCPAC and the CNO and, through State Department channels, to the Secretary of State. He declared that it was the determination of his staff that the United States should continue the escort despite the ceasefire pronouncement, and he described the ceasefire broadcast as an act of treachery. He had told Chiang, he said, that he proposed to continue the escort. Chiang was opposed to withdrawal of the escort and asked Smoot to make his opposition known to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Smoot exercised his own authority to allow the escort, which had just left, to continue on its way to the three-mile limit, even though there was no Communist artillery fire. Smoot declared that he would continue the escort unless instructed otherwise. He warned in his message to the Secretary of State that U.S. withdrawal would have serious implications for U.S.-GRC relations and that therefore the United States should not suspend escorting without GRC agreement, which should be arranged through diplomatic channels.³

Later in the day Chiang formally approached Drumright and Smoot with a request that the United States ignore the ceasefire broadcast and continue the escort. A letter was presented personally by Chiang to Smoot to go to the JCS and by the Chinese Nationalist Foreign Minister to Drumright to be passed to Dulles. The letters expressed the fear that U.S. pressures for the reduction of the garrison on Quemoy might lead the Chinese people to adopt an anti-U.S. attitude. The letter to Drumright warned that U.S. withdrawal of convoying would imply that the United States accepted the Chinese Communist position and that this would elicit strong GRC protests that would be made public. The Chinese Nationalists nevertheless pledged that they would refrain from retaliatory action as long as the Chinese Communists did so. In passing on this message, Drumright made it clear that he was opposed to suspending convoy escorts, although he indicated that it might be possible to announce a reduction in the number of U.S. ships involved.⁴

Chiang announced publicly that the GRC would continue to convoy and expressed the hope that the United States would continue to escort.⁵

At the same time that American officials on Taiwan were coming to the firm conclusion that the United States should not suspend convoy operations, officials in Washington were making the decision that the convoy operations should be suspended.

Burke, apparently before having a chance to consult with State, notified CINCPAC and TDC that in view of the ceasefire broadcast, the TDC should consult the GRC and, unless there were strenuous objections, should halt the convoy escorts. At the same time he urged the GRC to engage in a maximum effort to supply the Offshore Islands and declared that the United States should avoid provocative action and encourage the GRC to do likewise. Smoot was asked to request the GRC to engage in no overflights or leaflet drops during the week. At the same time, the TDC was ordered to have MAAG personnel survey the situation on all the Offshore Islands and at the same time to be prepared for tricks by the Chinese Communists and to maintain current readiness.⁶

After consultation between State and Navy, it was decided, at the insistence of State,⁷ that U.S. convoy operations would be suspended regardless of GRC opposition, after the current convoy returned. Such an order

was sent to CINCPAC and the TDC. However, they were ordered to be ready to resume convoys if the shelling resumed. Otherwise there would be no convoy operations necessary.⁸ Drumright was informed that the Chinese Communist move had not been revealed to the United States at Warsaw and that he might tell this to Chiang.⁹

Drumright was told that the United States was suspending convoy operations since they were not militarily necessary. He was informed that world opinion made the suspension necessary and he was requested to urge the GRC to build up supplies on the Offshore Islands.¹⁰ At the same time, the U.S. Government, through a State Department spokesman, welcomed the ceasefire and said it would suspend U.S. convoy operations if the artillery fire were halted permanently. It was announced that the United States was consulting with the GRC.¹¹

On October 7 Drumright reported that the GRC was upset at the American decision to suspend escort. The GRC had expressed the hope that public statements in Washington would stress the point that the escort would be resumed if the artillery fire were started again. The GRC had also inquired what the U.S. position would be

if there were an air and sea attack on a convoy to Quemoy. Drumright noted that the GRC expected a resumption of artillery fire after seven days, followed by an amphibious attack.¹²

Dulles returned to Washington on October 7 and was again met at the airport by Herter and Robertson, who discussed the ceasefire situation with him.¹³ During the week of the ceasefire, officials in Washington continued to urge restraint on the GRC. For example, in a personal message to Drumright, Dulles declared, "I assume everything possible has been done to assure that over coming hours and days Nationalists will hold their fire unless attacked and will avoid provocative action."¹⁴

In response to this, Drumright reported that he and Smoot had sought all possible opportunities to urge the GRC to avoid provocation. He reported that all was well except in the air, where the GRC was being provocative. On October 10, for example, eleven GRC planes were sent over the mainland, despite a Ministry of National Defense directive forbidding such operations.¹⁵

U.S. military officials on Taiwan took advantage of the ceasefire to explore the supply situation on Quemoy and to try to re-evaluate the situation while stabilizing

it. On October 6 a long-awaited Nike-Hercules missile unit with nuclear warheads arrived on Taiwan.¹⁶ An American military official was quoted as stating that atomic warheads accompanied the missiles,¹⁷ but this was later denied by a Defense Department official in Washington,¹⁸ and by a U.S. military official on Taiwan.¹⁹

Under the urging of the United States, the Chinese Nationalists carried out extensive supply operations during the period of the ceasefire. Plans were made to land approximately 1,000 tons per day.²⁰ On October 8, 1,300 tons were landed.²¹ The Nationalists were reported to have silenced their guns on the Offshore Islands and to be prepared to hold their fire unless fired upon.²² They also halted leaflet drops and most reconnaissance flights.²³

On October 8 the Chief of the Army Section of the Taiwan Defense Command visited Quemoy and found "no problem whatsoever in supply."²⁴ He declared that he was "amazed by the small degree of damage." Civilian areas except those near the airport were untouched. He reported that morale was higher than in the pre-August 23 period and that there was a complete success in supply of

the Islands. He stated that 307 tons of supplies, including ammunition, were used per day, and that this amount could be delivered even if the blockade were resumed.²⁵

Between October 12 and 14, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy was on Taiwan conferring with Chiang Kai-shek. During one meeting, Chiang expressed his fear that the United States would give away something in Warsaw, and declared that what to do with the Offshore Islands was entirely a matter for the GRC to decide. He feared that the United States was negotiating a deal and that he would like to be consulted. At this point the United States was beginning to think in terms of bringing about some reduction in the size of the Quemoy garrison, and McElroy sounded out Chiang on this point. Chiang left Drumright, who was at the meeting, with the impression that the Nationalists would accept a military argument as to why the forces on Quemoy should be reduced but would have no part of a political settlement involving their reduction. Drumright felt that what had emerged from the conversation was that Chiang might withdraw some troops in return for a U.S. declaration to defend the Offshore Islands and the supplying of better equipment to the Offshore Islands.

At the same meeting Chiang expressed the hope that Dulles would visit Taiwan.³¹ Dulles had been planning to make such a visit and it was probable that McElroy and Drumright maneuvered to get Chiang to make this request, although at the same time it was probably true that Chiang, having a poor impression as to what Dulles' purpose would be, was anxious to have a Dulles visit at this time.*

On October 15 and 16, with Dulles due to arrive shortly in Taiwan for talks with Chiang Kai-shek, evaluations of the situation were sent by Smoot and Felt. Smoot reported that resupply had in fact never been a problem. The panic had been created, not by the Nationalist military, but by the GRC's use of the incident to involve the United States in their never-to-die hope of returning to the mainland. With reference to the smaller islands, Smoot declared that the United States should stand firm and that it should let the GRC know that there were certain islands we did not consider worth defending. On the question of whether or not the United States should

* As will be indicated below, Dulles had already told GRC Ambassador Yeh that he would like to visit Taiwan, and the GRC had sent instructions to Yeh to invite Dulles.

press for a reduction in the size of the Quemoy garrison, Smoot expressed the view that political arguments for reducing the garrison on the Offshore Islands would be dangerous, but he noted that there were good military arguments, which he was prepared to make.^{32*}

On the next day Felt reported that the Chinese Communists had made an erroneous estimate when they determined that heavy artillery bombardment would reduce the Quemoy garrison to the point of evacuation or surrender. He expressed his view that the traditional Chinese Communist Army faith in artillery fire was here demonstrated but noted that the 500,000 rounds which were fired in fact did only minor damage and were not able to prevent resupply. He said that the United States should not press too hard for a GRC reduction on the Offshore Islands and should be willing to strengthen GRC forces.³⁴

REACTION TO THE CEASEFIRE IN WASHINGTON

With the decision made to halt convoy escort during the ceasefire period, Washington officials turned to the

* Smoot later decided that there were no good military arguments and requested and received permission to have one of his subordinates negotiate the troop reduction.³³

question of what further moves the United States should make in light of the termination of the immediate crisis. A meeting of State Department officials, including Dulles, Herter, Murphy, Smith, Reinhardt, Macomber, Robertson, Parsons, and Green, was held on the afternoon of October 8.³⁵ Dulles led off the discussion by indicating his belief that the ceasefire would be extended beyond one week. He argued that acquisition of the Offshore Islands by the Chinese Communists would be a great victory. His view was challenged only by Gerard Smith, head of the Policy Planning Staff, who noted that if the GRC abandoned the Offshore Islands it would strengthen a two-China policy and rob the Communists of their ability to shake things up whenever they wanted to. He proposed evacuating the Islands and stronger American guarantees for Taiwan.

Dulles strongly disagreed with Smith's proposal. He noted that the ceasefire was being hailed as a great victory for American policy. Though rejecting the total evacuation of the Islands, Dulles thought that the United States might use its leverage to gain a reduction in the size of the Quemoy garrison. He noted that Chiang must be made to realize that he had had a narrow escape since the American Government had had to strain its relations

with Congress and its allies almost to the breaking point in order to save him. Dulles asserted that a reduction in the size of the garrison would be aimed at impressing public opinion in the United States and elsewhere, and that the United States must continue to seek public support for its policy. The Secretary of State declared that the Government could not permit this situation to arise again. "It was agonizing," he said.

Moving beyond a possible reduction in the size of the Quemoy garrison, Dulles suggested that the Offshore Islands might be demilitarized if the Chinese Communists pledged not to seize them. The pledge would be underwritten by countries now recognizing Peking who would agree to sever relations and perhaps join with other countries in imposing economic sanctions if the Communists seized the Islands. Robertson objected to the plan, noting in any case that the Chinese Communists would not accept it and that it would be difficult to find any countries which recognized Peking which would also be willing to make the threat suggested by Dulles. Noting that the issue was U.S. support for the GRC, Robertson also opposed the suggestion made by Herter

that the United States put pressure on the GRC then and there to evacuate the smaller islands in the Quemoy group.

Dulles noted that acceptance of a two-China situation by the GRC might come sometime in the future when the Army was Taiwanese. He returned to his theme of GRC provocations and asked if Beam had ever asked Wang what provocations the Chinese Communists wanted removed; he stressed the importance of trying to pin Wang down on this. Finally, Dulles asked Robertson to look into the problem of the smaller islands in light of the report that Smoot had recommended a build-up on the Tans to the GRC.³⁶

Two days after the State Department meeting, Dulles met with the Joint Chiefs and other Administration officials at the Pentagon. Dulles began by proposing that the group consider various possible moves, including a reduction of the Quemoy garrison, but he indicated that no action should be taken under pressure. He asked how large a garrison was necessary and was told by Taylor that the garrison could be safely reduced from its estimated strength of about 85,000 to 25,000.

Allen Dulles noted that the shells fired during the crisis cost the Communists \$25,000,000. The shells came from Russia and the Chinese were paying for them.* He thought that if the Quemoy garrison were reduced in size, the Taiwanese might be removed. The Secretary of State stressed that the President believed that the islands should be treated as an outpost and should not become another Dien-Bien-Phu. Dulles voiced his belief that the GRC could play an active role in a Hungarian-type revolution. He asked if a reduction in the garrison were satisfactory from a military point of view. Twining replied that it was, provided that it did not appear to be a retreat. The meeting concluded with general agreement that a reduction in the GRC garrison and greater mobility for GRC forces would be pressed if the ceasefire continued.³⁸

In conversation with GRC Ambassador Yeh just prior to the interdepartmental meeting, Dulles underlined the problem of allied support. He stressed that the United

* This information is at variance with a post-crisis intelligence analysis by the Army, which came to the conclusion that the shells used were all manufactured in China.³⁷

States Government had to have the support of its people and its allies, and he asked the GRC to consider initiatives in regard to its Offshore Islands policy. Dulles also told Yeh that he would like to go to Taipei to talk with Chiang.³⁹

On October 12, with the original first-week ceasefire period drawing to a close, Dulles had a classified conversation with the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Theodore Green, which apparently reflected rather accurately Dulles' views of what the crisis was about and what had taken place thus far.

Dulles told Green that the Chinese Communist objective was to eliminate U.S. influence in the Western Pacific and was not limited to the Offshore Islands. He declared that the current operation was similar to the Berlin blockade and that the Chinese Communists had taken limited measures, i.e., artillery interdiction. Dulles went on to say that the GRC had not solved the resupply problem but were on the verge of doing so when the ceasefire was declared. Therefore the Chinese Communists were faced with a choice of continuing their expensive effort or accepting a ceasefire. The alternative to these two was the use of air power against Quemoy.

However, Dulles continued, the Chinese Communists recognized that if this were done, the GRC Air Force would attack the planes and probably the bases. In turn, the Chinese Communists would bomb Taiwan, and this would bring in the United States, which the Chinese Communists did not want.

He declared that the basic issues remained, but that they did not have to be settled then. As for allied support, Dulles told Senator Green that the Japanese were privately supporting a strong U.S. position.* He noted, in a rather self-revealing comment, that the Japanese had no religion and hence were guided exclusively by expediency and respect for strength. He stated that the Filipinos were also giving strong support.

Dulles stated further that the resupply had been difficult because the United States had not trained the GRC in amphibious work. He declared that the existence of Chiang would be useful in a Hungarian-type situation and that in fact the outcome in Hungary would have been quite different if there had been a Hungarian Army outside Hungary.

* It is not clear on what Dulles' view was based. All the material I have seen indicates that the Japanese were opposed to defending the Offshore Islands.

He told Green that no commitment had been made to defend Quemoy and that there was a limit as to how hard we could push the GRC, for example, in getting them to evacuate the Islands. He said that if we pushed too hard, they would make a deal with the Chinese Communists and that this was very much on his mind and had to be taken into consideration in framing U.S. policy.⁴⁰

In his discussion with Green, Dulles stressed the two points which were very much on his mind at this point. One was the need to take some steps to eliminate the possibility of a renewal of the crisis and to show that the United States was peaceful. Therefore Dulles felt that the United States should make some move toward reducing provocative actions in the Taiwan Straits. At the same time Dulles was conscious of pressure from the other side, from the Chinese Nationalists, who, he recognized, would bitterly resist any effort to make major changes in the status quo in the Straits.

On October 13 Dulles met with GRC Ambassador Yeh and was told that Chiang would be glad to have him visit Taipei. He was told that Chiang would like a visit followed by a short communiqué indicating agreement.

Dulles noted that the danger was now political and told Yeh that American military officers believed the Army garrison should be reduced.⁴¹ He also talked with Burke by phone and suggested that it might now be appropriate to reduce American forces in the Taiwan Straits area. Burke said that the Navy was thinking along the same lines.⁴² Later in the day the National Security Council met and Dulles conferred alone with the President.* He then met with his State Department staff.⁴³

With the feeling that the military crisis in the Taiwan Straits was at an end and having arranged to visit Taipei to talk with Chiang Kai-shek, Dulles wrote out a paper outlining his thoughts on what GRC policy should be. This was to form the basis of his negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek later in the month. He began by listing the seven roles of the GRC in which the United States was cooperating. These were:

- (1) To keep the anti-Communist Government on Taiwan strong enough to withstand any Communist assault.

*No information on what was discussed at these two meetings is available to me.

- (2) To prevent more Chinese from being forcefully subjected to Communist tyranny.
- (3) To be ready to help the Chinese on the mainland if the opportunity presented itself as a result of organized dissatisfaction.
- (4) To stimulate the possibility of revolt on the mainland by making Taiwan a model of political, economic and social welfare.
- (5) To keep the overseas Chinese from becoming a tool of Peking.
- (6) "To preempt the seat of China in the United Nations so that it would not go to the Chinese Communists, giving them increased prestige and influence in the world."
- (7) To preserve Chinese culture.

Dulles went on in the memorandum as to what could be done in relation to the Offshore Islands to accomplish the objectives. He expressed the hope that a de facto armistice could develop on both sides which would make possible an appreciable reduction of forces on the Offshore Islands. He then pointed out the bearing that the problem of creating a de facto armistice in the Taiwan

Straits and reducing forces would have on the previous seven points. The effect would be as follows:

- (1) There would be no problem of Taiwan if the matter were handled by the GRC as its program not a U.S. program it accepted by coercion.
- (2) Some appreciable reduction of forces under the conditions suggested would give comparable security to what now exists. There would be enough forces left not only to maintain internal security, but to put up a substantial resistance. The number left behind could at any time be augmented from Taiwan particularly if additional amphibious power were provided.

It would be a necessary accompaniment of the foregoing that the CHINATS should make clear that they did not intend to use the offshore islands for provocative purposes. Actually, there is very little "provocation" now by the CHINATS in the offshore islands. They are not used for purposes of blockading the ports of Amoy and Foochow. Also these mainland areas are so heavily militarized and so forbidding in their geographical formation that they do not serve as a useful place for staging commando raids or introducing intelligence agents much less for an invasion in aid of a future revolt.

It is possible--not probable--that other free nations which now have diplomatic relations with the CHICOMS could be induced to indicate to the CHICOMS that they would break these relations and throw their support to the CHINATS if the CHICOMS again break the peace by a major war effort to capture the offshore islands.

It should be observed in this connection that the offshore islands are not covered by the United States--Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty, and the President is not authorized to use the Armed Forces for their defense unless he judges it is necessary and appropriate for the defense of Taiwan. Thus the Chinese Communists, by disassociating attacks on the Quemoy and Matsu islands from their claims for Taiwan and Penghu, could automatically exclude United States armed participation in defense

of the offshore islands. This makes it the more important to develop increased and broader political pressures on the CHICOMS not to engage in a further arms attack on the offshore islands.

(3) As regards point three, the ability of the CHINATS would be increased with less division of their forces, with more located at a focal point such as Taiwan. From there they could be either redeployed to the offshore islands rather than be demobilized on the offshore islands.

The amphibious equipment which would make a return to the offshore islands more possible would equally serve to permit their being landed elsewhere if this was appropriate to give aid and comfort to a substantial organized resistance movement.

(4) As regards point four, the change would have some benefit in that it would tend to moderate what otherwise could be a source of division on Taiwan and between the Chinese who regard Taiwan as their home, and the recent arrivals who regard the mainland as their home. There is some evidence that the Taiwanese are not enthusiastic about the present dispositions which can require many of them to die for the defense of the offshore islands in which they have no sentimental interest.

(5-6) As regards points five and six, we believe that some move along the lines indicated is important, almost essential, to prevent more and more nations from recognizing the CHICOMS and bringing them into the U.N. There is great dissatisfaction in the present situation among many nations which, in deference to the U.S., do not recognize the CHICOMS. They strongly deprecate a situation which, as they see it, involves them in the risk of a world war because of the military dispositions by the CHINATS which, in their opinion, are unnecessarily provocative. They look upon the CHINATS' use of the offshore islands as carrying a constant invasion threat to the mainland, or, at a minimum, a threat to the integrity of the mainland China's principal ports, and they are sympathetic with the efforts of the CHICOMS to eliminate these threats. Actually, as noted, these threats are non-existent. But it is much better than the CHINATS should themselves

take steps which would emphasize the reality and do so on their own volition, rather than to lose good will with disastrous political consequences on account of maintaining a paper threat which in reality is non-existent.

(7) As regards point seven there is no particular bearing one way or the other because the place where Chinese culture is being preserved is Taiwan not on the offshore islands.⁴⁴

As we shall see, these views of Dulles were to be reflected in his conversations with Chiang Kai-shek.

On the 13th the State Department sent a long telegram to its Embassy in India asking it to convey information to the Indian Government while making it clear that the United States did not want a mediator in the crisis at that time.

It informed the U.S. Ambassador to India that the Indian Ambassador to Peking was being given an incorrect account of the situation by the Chinese Communists. He had been told, for example, that the Chinese Communists could have taken the Offshore Islands in 1955 because they were lightly armed; actually they were as heavily armed then as they were now. He was also told that the Chinese Communists hoped to acquire the Offshore Islands through the Warsaw talks and to settle the Taiwan question with Chiang Kai-shek. In point of fact, the

Chinese Communists refused to discuss the Offshore Islands or the renunciation of force in the Taiwan Straits at the Warsaw talks.

The Ambassador was also authorized to inform the Indians that Communist China had not replied to the American letter of July 28 notifying them of Beam's appointment and their willingness to reopen the talks until after the September 6 statement by Chou En-lai. The Indian Ambassador to Peking had been told that the Chinese Nationalists were interfering with shipping and undertaking other provocations from the Offshore Islands and that this was the reason for the shelling. However, as pointed out in this message to New Delhi, the last increase in troops on Quemoy was in 1955. In addition, it was pointed out that the Chinese Nationalists had discontinued attempts to blockade since early 1956 and that the Offshore Islands had no airfields usable by jet planes.⁴⁵

At a press conference on October 14, Dulles declared that there was no point in bargaining with the Chinese Communists over the future of the Offshore Islands or the size of the Quemoy garrison. The Secretary of State denied that there were any plans to urge Chiang to reduce

the size of the GRC garrison on Quemoy. Dulles said that the Communist suspension of the ceasefire for two more weeks was not "dependable."⁴⁶ He stated:

The United States welcomes the Chinese Communist decision of October 12 to continue to suspend the shelling of Quemoy. We hope that this suspension will in fact be for more than the 2 weeks mentioned. Short suspensions of armed attack do not provide a solid foundation upon which to stabilize the situation in the interest of peace.⁴⁷

On October 15 Eisenhower at a press conference briefly endorsed the views given by Dulles to the press on the previous day. The President noted that there was no indication that the GRC would agree (as they later did) to reduce the size of their Quemoy garrison in return for an increase in its fire power.⁴⁸

On October 16 Dulles continued staff meetings on the situation in the Taiwan Straits and on his position paper for his trip to Taiwan.⁴⁹

On the next day it was announced in Washington that Dulles would visit Chiang the following week accompanied by Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East Walter Robertson.⁵⁰ Dulles left that evening to attend the funeral of Pope Pius before going to Taiwan.⁵¹ An

indication that the Dulles trip was planned on the assumption that the crisis was over may be found in the fact that the special daily Situation Reports prepared for the President were suspended as of October 17.^{52*}

THE DULLES VISIT TO TAIWAN

On October 21 Dulles arrived in Taiwan for a series of intensive meetings with Chiang Kai-shek and U.S. officials. Upon arrival, he issued a statement indicating that the talks were not aimed at reaching any new agreements but simply at consolidating a relationship of mutual trust and confidence.⁵³

The day before Dulles' arrival on Taiwan, the Chinese Communists announced the resumption of artillery fire against the Offshore Islands, claiming it was the result of an intrusion of a U.S. ship into Chinese waters. They continued the fire during the whole time of Dulles' visit to Taiwan.

Thus the Dulles-Chiang conversations, which had been expected to be carried on in an atmosphere in which the

* However, they were resumed when the shelling began again.

military phase of the crisis was clearly over, took place in a slightly different climate. It was clear to everyone then that the shelling could not isolate Quemoy, and the discussions apparently proceeded in very much the same form as they would have if the Chinese Communists had not resumed their fire. Dulles consulted with Eisenhower by phone from Alaska, on route to Taiwan, when the shelling broke out, and it was agreed that he should continue his trip. It was also announced that the United States would not immediately resume escort operations.⁵⁴

Prior to meeting with Chiang, Dulles held several meetings with the U.S. officials on Taiwan as well as with those who had accompanied him to the Island, including Chief of Staff of the Army General Maxwell Taylor. Taylor reported to the JCS that Dulles requested a briefing about the effect of a possible air attack on Quemoy. The briefer, a member of the Taiwan Defense Command, said that the TDC had concluded that an air attack on Quemoy would not be decisive. The Taiwan Defense Command believed that it should be countered by an air attack limited to the vicinity of Quemoy since the Chinese Communist airfields could not be cratered

without atomic weapons.⁵⁵ After this morning briefing, Dulles lunched with Taylor and the senior American officials on the Island, including Smoot, Drumright and Ray Cline.⁵⁶ Dulles then met with Drumright and Robertson to go over the talking paper he had drafted earlier in the day for his meeting with Chiang. Though some minor changes were made, the specific requests to the GRC were left as originally drafted by Dulles.⁵⁷

In his first meeting with Chiang on the 21st at 4:00 p.m., Dulles began by speaking along the lines of a talking paper which he was to present in full to Chiang on the 22d. He began by congratulating the GRC on its successful defense of Quemoy. Dulles indicated that the great danger to the GRC was political, stemming from world feeling that the GRC wanted to threaten peace. Dulles expressed his view that the GRC could have an assured future if it made clear that its counter-attacks on the mainland were based on considerations for "the minds and souls of 600 million Chinese and not on might." Dulles stressed that the GRC must present a peaceful image.

Dulles went on to express his thanks but not surprise at GRC restraint during the operation. He noted

his belief that it would be possible to continue the military defense, that the interdiction bombardment and could be overcome, and that any amphibious assault on Quemoy could and would be repulsed.* He implied that an air attack on Taiwan would invoke a joint response. In each case Dulles stressed that the method used would be only that necessary for successful repulsion of the operation.

Chiang, in reacting to Dulles' statement, noted that he and his policies had been misunderstood, and that the United States had shown a lack of confidence in him. He felt that any decisions made now should be private. He stated that he did not want a world war to free China, and he agreed on the principle of not attacking the mainland by air. Dulles replied that while even some U.S. officials on Taiwan suspected Chiang of trying to involve the United States in a war, he did not share this view. Chiang admitted that he was aware of these suspicions and deeply resented them. He noted that the on-again off-again attacks affected Quemoy

* Dulles' comments while stating that an amphibious assault on Quemoy could be repulsed did not make it clear whether the United States would participate.

morale and declared in conclusion that if Quemoy were lost, the effect on Taiwan would be disastrous and defense would crumble.⁵⁸ Dulles and Chiang met again informally for dinner that evening.⁵⁹

Taylor reported to his colleagues in the JCS that the Dulles-Chiang talks were being conducted on a very private basis with no military officials present. However, Dulles briefed the group after his meeting with Chiang on the 21st, telling them that he had raised the question of reducing forces on the Offshore Islands after the firing ended. He expressed his view that it was neither practical nor necessary to reduce the garrisons to the point of being lightly held outposts and he asked the military to work out a solution to reduce the garrison by about 15,000 or 20,000 men.⁶⁰

Dulles' special assistant and his official spokesman for the trip, Joseph Nathaniel Greene, told the press on Taiwan that the first meeting between Dulles and Chiang had been devoted to an assessment of the situation, including a discussion of several political and military matters. He denied that Dulles had come to Taipei to persuade the GRC to change any of its policies.⁶⁶

On the evening of the 22d, Dulles met with Chiang and some of his subordinates, as well as some other State Department officials, in order to hear Chiang's response to the Dulles talking paper. Chiang began by noting that he expected the on-again, off-again firing to continue. He declared that this was a device for paralyzing morale and in the long run could be very effective. Three or four months of this could be very serious and would have an adverse effect on the defenses of Quemoy.

There was a need, he said, to strengthen the Quemoy garrison with more guns. Dulles replied that the United States was considering supplying more guns but that no one in the United States believed that conventional weapons could knock out the deeply emplaced guns of the Chinese Communists, that only nuclear weapons could do this. Dulles asked whether Chiang wanted the United States to use nuclear weapons. Chiang replied that it was not necessary to use nuclear weapons, though the use of tactical atomic weapons might be advisable. Dulles said that no tactical atomic weapons in existence could knock out the gun emplacements. To use a bomb such as the one exploded at Hiroshima (i.e., 20 kt.) would kill millions of people, and heavy fall-out and casualties would result from exploding it on the ground, as would have to be done if the gun emplacements were to be destroyed.* Chiang admitted that he was not a nuclear expert, but he felt that some third way should be found as an alternative to either an all-out attack or doing

*Dulles was later to check this evaluation with the JCS and to learn that the guns could be taken out with far fewer casualties.

nothing at all. Dulles declared that the Chinese Communist attacks were not effective. Chiang said that he agreed but that the problem was one of morale and that positive action was needed.

Returning to the question of the use of atomic weapons, Dulles said that these could knock out the guns around Quemoy but would probably kill "very many people."* Chiang admitted that he had not found any solution. Dulles repeated that only nuclear weapons could take out the gun emplacements and went on to say that the use of nuclear weapons would involve nuclear attacks on Taiwan, which, in turn, would completely destroy the island. Chiang declared that the Chinese Nationalists might have to bomb supply lines to the Amoy area. Dulles stated that the United States was studying the possibility of providing better guns. Chiang cautioned that the patience of the defenders on Quemoy might break and that they could act on their own. The meeting concluded with Dulles observing that the best solution was an armistice. 67

*In an original typescript version of the memorandum of conversation, this statement read "kill 20 million people." It was changed before the minutes of the meeting were dittoed to "very many people."

On the morning of the 23rd, Dulles had his final meeting with Chiang. The only other person present was GRC Ambassador Yeh, who served as interpreter. Dulles declared that the whole fate of Free China should not be identified with holding a few square miles of highly vulnerable territory. Chiang retorted that if Quemoy were lost, Free China was lost. Dulles rejected this causal relationship. Chiang responded that Taiwan could not be held after Quemoy fell, that Communist agents on Taiwan would bring about the fall of the Government within five months. He said he could guarantee the defense of Quemoy, but only with current U.S. support. Dulles declared that no one could guarantee indefinitely the defense of an island in that position. Chiang asked what could be done to prevent an on-again, off-again attack on the Islands. Dulles, returning to nuclear questions, declared that only ground-burst nuclear weapons could effectively take out the guns and that this would kill most of the people on Quemoy by fallout. He suggested reducing the garrison as a sound political and military move. Chiang stated he was prepared to move in this direction if hostilities stopped, but that it was

impossible to do so under fire. Dulles expressed the hope that a reduction of 15,000 to 20,000 men, which was being discussed, could be brought about. Chiang expressed the hope that the United States would consult him before making any decisions and not do anything which depreciated his prestige. In dictating a memorandum of this conversation, Dulles reported that he interpreted Chiang's remark as a reference to the Eisenhower and Dulles press conferences. He pointed out to Chiang that answers to loaded questions at press conferences were difficult and urged Chiang to look instead at considered State papers. Chiang declared that the renunciation of force was a very important milestone and that free nations should not risk war as a means of promoting their own policies.⁶⁸

Following the meeting, a joint communiqué was issued which closely followed the proposed American draft given by Drumright on the 22d, with several significant changes. Apparently at the request of the Chinese Nationalists at a meeting between Drumright and the GRC officials, a sentence was added, stating that "it was recognized that under present conditions the defense of the Quemoy together with the Matsus, is closely related to the defense of Taiwan and Pengu." Also added was the specific

charge that the Chinese Communists with the support of the Soviet Union were trying to conquer Taiwan, eliminate Free China, and expel the United States from the rest of the Pacific. The following U.S. proposed sentences were eliminated.

The Government of the Republic of China made it clear that it rejects the conception that its high mission, as a representative of Free China, can be carried out through war. It will never itself initiate war to reestablish its authority upon the mainland and never fight save in the defense of those who freely accept its jurisdiction. The Republic of China has no military bases for attacks on the mainland. Its bases are already on the mainland and in the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people. These it will seek to sustain by its conduct and example.

Substituted for that was a statement in which the Government of the Republic of China declared that the principal means of achieving its objective was the implementation of Sun Yat Sen's three principles and "not the use of force."⁶⁹

After issuing the communiqué, Dulles in an off-the-record conference with the American press on Taipei stressed the basic unity of the United States and the GRC. He pointed to the importance of spelling out the renunciation of force by the GRC and stated that the

Warsaw talks had not been discontinued. He stressed that there would be reciprocity if there was a continuing ceasefire.⁷⁰

Taylor, in reporting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on these Dulles-Chiang meetings, noted that the major achievement was in the words of the communiqué: "not the use of force." Dulles had informed Taylor, in a meeting right after his final conversation with Chiang, that Chiang had raised the question of the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the coastal batteries and in ensuing discussions had shown a complete ignorance of atomic weapon effects. Dulles spoke to Taylor and the military officials on Taiwan about the need to brief Chiang on the elementary facts of nuclear weapons.^{71*}

On the same day, Drumright reported that the request to reduce the garrison had made a good start and that, if kept in military channels and as a military matter, it

* This caused considerable confusion on Taiwan. On October 25 the Taiwan Defense Command requested guidance from Washington as to how to brief Chiang. On the 25th Smoot was informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been told by Dulles of his request to the Taiwan Defense Command to brief Chiang. The message to Smoot indicated that a briefing would shortly be forwarded to Taiwan. After several additional exchanges of messages, Burke in a personal message to Smoot advised him to give a briefing which would emphasize the political implications of any decision to use nuclear weapons.⁷²

stood a good chance of succeeding.⁷³ Dulles and Smoot had agreed that the negotiations for a reduction in the size of the garrison would be conducted by the Chief of the U.S. Army MAAG unit on Taiwan.⁷⁴

THE ODD-EVEN CEASEFIRE PERIOD

In the face of the resumed Chinese Communist artillery fire no resupply was attempted since 40,000 tons had been landed on Quemoy during the period of the ceasefire (October 6 to 20) and there was no urgency for landing additional supplies.⁷⁵

On October 21, in order to avoid any further intrusions into the three-mile territorial waters of Quemoy, U.S. naval ships were ordered to remain fifteen miles from Chinese Communist territory or GRC-held islands along the China mainland.⁷⁶ However on the same day, the GRC removed its ban on over-flights and air engagements.⁷⁷ On October 22, U.S. officials on Taiwan warned that the United States would renew its escort operations if the Communist artillery fire made it militarily necessary.⁷⁸

Following the announcement of the even-day ceasefire on October 25, it was immediately clear to U.S. military and diplomatic officials in Washington that Chiang Kai-shek would be very unhappy about the firing procedure laid down by the Chinese Communists. As Smoot reported, the GRC did not like having to dance to the Chinese Communist tune. He warned that the GRC might try to resupply on odd days. In the same telegram, however, Smoot was able

to report that for the moment he had talked Chiang out of trying to resupply on odd days. Smoot stressed that he had made it clear that the United States would refuse to escort on these days.⁸³ Nevertheless it was very clear that the firing pattern established by the Chinese Communists created tensions in U.S.-GRC relations and between Chiang and his military. If he did try to go in on the odd days, Chiang had to face up to the United States refusal to escort and therefore run the risk of the convoys being unsuccessful.

Both Washington and the Nationalist Chinese were aware that the odd-even day procedure was designed to sow dissension between them, but they saw no way to avoid it. Some of the Chinese Nationalist leaders, including Chiang Kai-shek, wanted to go in on the even days for prestige reasons, while recognizing the difficulty of making out a strong case. U.S. military leaders, while sympathizing with Chiang's feelings, were under strict orders not to go in when it was not militarily necessary and did not feel that they could justify requests to convoy on the odd days. On October 29 CINCPAC urged that the United States reiterate its support for the Offshore Islands, but that the United States should discourage

Chiang from odd-day resupply operations in the face of Chinese Communist fire.⁸⁴ On October 30 an order went out from the CNO directing CINCPAC not to escort on odd days. In addition patrols were ordered to be kept outside the twelve-mile limit. The CNO informed CINCPAC that he concurred in the desirability of resuming patrols within twelve miles but that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had raised objections.⁸⁵

Simultaneously Drumright was told that he should leave it to the GRC when to resupply and that the GRC should understand in advance that if it chose to resupply on odd days and if it attracted Chinese Communist interference, the United States would not necessarily engage in escort. The military need for escort was obviously lacking if the GRC could supply on even days.⁸⁶

The issue of whether or not convoys on odd days should be escorted, which depended on whether the Chinese Communists fired on them, remained in abeyance through the end of October because rough seas prevented convoy resupply on both odd and even days and also because supplies on Quemoy had reached such high levels that resupply was not an urgent problem.

On November 5 Smoot reported that the GRC had begun resupply and was observing the odd-even day delivery schedule. The United States had advised that it could not provide assistance on the odd days because there was no military necessity to convoy on those days.⁸⁷

On November 8 and 9, General Lawrence Kuter, U.S. Air Force Commander in the Pacific, met with a number of Chinese officials, including Chiang Kai-shek. He later reported that Chiang's principal point was the need to maintain air superiority and he noted his agreement with Chiang that the performance of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force had been one of the bright spots in the crisis. Chiang, Kuter wrote, claimed that there was considerable unrest in Peking and cited the firing of the Chief of Staff who, he claimed had originally argued for the Offshore Islands venture. Kuter however believed that Su was fired simply as a scapegoat.

Chiang believed, according to Kuter, that Khrushchev came to Peking to discuss the shift of attention from the Middle East and that Mao's military advisers, who had been urging an attempt to seize Quemoy and Matsu, concurred in Khrushchev's proposal that they attack. The green light

was then given to occupy the airfields. Chiang strongly impressed on Kuter that since the United States was not willing to use atomic weapons, it should strengthen the Quemoy conventional defense.^{88*}

* Following his visit to Taiwan, Kuter wrote a letter to General Thomas White, Air Force Chief of Staff, in which he noted that the GRC military had hoped during September to maneuver the United States into a position where it would fight with the Nationalists for control of the mainland. They were now discouraged by Chiang's renunciation of force.⁸⁹

A week later at an Air Force Commanders meeting, Kuter in a briefing on the crisis declared that the military had failed to convince the Government that it must be free to use suitable nuclear weapons at the outset of any conflict. He declared that the Communists could not be defeated with conventional weapons and suggested that the Air Force stress kiloton weapons. He concluded that "a priority requirement is to educate our various Government policy-makers that the very great spread in available nukes has made these weapons conventional."⁹⁰

On December 31, in his final critique of the administration's reluctance to use nuclear weapons in the crisis, General Kuter in a letter to General Curtis LeMay, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, noted that he would not harangue LeMay with "well known and irrefutable arguments that demand that all our war plans be based on the use of atomic weapons." He asserted that he was alarmed by the growing trend of the Army, Navy and TAC of adopting plans for HE operations for limited war. He declared that the JCS directive to prepare for non-atomic operations was adopted without any resistance from CINCPAC and that therefore PACAF was required to take drastic action to fight in a manner for which it was not and should not be prepared to fight and had no chance of winning. Kuter expressed his view that to increase conventional capability would be disastrous. The employment of PACAF in extended island bomb warfare would completely deplete its war-making resources in a few days.⁹¹

On November 11 the Taiwan Defense Commander reported to CINCPAC that while recognizing the need to prevent provocative action, he believed that the time had come to permit the Chinese Nationalists to resume patrol of the Taiwan Straits and to permit GRC aerial reconnaissance.⁹²

Eleven days later CINCPAC informed the Chief of Naval Operations that its evaluation of the current situation was that it did not justify continuation of the currently committed U.S. augmented forces and that the Taiwan Defense Commander had concurred in this evaluation. He reported that CINCPACAF wanted a well publicized withdrawal but that he proposed a quiet one.⁹³

On November 27 the JCS advised CINCPAC that it agreed that the situation did not require the continued presence of all the authorized forces. It thus authorized a redeployment of the entire attack CASAF TAC forces at the discretion of CINCPAC. Accepting the advice of CINCPAC and the TDC and rejecting the advice of PACAF, General Kuter, the JCS ordered a low-key withdrawal with no country visits and indicated that the GRC should be informed in advance.⁹⁴

On December 2 CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF of this order and the decision that no announcement of the U.S. phasedown would be made.⁹⁵

TROOP REDUCTION ON QUEMOY

As has been noted, Dulles attached great importance to securing a reduction in the size of the Quemoy garrison as a gesture to indicate U.S. and GRC peaceful intentions. Chiang in his talks with Dulles had agreed that in principle he would not oppose such reduction provided his military officials were convinced that it was militarily sensible to do, but that he would not do it for political reasons.

On November 11 in a letter from Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far East, to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) John N. Irwin, reporting on Dulles' trip to Taiwan, Robertson noted that Dulles had suggested the possibility of reducing the garrison on Taiwan for sound military reasons, and not as a political gesture, but there was no detailed discussion or agreement. Chiang had indicated that he might move in this direction if there were a suspension of hostilities. "In case there was to be a suspension of hostilities of considerable duration, we might [Robertson wrote] wish to develop a program for redeployment of GRC forces involving a much more substantial reduction of such forces on the

Offshore Islands and the provision of further equipment to the GRC forces. I have in mind the kind of program put forward in a meeting between Secretary Dulles and the JCS on October 10. Under present conditions, however, a program of this magnitude does not appear feasible."⁹⁶

On November 13 Chinese Nationalist Chief of Staff Wang and the head of the U. S. Army MAAG on Taiwan, General Dean, reached an oral agreement as follows:

(a) The United States would provide 12 additional 240-mm. howitzers and twelve 150-mm. guns, plus one additional M-24 tank unit for Quemoy.

(b) In return the GRC agreed to reduce its garrison by 15,000 men, including one infantry division.

Following this agreement Chiang summoned a conference of Smoot, Drumwright, and the members of the MAAG unit and asked for more artillery.⁹⁷

On November 14 Drumright reported that Chiang had agreed in principle to the manpower reduction, noting that the Nike battalion was increasing firepower in the area.⁹⁸ While agreeing to a reduction in principle, Chiang urged a greater increase in tank firepower and artillery firepower than had been planned.⁹⁹

On November 17 a formal agreement was signed between General Wang and General Dean which provided for an increase in artillery fire for the Offshore Islands and the withdrawal of not less than 15,000 men. The target date for completion was to be June 30. The text of the formal agreement read as follows:

With respect to military defense of the Offshore Island Complexes of Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu, the undersigned agree as follows:

1. continued improvement of forces;
2. due to unusual conditions of terrain and logistics requirements, units on Offshore Islands shall be modified;
3. existing counter-battery artillery capability be augmented as follows:
 - a. Kinmen (Quemoy) complex -- a minimum of 12 (additional) 240 mm howitzers, and a minimum of 12 (additional) 150 mm guns;
 - b. Matsu complex -- 240 mm howitzers and 4 more when available, 1 battalion of 155 mm guns, when available;
 - c. Further study of need for more;
 - d. Lacrosse missile considered at a later date;
4. armor strength of Kinmen (Quemoy) augmented:
 - a. a minimum of 1 tank battalion;
 - b. a study of tank strength.
5. services and combat support units will not be increased and will be reduced if possible.
6. reduction of forces on Kinmen (Quemoy) will include 1 infantry division and 1 additional division and/or individual so that there shall be a net reduction of not less than 15,000 men with a target date of 30 June 1959 for completion.¹⁰¹

On November 21 in commenting on his agreement, Dean reported that he had been told by Dulles to use the

American 240's as a means of bargaining to obtain GRC agreement to reduce the strength on the Offshore Islands by at least 15,000 men. He reported¹⁰² that he had obtained Chiang's concurrence on the best possible terms.

On November 28 General Peng, Commander in Chief of the Army of the Republic of China, in a conversation with General Taylor, stated that Chiang had agreed to a reduction of forces on Quemoy by 15,000 men, provided it were done gradually and firepower were increased. He listed the needed¹⁰³ firepower increases and urged increased aid.

On December 9, 1958, the formal U.S. - GRC agreement was approved by the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

By the end of December the United States had completed an agreement with the GRC which was to lead to reduction of approximately 15,000 men in the manpower on Quemoy.

DULLES AND THE ROLE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

On November 7 Secretary of State Dulles (accompanied by Herter, Murphy, Robertson, Smith and others from State) was, at his request, briefed by a representative of the JCS

at the Pentagon on the effects of nuclear weapons with particular reference to Taiwan.¹⁰⁴ At the conclusion of the briefing, which lasted less than an hour, Dulles asked whether nuclear weapons could be used to take out the artillery pieces opposite Quemoy without extensive civilian damage both in the Amoy area and on Quemoy and Taiwan. The colonel giving the briefing referred the question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁰⁵

After much discussion of the subject and considerable disagreement both among the Services and between the Services and the Joint Staff, Dulles was informed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 8 that:

the batteries could be rendered ineffective by a combination of destruction or damage to the guns and gun emplacements and by inflicting casualties to the personnel operating these guns. By employing air-burst weapons, this could be accomplished with no significant radioactive fall-out implications in either the Amoy area or on Quemoy/Taiwan. Several types of atomic weapons and delivery systems, capable of achieving the above, are available in the area.¹⁰⁶

WARSAW TALKS

The first meeting of the Sino-American talks after the initial Chinese Communist ceasefire was held on October 10.

ACTIVITY IN WASHINGTON

On October 24 Dulles returned to Washington and briefed his staff and then the President on his talks with Chiang.¹¹⁸

On October 28 the Washington intelligence community produced its final SNIE on the crisis in which it concluded that the Chinese Communists had not initiated the crisis with the firm intention of obtaining the Offshore Islands regardless of U.S.-GRC and world reaction. It

noted that the failure to use the Chinese Communist Air Force for offensive action and less than maximum artillery strength indicated that this was less than a total effort. The SNIE evaluated the motives of the Chinese as follows:

- (a) probe U.S. intentions; (b) drive a wedge in U.S.-GRC relations; (c) discredit U.S. and GRC; (d) remind the world that Communist China was to be reckoned with;
- (e) prevent development of a two-China situation; (f) reduce the morale of the GRC.

It concluded that the Soviets probably did not initiate the action but had encouraged and supported it.¹¹⁹

On the same day, Admiral Post, the Director of the Far East Division in ISA of the Department of Defense, in testimony before an executive session of a House Committee, discussed the problems raised by "intransigence on both Chinese sides." Admiral Post expressed the belief that the Chinese Communists had stopped because their operation had failed. He declared that the United States was in a better position because the GRC was stronger and at the same time had renounced the use of force to return to the mainland.¹²⁰

At a press conference on October 28, Dulles declared that the intermittent shelling had no military purpose.

He asserted that the Chinese Communists had recognized that they could not impose a blockade and were trying to save face. He believed that the Communists would not expand the scope of their operations and that their objective was Taiwan and not the Offshore Islands.¹²¹ On the next day Dulles held his last State Department staff meeting on the crisis.

A legal defense of the U.S. position during the crisis was presented on November 20 by Ely Maurer, Assistant Legal Advisor of the State Department. In the talk Maurer stressed the wide latitude given the President by the Formosa Revolution. He identified "Quemoy" as consisting of the two Tans as well as the two Quemoy.¹²²

A paper presented to the Taiwan Defense Command by the GRC Ministry of National Defense on December 25, 1958, summarized the main deficiencies in the crisis operations as seen by the GRC. The report noted that the Chinese Air Force had not been permitted to bomb airfields occupied by the Communists in late July which threatened the Offshore Islands as well as Taiwan. The failure to bomb the artillery opposite Quemoy enabled the Communists to use their superior firepower to bring the Islands under attack. The crisis, according to the report, demonstrated

the need for augmenting the Chinese Navy and Air Force and increasing both supplies and manpower on the Offshore Islands. The GRC summary warned that enemy air attacks could pose a serious threat to the Islands and stated that this was only the end of round one. It hailed close military cooperation between the United States and the GRC as the major success of the crisis.¹²³

Following the crisis the Joint Chiefs were asked by the National Security Council staff to produce a paper on lessons learned from the Quemoy crisis. The request was transmitted by the Joint Chiefs to the Services as well as to their own staff and to CINCPAC and his subordinate commands. A number of "lessons learned" papers were produced at various levels (and are available) stressing the need for clearer political direction and a decision on whether nuclear weapons would be used. The papers by and large assumed that American policy had been successful because the United States had stood firm. The papers also dealt with a variety of technical subjects including the need for improved communication facilities. On February 9 the Joint Chiefs finally produced a paper on "Lessons Learned from the Lebanon and Quemoy Crises" which stressed

the need for more comprehensive political guidance and more understanding on the part of political leaders of the implications of restrictions put on the use of military force. The paper concluded that artillery bombardment alone, however intense, did not appear sufficient to stop resupply of Quemoy.¹²⁴

On the following day Twining met with Gordon Gray of the National Security Council staff and was informed that there no longer existed a need for a formal JCS paper on lessons learned from the Quemoy crisis and thus the paper was withdrawn.¹²⁵

The crisis in the Taiwan Straits was over. The lessons learned, if any, would be reflected not in a single paper but in many operations of the Government.

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